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ABSTRACT
THE TELEPHONE WAR:
INTERCONNECTION, COMPETITION, AND MONOPOLY
IN THE MAKING OF UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE SERVICE, 1894-1920
MILTON L. MUELLER
DR. CAROLYN MARVIN
The dissertation is a historical and theoretical study
of competition between the Bell and independent telephone
systems between 1894 and 1920. It is concerned with the
historical origins of telephone monopoly in the U.S., and
with the unique dynamics of competition between unconnected
or incompatible communications networks. The study focuses
on the competing networks' refusal to interconnect with each
other, exploring the economic and communicative consequences
of fragmented telephone communications. Two bodies of
theory provided the foundation for the study's method: the
"network externality" literature in Economics and the
probabilistic models of interdependent demand developed by
W. Brian Arthur. The dynamics of network competition are
illustrated by means of an urn model. Unlike previous
efforts, this urn model incorporates the possibility of
nonuniform calling patterns and user duplication.
In order
to display the actual scope of telephone competition and to
evaluate theories about the role of long distance
connections in the competitive struggle, maps of the
telephone access universes of three cities at various points
in time were constructed.
The conclusions of the study conflict with many
standard assumptions about telephone history.
Bell's
refusal to connect with the independents stimulated and
broadened the scope of competition rather than thwarting it.
The concept of "universal service," first formulated at this
time, denoted an end to competitive fragmentation rather
than a telephone in every home. The universality of the
U.S. telephone system had its roots in the competitive era
rather than in subsequent regulatory policies. A telephone
monopoly was created not because it realized supply-side
economies of scale, but to achieve demand-side economies of
scope. The decisive ingredient in Bell's success was not
its ultra-long distance transmission technology but its
ability to offer near-universal connections within a 100
mile region.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction

This is the story of how telephone communications in the

United States went through a remarkable upheaval which
fundamentally changed its character.

Although the events recounted

here began over 90 years ago and reached their denouement in 1921,
the issues that were faced and resolved at that time will seem
strikingly familiar to the inhabitants of the 1980s:
of monopoly

VS.

the questions

competition in telecommunications networks and of

universal service.

The events with which this study is concerned began in 1894,
eighteen years after Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone.
Until then, the telephone business had been under the exclusive
control of the American Bell Telephone Company of Boston, the
corporate predecessor of AT&T. [1] American Bell enjoyed a monopoly
because the courts had construed the inventor Bell's patent rights
so broadly that they had made it illegal for anyone else to
manufacture a telephone.

Once Bell's fundamental patents expired,

however, anyone with capital and a municipal franchise could enter
the business.

After 1894, thousands of new telephone operating

companies sprang into existence.

them as lithe opposition.

II

The Bell organization referred to

To the rest of the country, theY'tvere
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known as

II

the independe:nts."

For the next twenty years, Bell and

the independents waged an intense battle to link America by
telephone.
The independents took root in the small towns and rural areas

neglected by Bell, but soon spread to many of the cities already
served by the Bell Company.

At the peak of its strength, from 1902

to 1907, the independent movement controlled roughly half of the
telephones in the U.S.

Fueled by a populist ideology of localism

and antimonopoly, they developed their own manufacturers, technical
publications and state, regional and national organizations.

In

their attempt to remain competitive with the increasingly

interconnected Bell system, they built long distance lines and
began to consolidate into regional networks spanning hundreds of
miles.

This is not a business history of Bell or the independents,
nor is it a social and political history of how populist localism
and a nationwide corporation came to terms with each other.

It is

a study of how relations of social communication shape our
institutions.

The outcome of the telephone war was one of the

world's biggest and most long-lasting monopolies.

For the 70 years

preceding the AT&T breakup, the telephone company was the largest
private institution in the country, and the telephone industry was

the most thoroughly monopolistic utility.

Why telephone

communication should create such a huge and monopolistic
organization is a question that has occupied the minds of
economists (and antitrust authorities) for many years.

This study

takes a new and, it is hoped, more fruitful approach to the
problem.

Unlike most previous accounts of the competitive era, it
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explores the subject of telephone competition and monopoly from the
standpoint of communications as well as economics.

That is, it

contrasts the ways in which competitive and monopolistic
organization affected the ability of people to communicate with

each other by telephone.
The focal point of the study is interconnection policy and its
economic consequences.

Interconnection is central to the story

because for most of the period, the Bell system and its rivals
refused to connect their networks.

Competition took the form of

two separate telephone systems in the same area vying with each
other for subscribers and for connections to other localities.
"Dual service 11 was the contemporary name for competing,
noninterconnected telephone exchanges in the same community.
Because it diverges so radically from our current experience with a
universally interconnected telephone system, it is hard to

appreciate just how widespread and long-lived the phenomenon was.
Dual service existed in some form for thirty years, from 1894
to 1924.

From 1900 to 1915, at least 40 percent of the telephone

exchanges in U.S.

cities with populations over 5,000 competed with

another exchange in the same location.

During the peak of the

independent movement's strength, between 1902 and 1910, this
percentage remained over 50 percent.

Some of the nation's largest

cities had dual telephone systems for many years:
Minneapolis-St.

Paul, St.

Louis, Los Angeles.

Cleveland,
Telephone

competition of this kind meant that the customers of one exchange

couldn't call the customers of the other.

Anyone who wanted to be

able to call (or be called by) all telephone users had to subscribe
to both systems.

Duplicate subscribers literally had two separate
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telephone instruments, ~el1 and Independent, on their walls.

Even

when there 'was only one exchange in a community, dual service
divided subscribers;

if it was a Bell exchange it could not make

connections with the subscribers of competing independent exchanges
in other cities, and vice-versa.
Louisville, Kentucky"

As of 1914 Bell subscribers in

for example, a dual service city, could call

the nearby towns of Jeffersontown and Taylorsville, but not
Elizabeth or Lanesville, where there were only independent

exchanges.
Data about the nature and extent of dual service has never

before been systematically collected and published.

Its existence

raises a number of intriguing historical questions.

How many and

what type of users took out duplicate subscriptions?

To what

extent did the division of subscribers into two systems correspond
to other social divisions, such as social class or ethnic groups?
How frequently were users unable to reach desired parties due to

competition?

To what extent did the availability of long distance

connections affect the choice of a local subscription?

The study

explores these economic and communicative features of dual service

in detail.

It concludes that in the context of a still-developing

network used by a minority of the population, its advantages
outweighed its drawbacks.

By maintaining separate,

noninterconnected networks, Bell and the Independents were forced
to compete on the basis of the most important determinant of their
product's value:

how many subscribers and locations they reached.

This led to vigorous price competition and relentless efforts to
extend exchanges and toll connections to every community.

The

result was the most rapid and extensive development of telephone
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service in the world.

The problems of a divided network were

overcome by methods such as duplicate subscriptions, the

segregation of subscribers into communities of interest and
relaying messages.
The alternative to dual service was "universal service.

II

At

the time, universal service did not mean a telephone in every home,

but the interconnection of all telephone users in a single system
under centralized management.

The policy was advocated forcefully

by AT&T President Theodore Vail, and of course it eventually
prevailed.

As telephone service penetrated more deeply into

business and social life, the fragmented access structure of dual
telephone systems came to be seen as a nuisance by many
subscribers, especially business users who had to maintain two
subscriptions.

The competitive process also pushed the contestants

themselves away from fragmentation.

Bell relaxed its

interconnection policies in order to gain access to communities

served by Independents, and many Independent exchanges chose to
interconnect with Bell to gain long distance connections to other
cities.

Since a newly-invented institution J the public utility

commission J seemed to provide a way to regulate rates and service

without market competition, the country embraced a policy of
monopoly.
The decisive factor in the move to monopoly was its ability to
interconnect all telephone users.

Considerations of access and

interconnection far outweighed the economic factors normally

invoked to explain monopoly.

The study demonstrates that

supply-side economies of scale were not a decisive factor in the

emergence of monopoly.

The growth of "sunk costs" and shortages of
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capital, while limiting new entry in the later stages of the
battle, were not by themselves sufficient to explain the outcome.

Ultimately, telephone monopoly must be interpreted primarily as a
communications phenomenon, i.e.

as a structure that gave all

telephone users access to each other.

In the course of advancing this historical interpretation, the
dissertation argues for a new approach to the understanding of

competition and monopoly in communications systems.

Until very

recently, economists confined their search for the cause of

monopoly to the production costs of the firm.

According to this

viewpoint, telephone service is no different from any other
product.

The industry's organization is a function of how firms'

costs respond to changes in the scale of production or to the

number of other firms participating in the market.

If it is

possible for mUltiple firms to produce for the market with no loss
of efficiency, the industry is considered to be competitive;

if

economies of scale, cost subadditivity or other factors dictate

that a single firm can supply the whole market at the lowest cost,
the industry is said to be a natural monopoly.

Most contemporary

attempts to explain the presence of monopoly or competition in

telephone service follow these lines.

Indeed, the literature often

forces the issue into this mold despite a rather embarrassing lack
of supporting empirical evidence and some disturbing theoretical

anomalies. [2]
A new and growing body of theory, however, suggests that other
factors can control industrial organization.

This literature is

concerned with the demand interdependence of communications and

standards.

Interdependent demand means that the value of a product
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to one person depends upon how many other people (or which other
people) also choose to use it.

The choice of one telephone system

over another, or competence in one language rather than another,
for example, will limit one's range of communication to those using

the same network or language.

If everyone adopts the same network

or language the result will be universal, reciprocal communications

access.

In this framework, monopoly is approached not as a product

of supply-side cost efficiencies but as a coordination process
which allows users to achieve demand-side economies of scope.
In markets with interdependent demand, competition has
peculiar characteristics.

For a variety of reasons, competition

between coordinative standards or networks tends to be transitory.
Once a decisive competitive advantage is attained by one of the
networks it can become self-reinforcing, because more and more of
the people one wants to communicate with come to be found on the
dominant network.

Also, because of the interdependence of demand,

the control of communications access to one individual, group or

location will affect the choices made by people in other groups or
locations.

Thus, competition is not just a matter of cutting costs

and improving service;

access.

it also involves the strategic use of

The tendency is to compete for control of all of the

market rather than for a profitable share of the market as in
normal economic competition.
This kind of "monopoly" and Ucompetitionll can characterize
communications systems whether or not they are commercial products.

Human speech is a readily apparent example.

A single language

usually prevails in a given territory because speakers must employ
a common grammar and vocabulary to be able to understand each
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other.

The presence of two languages in the same community follows

much the same pattern as did dual service in telephone
communications.

Dual service made heavy users subscribe to both

systems and prevented nonduplicating subscribers from calling each

other.

Similarly, in the public areas of bilingual countries,

signs must be in both languages and many speakers must be

bilingual.

For unilingual people, day-to-day activity tends to

flow within the barriers to communication created by the separate

language groups.

For this reason most languages, like most

telephone systems, have evolved into territorial monopolies.
Still, in many parts of the world two or more languages overlap and
11

compete II for status as the dominant communications mediurn.[3]
The next two chapters define the theoretical constructs used

in the study.

Chapter 2, a literature review, traces the evolution

of economic and historical thinking about telephone competition and
monopoly.

Chapter 3 defines the theoretical concepts on which the

study rests.

It shows how demand interdependence gives special

characteristics to competition between incompatible or

noninterconnected networks.

It observes that interdependent demand

can be modelled using probabilistic methods, and explores some of

the implications these methods have for analyzing network
competition.

The Chapter also advances the idea that each link in

a communications network is a separate product.

This view solves

many of the theoretical problems encountered by economists who have
grappled with issues of interconnection, competition and monopoly

in the telephone industry.

It highlights economies of scope rather

than scale as the critical factor giving the telephone industry its
unique organization.

Economies of scope are defined as the ability
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to achieve efficiencies by combining multiple outputs in a single
product.

The analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the source of

these scope economies is the user rather than the producer.

Chapters 4 through 10 constitute the historical narrative.
The narrative focuses on the following four empirical issues:

1) It attempts to map the changes in telephone access for
selected Bell and independent exchanges during the period.

That

is, it attempts to show how many subscribers and locations could

actually be telephoned from the Bell and independent exchange in a
given city.

This information is important because the relative

scope of Bell and independent access was one of the most important
factors affecting their competitiveness.

2) The study quantifies the rise and decline of dual service
between 1894 and 1921.

It attempts to show how many cities had two

competing exchanges, as well as the total population affected.
Complete information is only available for cities over 5,000 in
population.
3) The third empirical goal of the dissertation is to

accumulate data on the---unique dynamics of competition between
noninterconnected networks.

The narrative explores how

noninterconnection affected users, rates, and development, and
examines the use of both connection and the refusal to connect as a
competitive tactic.

4) The fourth goal is to accurately trace the evolution of
law, public policy and business policies regarding the
interconnection of separate telephone systems.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
[1] Between 1878 and 1880
with a telephone enterprise of
competitive phase was ended by
telephone business to Bell and
Union.

the Bell Telephone Company competed
Western Union, but this brief
a settlement that ceded the
the telegraph business to Western

[2] See Chapter 2.
[3] Ronald Wardhaugh. Languages in Competition: Dominance,
Diversity and Decline (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 1987.
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Chapter 2
The Riddle of Monopoly:

-

Economic and Historical Approaches to the Telephone.

Judging from the literature on the subject, telephone monopoly
is an insoluble riddle.

There are those who insist that monopoly

is natural and benign, others who condemn it as an illegitimate

product of business predation.
positions at once.

Some writers appear to take both

The tendency of public authorities or economic

theorists to line up on opposite sides of this question can have

bizarre consequences.

Between 1913 and 1921 the u.S.

tried to

prohibit and promote telephone monopoly at the same time.

State

public utility commissions went about encouraging the consolidation
of competing companies and actively suppressing new competition,

while the federal government's trustbusters were prohibiting
further consolidations and attempting to preserve competition. [lJ A
1921 law exempting telephone companies from the antitrust statutes
put an end to this policy standoff for the time being.

But the

resolution was more apparent than real, for over the next six

decades the officially sanctioned Bell monopoly was twice the
target of antitrust actions.[2J One hundred and twelve years after
the invention of the telephone, the status of monopoly is still
controversial.
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The following chapter reviews the literature that attempts to
explain and interpret telephone competition and monopoly.

Its

exposition follows the actual evolution of thinking on the subject.
For most of the sixty five-year span covered by this review, there

has been a sharp split between explanations of monopoly derived
from history and those based on economic theory.

The two lines of

analysis share a common origin, however, in the utility politics of
the Progressive era.

Thus, the review begins with J.

Stehman's history of AT&T, written in the early 1920s.

Warren

Since then,

natural monopoly theory and historical investigations of the
telephone monopoly followed separate paths.

For the sake of

continuity, a review of the historical literature is held off until
the second section and the narrative follows the evolution of
natural monopoly theory and its application to the telephone
industry.

The next section surveys the historical studies of the

competitive era and their interpretations of the rise of the AT&T
monopoly.

Section 3 looks at body of economic theory that

developed independently of the natural monopoly tradition and
brought new insights to the monopoly-competition question.

This

new theory analyzes the unique demand characteristics of networks

and compatibility standards.

The chapter concludes with a critical

overview that also serves as an introduction to the method and
rationale of this study.

I

The Natural Monopoly Tradition

J.

Warren Stehman's Financial History of AT&T (1925) is the

first comprehensive, scholarly history of the American telephone
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industry. [3J Though published as a book in 1925, it was actually
written in the years 1920-22, just as the developmental stage of
the industry was drawing to a close.

Stehman's book could just as

well be treated as part of the final chapter of the narrative
rather than as a part of the literature about it.

The book

thoroughly embodies the attitudes and theories underlying the
transformation of the telephone business from a competitive

enterprise to a regulated monopoly, and illustrates the new role of
academically trained experts in rationalizing governmental control

of industry.

It is noteworthy, then, that in this work there is

little ambiguity about the origins and purpose of telephone
monopoly.
As a permanent proposition, Stehman believed that lithe ideal
condition for telephone service is that of complete monopoly,

II

The

justification for monopoly in the telephone industry was recognized
to be different from that of other public utilities, however:

.. the telephone industry is, perhaps to a greater degree
than any other public utility, essentially monopolistic in
character. In the telephone industry competition involves
an added expense, through the duplication of certain parts
of the plant, just as it does with gas, electric and other
public-utility companies. But there is an additional and
more important peculiarity of the telephone industry: that
is, that the efficiency and value of the service depend
upon the number of persons with whom the subscriber can
communicate.
Two telephone systems in a community are a
source of great inconvenience and usually of expense to the

subscribers. An individual who desires to talk to people
on each of the two systems is compelled either to install
telephones of both companies or to go, from time to time,
to some other place than his residence or place of business

to use the telephones of the system to which he is not a
subscriber. [4 J

The argument against "wasteful" duplication of facilities was being
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applied to the utility infrastructure with few exceptions during
the Progressive era.

The need for universal interconnection,

however, was recognized as a separate and even stronger reason for

preventing competition.

Competing companies could be required to

interconnect and exchange traffic, Stehman knew, but this was

rejected as an adequate solution to the problem.

While it

eliminated the barriers to communication created by competition,
interconnection required the competing companies to make joint

financial arrangements and to work so closely together that the
result was tantamount to monopoly anyway. [5]
The Progressive era was thus quite clear about the reasons for

telephone monopoly:

it was required to bring about universal

interconnection, or what at the time was called "universal
service."

If rates and service could not be controlled by means of

competition, they would have to be set by regulation.

The

telephone was classed with a growing number of urban

infrastructures (natural and artificial gas, street railways,
electric power, waterworks) as a public service corporation subject
to regulation by commission.

By classing the telephone system with other utility
monopolies, Stehman took a stand with a growing number of academic
political economists who believed that regulation rather than
socialism or laissez-faire was the best response to the new

problems posed by large-scale, modern industry.

Since the 1880s,

business regulation had gained acceptance by virtually all of the
states.

The thinking behind it was the product of a new school of

political economy, born in the populist turmoil of the 1880s, which
held that in certain industries competition was destructive and
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inefficient and ought to be superseded by government regulation.
In their attempt to come up with a scientific definition of which
industries should be regulated, they developed the concept of
natural monopoly.
One of the simplest and most straightforward theories was
articulated by Henry Garter Adams, an influential professor who was
also the recipient of the first doctorate in Economics awarded by
Johns Hopkins University.

classes:

Adams divided industries into three

those with constant returns to scale, those with

diminishing returns to scale, and those with increasing returns to

scale.

Businesses in the first two categories, he believed, could

be left to the regulatory pressures of competition.

In industries

characterized by economies of scale. however, competition was
disruptive, inefficient, and temporary.

A firm became more

efficient as it controlled more of the market.

"The control of the

state over industries should be coextensive with the application of

the law of increasing returns in industries,lI Adams wrote. [6]

Other theorists concluded that there was no single
characteristic defining natural monopoly, though scale economy was
always an important factor.

Thomas Henry Farrer, the Secretary of

the British Board of Trade, listed five separate factors defining
inherent monopolies, four of them pertaining to the peculiar fixity

of utility infrastructures. [7] The "natural monopoly" label was
coined by Richard T.

Ely, a contemporary of Adams·s.

Ely was a

professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University and the
founder of the American Economic Association.

Like Farrer, he saw

monopoly as the product of a conjunction of factors, including
scale economies, a high proportion of fixed to variable costs, and
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physical obstacles to the multiplication of competing facilities.
Ely's articles and books "disseminated and popularized the notion
of natural monopoly" from the late 1880s on. [8] His textbook of
1937, Outlines of Economics, became a standard reference in the

field. [9]
In the natural monopoly tradition, the explanation for utility
monopolies was to be found in supply-side phenomena.

It

concentrates on the production costs of the firm, and asserted that

scale economies were decisive.

Even at this early date, the seeds

of the split between historical and economic treatments of

telephone monopoly had been sown.

The new political economy had

developed primarily from observations of the railroad and gas
industries in the 1880s.

The telephone was like these industries

in that monopoly, once controlled, was thought to possess certain

benefits.

But the source of monopoly clearly did not conform to

the rationales of the academic economists.
paradigmatic case of scale economies:

Electric power was a

the larger generating plants

became, the lower their average costs dropped.

Universal

interconnection, on the other hand, was not a case of increasing
returns to scale.

Even Stehman, steeped as he was in the new

doctrine, recognized it as a separate and distinct justification

for monopoly.

Aside from that, everyone familiar with the

telephone industry at that time thought that it did not possess
decreasing costs.

On the contrary, it was generally believed that

the average cost of providing local exchange service increased with

the number of subscribers. [10] Despite these disparities, the
telephone system was incorporated into an institutional and

theoretical bundle that included gas, electric power, railroads and
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streetcars.

In doing this, the Progressive era created conditions

which effectively smothered theoretical recognition of the
interconnection issue, and instead subsumed the telephone
industry's peculiar problems under the general rubric of "economies

of scale.

II

This did not happen instantly.

The earliest books about

public utility regulation, textbooks for commissioners and students
of the regulated industries, contained detailed and specific
discussions of the peculiarities of the telephone system.

Jones

and Bigham's Principles of Public Utilities, published in 1931,
recognized that subscriber growth produced diseconomies rather than
economies, and made the important (and still neglected) observation
that our inability to define the unit by which increasing scale is
measured makes it tricky if not impossible to determine whether
scale economies exist in telephone exchange service.

The ultimate

justification for monopoly, they maintained, was not scale

economies but "the necessity of a unified service."

The authors go

on to draw an important qualitative distinction between telephone
service and other utilities:

To one who uses electricity, gas, water and street railways
it matters not whether he be served by the same company as

his friends, but to the user of the telephone it is highly
important that he be on the same system with them and with
all those with whom he might wish to get in touch. [11]

Similar arguments were made in other utility manuals published
before 1940. [12]
In the utility textbooks published after 1940, however, a
subtle but important change took place.

Gradually and
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unconsciously, the basis of telephone monopoly in universal
interconnection was forgotten.

Natural monopoly acquired a purely

economic construction:

it meant industries with economies of scale

over the whole market.

The telephone was no longer treated as in

any way exceptional to this principle.

The concept of natural

monopoly was given formal definition as a downward sloping average

cost curve.

The bulk of the books were consumed with the task of

using economic theory to establish efficient rates in the absence
of market competition.

With one or two exceptions, historical

background disappeared altogether.

One indication of the change

was expressed in the way the books were labelled.

Prior to 1940,

this genre of work referred to its subject as utility industries or
utility regulation.

From then on, the subject was utility

economics.

It would be presumptuous to imply that post-1940 regulatory
economists were unaware of the issue of interconnection.

What

occurred, rather, was a general acceptance of economic theory as

the most valid, scientific method of analyzing and explaining
industrial organization.

Economic theory is concerned with demand,

costs, prices and the quantity of supply.

Those are the tools of

its trade, the fundamental categories with which it confronts the
social world.

Since interconnection did not fit comfortably into

this framework, it was usually ignored in discussions of industrial

organization (though not in treatments of telephone history).

The

economics of the telephone system were lumped together

indiscriminately with other utilities.

A 1941 book states

forthrightly that the telephone is subject to decreasing cost; [13]
another, published in 1947, includes it with gas, electricity and
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water in a laundry list.of industries in which "duplication is not

economical [because] the amount of fixed capital is so greatly
increased that the only possible outcome is higher prices or poorer

service."[14]
By 1960, the issue of monopoly organization had been fully
absorbed by the economic paradigm.

become more sophisticated about it.

Economists had, it is true,

They no longer equated natural

monopoly with economies of scale, but recognized that a single firm
could be the most efficient supplier even when the expansion of

output resulted in increases in average cost. [15] The accepted
definition of natural monopoly was that it exists

II

when one firm

can supply the entire market at less cost than two or more
firms."[16]
The emergence of the "contestable rnarkets ll school of

industrial organization after 1978 refined and elaborated this
observation. [17] In the new theory, "cost subadditivity" replaced
scale economies as the recipe for natural monopoly.

This

formulation vindicated Bonbright's observation that a monopoly
could be the most efficient supplier in the absence of decreasing
costs.

At a given output, scale economies are sufficient to make

cost functions subadditive, but cost functions can still be
subadditive when average costs are increasing. [18] Although more
precise than before, the basic conception of natural monopoly

remained unchanged.
side.

The theory still concentrated on the supply

It examined the average costs of a firm to see how they are

affected by the number of other firms supplying a market.
Sharkey's verbal definition is almost identical to that employed
before the new theory was developed. [19] The revamped industrial
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organization theory simply formalized and mathematicized the
definition of natural monopoly.

Gone are the clumsy, descriptive

lists of special features set out in the works of Ely and Farrer
and the early utility textbooks.

Gone, too,

is any reference to

"unifying the service" or interconnecting subscribers.
In those rare cases where the interconnection issue was

recognized, economists went to great lengths to bend, hammer and
twist the phenomenon into the familiar shape of a decreasing cost

curve.

The most notable example is provided by Alfred Kahn's

classic two volume treatise, The Economics of Regulation. [20J In
the course of arguing for a definition of natural monopoly as a

product of long-run decreasing average costs, Kahn was forced to
recognize the peculiarities of the telephone system:

There are cases of natural monopoly that would seem at

first blush not explicable in terms of long-run decreasing
costs. We have already observed, for example, that as the
number of telephone subscribers goes up, the number of
possible connections among them grow more rapidly:

local

exchange service is therefore believed to be subject to
increasing, not decreasing unit costs, when the output is

the number of subscribers.

And yet, it seems clear that

this service is a natural monopoly:
if there were two
telephone systems serving a community, each subscriber
would have to have two instruments, two lines into his

home, two bills if he wanted to be able to call everyone
else.
Despite this apparent presence of increasing costs,
in short, monopoly is still natural because one company can

serve any number of subscribers (for example, all in a
community) at lower cost than two. [21J

This passage bears close analysis.

Kahn recognized that the

requirements of connecting telephone users forces a competi"tive

system to completely duplicate the network of its rival, and that
subscribers in such a competitive market would be forced to pay
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twice for essentially the same service.

But for him, the simple

observation that one company can interconnect lIany number of
subscribers ... at lower cost than two" is sufficient for it to

qualify as a traditional natural monopoly.

The argument appears to

be persuasive, and in fact it is often cited by others.

Actually,

it is closer to being an open confession that natural monopoly
theory is an inappropriate and even misleading tool with which to
approach the roots of telephone monopoly.
Several anomalies in Kahn's passage jump out at the reader

immediately.

The first is that the rationale for monopoly he

advances is entirely independent of the level of output.

The

elimination of the need for duplicate subscriptions occurs whether

we are talking about a telephone system of 100 subscribers or 100
million subscribers.

Another quirk is the subtle way the argument

relies on demand-side rather than supply-side efficiencies.

In

natural monopoly theory, a telephone monopoly is supposed to be
able to charge less because its average costs are lower than they

would be if it divided the market with a competitor.

In Kahn's

argument, however, monopoly is more efficient not because it makes
telephone service cheaper to produce, but because it makes

telephone service cheaper to consume by eliminating the need for
duplicate subscriptions.

Indeed, Kahn even admits that the unit

costs of the monopoly producer may increase.

Kahn's passage makes a case for an entirely different kind of
monopoly than that with which the theory of natural monopoly is
concerned.

Economic theory attempts to explain why all of the

production for a market comes to be concentrated in a single firm,

a single company.

Yet the rationale for telephone monopoly
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advanced here does not require putting all telephone service into

the hands of one company;

the costs of duplicate subscriptions

could also be avoided by dividing the market among many
interconnected companies, assigning each one an exclusive

territory.

The same end could also be accomplished by

interconnecting networks which overlapped and even competed with
each other.
A more important argument is that the basic categories of

natural monopoly theory--and particularly the notion of the scale
of output--are simply inapplicable to networks.

In essence,

natural monopoly theory compares the average costs of one firm
supplying all the output demanded by society to the costs incurred
by many firms who together supply the same quantity of output.
This type of economic analysis can only be applied to commodities
that are homogeneous and fungible, like wheat, chairs or electric

power.

Economists say that these commodities are "homogenous 11

because any unit is a substitute for any other unit.

To increase

the supply of these goods simply adds identical units to the
output.

To introduce competition divides this homogenous output

among several different firms.
Communications networks lack this homogeneity.

The most

important output dimension of a telephone network is the people or
locations it connects, and no two locations or subscribers are
identical.

A group of subscribers in Chicago is not a substitute

for, or in any way comparable to, a group of subscribers in Los

Angeles or Atlanta.

A telephone network that adds new subscribers,

or extends its network to new locations, is not producing more
"unitsl! of the same service, it is supplying a different service.

to.
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By the same token, introducing competition into the market for
telephone access does not apportion different shares of a

homogenous output to separate firms, but fundamentally changes the
character of the service by dividing network users into two or more

inaccessible groups.

As Jones and Bigham had recognized back in

1931, if half of a city's population buys electric power service
from one company and the other half buys it from a competitor, the
product consumed by the customers of either system is the same.
But if part of the population subscribes to one network and another
part subscribes to a separate one, and the two are not

interconnected, the competing networks are completely different
economic goods.

This inherent lack of homogeneity in networks

defeats any attempt to explain the organization of the telephone
industry solely in terms of natural monopoly theory.

The whole

conceptual framework developed to analyze the response of average
costs to the quantity of output in other industries is simply
inapplicable.
As if to confirm the essential irrelevance of natural monopoly

theory to the issue of telephone monopoly, the AT&T divestiture
debate of the late 1970s and early 'SOs led to several empirical,
econometric studies of cost functions and scale economies in the

Bell system.

The results were remarkably inconclusive.

Some of

the most comprehensive studies rejected the hypothesis that there
were economies of scale and scope across all telecommunications

services.[22] Other studies, using different statistical techniques
and different measures of output, concluded that there were
significant economies of scale and scope. [23] In his review of
empirical studies of returns to scale in telecommunications,
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Littlechild (1979) observed that the only obvious scale economies

are in long distance tranmission, which is, ironically, where new
competition has taken root, whereas the least clear pattern of

scale economies is in the local exchange, which largely remains a
monopoly. [24J The inability of sustained, rigorous economic
analysis to resolve the question should give us pause, because the

telephone industry was the most clear-cut case of monopoly in the
U.S.

It becomes less strange when one realizes that monopolistic

organization never was a product of cost functions to begin with,
but was a historical consequence of the need to interconnect

subscribers.

II

Competition and Monopoly in the Historical Literature.
The historical literature, of course, approaches the phenomena
of competition and monopoly from an entirely different angle.

"Average costs," and IIsubadditivityll do not appear as dramatis
personae.

Each historical interpretation, however, does contain

implicit or explicit theories of how and why monopoly was achieved.
The following survey focuses on each work's approach to the central
questions with which this study is concerned:

or cause of monopoly?

What was the source

Was competition or monopoly more desireable?

Why did the independents fail?

How is AT&T's achievement of

preeminence characterized and evaluated?

What role did

interconnection play in both the competitive and monopoly phases?

To begin at the beginning, let us return for a moment to
Stehman's history, written in the early 1920s, in order to set out
his attitude toward the independents and the causes of AT&T's
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success.

historian.

Stehman's approach was that of the progressive economic

He chronicles how the methods of proyiding efficient

telephone service at reasonable rates and of raising the huge

amounts of capital needed to finance the growth of the system were
improved by trial and error until, by 1920 or so, the system took
its "final" and (he implies) most rational form:

that of the

privately owned utility monopoly whose rates, service and finances

are regulated by public service commissions.

Independent

competition was considered to be one of the errors along the way.

It may have improved service and increased the use of the telephone
in those areas where Bell service was poor and its management
discourteous.

In communities with good service and reasonable

rates, however, the presence of dual telephone systems was a net
loss for all concerned.

In general, competition resulted in

overcapitalization, "ruinously low rates," inadequate maintenance
of telephone plant, and a lack of universal communication between

subscribers. [25]
In contrast to the FCC Investigation only 15 years later,
Stehman tends to be pro-Bell, stressing the conservatism and
rationality of its financial practices and the public-spiritedness

of its management during the Vail years.

Its independent

competitors, on the other hand, are mostly cast as financial

manipulators who entered the business to make quick profits without
adequate knowledge of what was required to provide good service
over the long term.

Like many modern writers, Stehman's Financial

History gives long distance interconnection a crucial role in

determining the outcome of the competition.

The independents

failed to win the struggle, according to Stehman, because the Bell
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System's long distance lines constituted !Ian almost insurmountable

obstacle to competition."[26J
Since the Progressive era, there have been two distinct waves
of historical interest in the phenomenon of telephone competition.

The first occurred in the 1930s, when the New Dealers in federal
regulatory agencies were attempting to come to grips with the
dominance of monopolies and large corporate enterprises in the

national economy.

concern:

Three separate publications emerged out of this

the FCC Report (1939) summarizing its five-year

investigation of AT&T, and books by Coon (1939) and Danielian
(1939) popularizing aspects of the FCC's investigation. [27J An
insider's history of the independent telephone movement by MacMeal
(1934) also was published during this period. [28J The extensive
documentary and statistical data compiled by the FCC Investigation
are still highly informative, and until the opening of the AT&T
archives in the 1980s all of the historical studies which followed
relied heavily on them.
The FCC investigation had its origins in a growing sense that
the AT&T monopoly operated free of effective federal regulation.
The reports and data that came out of it must be understood as a

determined effort on the part of the Commissioners, and
particularly Paul Walker, the FCC Telephone Division Chief, to
justify and expand its powers to regulate the telephone giant.

The

attitude toward telephone monopoly taken by the Commission
investigation is highly critical, but also fundamentally ambiguous.
The entire thrust of the report was to document the attempt of the
Bell system to "gain control over the larger part of telephone
communications in the U. S.

II

The clear .implication was that AT&T's
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dominance was accornplis~ed through ruthless business tactics and

was vaguely threatening to public welfare.

AT&T's efforts to

thwart independent competition were described in a reproving tone.
Danielian's book characterizes the rise of AT&T as lIindustrial
conquest," and expresses a powerful sense of alarm at the
implications of the emergence of the large-scale business
corporation and the phenomenon of "management control."

And yet the force of these objections was dissipated by the
authors' willing acceptance of the idea that telephone service
should be a monopoly.

The report wrote off dual service as

"wasteful from the viewpoint of investment and [a] burden on both
the telephone operating companies and the rate payer."[29] A book
published by men affiliated with the FCC makes it clear that they
thought long distance service, too, was best provided by a single
company.[30] Despite their solicitude for the embattled
independents, in other words, they were no more interested in

preserving competition than Theodore Vail himself.
In this manner the FCC inaugurated what was to become a
longstanding tradition in America:

a policy of official

schizophrenia toward telecommunications monopoly.

The

rationalizing progressives of the 1920s had embraced monopoly
unambiguously.

To the New Dealers, monopoly was something to be

both feared and desired, both prosecuted and encouraged.

Had the

FCC investigators been defenders of competition, fragmentation,

localism, autonomy and variety in telephone communications their

hostility toward AT&T would be understandable.

But they were not.

They supported universal service, exchange monopoly, nationwide
long distance interconnection, and

larg~,

well-financed research
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and development efforts.

That is, the Commission wholeheartedly

embraced all the things that logically pointed in the direction of
a vertically integrated telephone monopoly, yet seemed
extraordinarily uncomfortable with the size and power of the
resulting institution.

This two-sided attitude toward telephone

monopoly persisted through fifty years and two antitrust cases.
The Investigation report places most of the responsibility for
the independents' failure on their inability to raise enough
capital to expand. [31] It adduces some disturbing evidence that the
Bell system helped bring about this "financial strangulation"
through its ties to influential New York capitalists, particularly
the Baker-Morgan interests.

The assumption of control over AT&T by

the Morgan interests in 1907 is recognized as an important turning

point in the system's development.

Aside from marking the ebbing

of the independent tide, the advent of "banking control" led to
sweeping changes in AT&T's competitive policy, management and

organization.

As a historical account of the Bell-independent battle, the
FCC report correctly delineated the broad outlines of the story.
There are, however, some holes and inconsistencies in its

treatment, particularly regarding interconnection.

The report

states that the Bell system sought to stop competition by refusing
to interconnect with the independents, and that this policy did not
change until 1907, with the advent of banking control.

This

refusal to connect, the report implies, was an effective means of

"curbing the independerit movement.

II

It also asserts, in direct

contradiction with another statement in the report, that Bell's
refusal continued until action by State legislatures and federal
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antitrust authorities forced it to connect with noncompeting

independents.

These assertions about the competitive role of

interconnection are still widely accepted, and were passed down

essentially unaltered until the early 1980s.
In fact, Bell began to interconnect with noncompeting

independents in 1900.

By then, refusal to interconnect had proven

to be a completely ineffective way to contain independent growth;
the policy actually hurt Bell and stimulated independent long
distance development.

Bell's liberalized (but still selective)

interconnection policy, on the other hand, brought many

independently-owned exchanges into the Bell system and thus helped
to preempt local and long distance competition.

The implicit

theory of the relation between interconnection and competition

handed down by the FCC almost inverted the truth.
The FCC report also devoted a lot of attention to the failure
of the Telephone, Telegraph and Cable Company to develop a
nationwide long distance alternative to the Bell system from 1898
to 1902.

By placing great emphasis on this isolated event, the

report left many readers with the impression that the independents
never developed their own long distance networks. [32] Bell's long
distance facilities, the report states, were its "principal

advantage II over its competitors, and its refusal to interconnect
"confined [the independents] within the limit of the particular
territory served.

IT

This aspect of the report understated the

amount of independent toll line development, and overstated the
importance of making telephone connections to locations over 100
miles away at a time when American society was far more localized

than it is today.
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The FCC investigat~on remained the principal economic history

of the American telephone industry for the next forty years.
Researchers began to take a second look at the Bell - independent
rivalry after 1969, concurrent with the revival of telephone
competition.

The outstanding contributions from this era are

Richard Gabel (1969), Langdale (1978), Bornholtz and Evans (1983)
and David Gabel (1986).

There are also a growing number of social,

technological and business histories pertaining to the telephone
which, while not directly concerned with the issue of competition

and monopoly, provide useful supplementary insights and data. [33]
Richard Gabel was the first since the 1930s to reassess the
value and feasibility of telephone competition. [34] The Federal
Communications Commission was embarking on a series of policy
debates over the value of new entry in telecommunications markets.

Gabel weighed in with an influential reminder that competition had
existed before, and emphasized its benefits:

lowered rates,

extended and improved service, and upgraded technology.

His

analysis of Bell's competitive strategy and his account of the
failure of the independents to achieve long distance
interconnection relied heavily on the FCC investigation.

In some

cases, the piece reproduces verbatim entire sentences from the

investigation text.

Gabel added, however, a new and fateful twist to the
interpretation of interconnection issues.

In his view, competition

could have been preserved indefinitely had Bell and the
independents been required to interconnect sooner:

had there been full interconnection during the early years
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of competitive rivalry, it may be hazarded that the

structure of the telephone industry would have been more
equally balanced. There is little question but that
interconnection would have relieved subscribers of the
burden of dual instruments and separate directories and

lessened the public demand for forced consolidations.

The

Bell System watchword uUniversal Service ll could have been

achieved without "One System, One Policy."[35J

Gabel's comment contained the germ of a new theory of regulation.
Both Stehman and the FCC before him had recognized that the value
of a telephone network increased with the number of people it
linked, and therefore that an established network reaped a certain
advantage by refusing to interconnect with a smaller competitor.
But prior to this interconnection was viewed as a way to eliminate

one of competition's undesireable consequences (fragmentation of
subscribers), not as a way to promote competition.

More often, it

was treated as inimical to competition.

Gabel's analysis was based on the interpretation of
interconnection issues contained in the FCC report, which as we

have seen was flawed and incomplete.

Nevertheless, the philosophy

toward interconnection and competition expressed in his short

article became the basis of the procompetitive telecommunications
policy that culminated in the divestiture of AT&T. [36J The new
policy appeared to offer regulators a way to capture the benefits
of competition without the problems of fragmentation.
As a piece of scholarship, John V.

Langdale's "The growth of

long-distance telephony in the Bell System:

l875-1907"[37J

represents an advance in telephone historiography.

Langdale's

research was the first to move beyond the FCC investigation data
into the primary sources.

It also marked the beginning of a shift
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in emphasis in the

inte~pretation

of the causes of telephone

monopoly, a change based on parallel developments in economic
theory. [38]
One of Langdale's purposes was to examine lithe use of long

distance telephony by the Bell System as a competitive strategy."
He concluded that Bell's dominance resulted in part from the
II

sys tem wide interconnections which the Bell System provided

through its long distance network."[39] Langdale thus initiated a
new tendency to emphasize long distance interconnection as the

s-ouree of Bell's success, as against the earlier tendency to give
primacy to financial issues.

Langdale asserted that the

independent network "was fragmented by the Bell System's policy of
taking over strategically located companies whose removal

disconnected important parts of the independent network," and that
a growing number of independents chose to connect with Bell.

In

the context of the late 1970s, his analysis tended to support the
view of interconnection advanced by Gabel.

If the exploitation of

system advantages was the source of Bell's monopoly power, then

requiring interconnection with competing companies could open the
door to smaller competitors.

In making this argument, however, Langdale was the first to
call attention to the Bell policy of "sublicensing" (i.e.
interconnecting with) noncompeting independent exchanges, and to
give some indication of its deleterious effects on independent

attempts to construct a competing system.

The large number of

independent exchanges that chose to connect with Bell after 1907
was a major factor in the decline of competition.

Langdale

hypothesized that the growth of connecting independents was
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produced by the superiority of Bell's long distance facilities.
Like Stehman and the FCC before him, Langdale placed a heavy
explanatory load on long distance interconnection.

A chapter on "The early history of telephone competition" by
Bornholtz and Evans (1983) was published in the aftermath of the
AT&T divestiture agreement. [40] Its treament of the subject was
shaped by the post-divestiture debate over extending competition to
the local exchange.

Bornholtz and Evans's treatment of

interconnection issues was the one of the most interesting and
hIstorically accurate up to that time.

The authors were critics of

the AT&T monopoly, but unlike the FCC investigators based their
attack on a consistently pro-competition position.

Consequently,

they did not dismiss dual service as irrational, but made use of
primary sources to examine its characteristics at both the local

and long distance levels.

They were also the first to accurately

characterize Bell and independent motives for opposing or

supporting interconnection in various situations.

What their account lacked was an appreciation of the special
economic features of networks.

Their stated aim was to prove that

there is nothing inherently monopolistic about telephone service.
This argument was based on a sophisticated, but false, attempt to
deny that interconnection adds a unique dimension to the industrial
organization of communications networks.

This failing undermined

the validity of both their historical explanation of telephone
monopoly and the policy prescriptions they derived from it.
The authors argued that there is no fundamental economic
difference between competing telephone systems and competing
department stores:
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Macy's, Bloomingdale's and Brooks Brothers could economize

on duplicate facilities by merging. You might even be able
to purchase your Brooks Brothers suit for less after the
merger.
But other consumers may have to pay more for their
polyester leisure suits, video games, and fine china.

Merger may thereby raise the aggregate cost of supplying
the services offered by these stores. Two telephone
systems could possibly economize on duplicate wires and

duplicate telephones for subscribers who desire to reach
subscribers on both systems. Duplicate subscribers gain
from this merger. Nonduplicate subscribers who have little
demand for reaching subscribers on the other system lose

from this merger. In both cases one would expect the
competitive process to reveal the socially desireable
configuration of businesses. [4l]

This is an effective answer to a rationale for telephone monopoly
based solely on uneconomical duplication of facilities.

There may

be no difference between telephone service and any other economic
good in this respect.

The argument does, however, overlook

important differences between communications networks and polyester

leisure suits (or any other homogenous commodity).

The nature of a

polyester leisure suit is not affected by where other people
consume it, or even whether other people consume it.

A

communications network, in contrast, is defined by who or what it

connects.

Two people can go to different stores and get the same

suit, but if they subscribe to different networks they will not get
the same kind of communications access that they will get if they
both subscribe to the same network.
Bornholtz and Evans' attempt to normalize network competition
did strange things to their treatment of interconnection issues.

They wanted to argue that a competitive market will provide
whatever level of interconnection the public desires.

At the same

time, they correctly observed that the actual competition took the
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form of rivalrous system-building, and that both the Bell System
and the independent movement used their control of the subscribers
on their system as "bargaining chips in obtaining franchises and in

enticing subscribers onto their systems."[42J The contestants'
refusal to interconnect was a logical extension of this policy;

each of them hoped to win the competitive battle and emerge as the
dominant system to the exclusion of the other.

The authors are

thus forced to explain away these aspects of the history by
claiming that it was an imperfect or illegitimate or avoidable form

of competition. [43J They suggested that "more" competition would
have occurred if the local exchanges had been structurally
separated from long distance telephony (a policy that just happens
to resemble the AT&T divestiture settlement).
To someone who recognizes the unique economic features of

networks (see Chapter 3), these aspects of the Bell-independent
competition were perfectly predictable.

A network with exclusive

control of access to a location or person with whom others wish to
communicate differentiates itself from its rival and attains a

special kind of leverage over the subscription decisions of people
who want to call that location or person.

Noninterconnected

networks cannot offer perfect substitutes, so they must compete on
the basis of who they reach as well as price and service.

By the

same token, a network becomes more valuable as it becomes more
universal;

hence rivalrous networks are propelled into a

system-building race.

These are not accidental or avoidable

features of network competition;

they are the essence of network

competition.

The Bornholz-Evans piece shows that the monopoly riddle can
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induce schizophrenia in free market economists as well as in New

Deal-era regulators.

In their desire to undermine the case for

natural monopoly in telephone service, such economists assume that

communications networks are no different from any other economic
good.

When the differences that they deny the existence of result

in deviations from the market structure that would be expected of a

normal, homogenous commodity, they assert that there is something
wrong with the market and propose highly interventionist policies

(such as separating exchange from interexchange service) to make
the market structure conform to their initial assumption. [44]
Although confined in scope to a single state, David Gabel's
Ph.D.

dissertation (1986) was the most detailed investigation of

the Bell-independent competition since the FCC investigation. [45]
Its theme was the origin of telephone system regulation in the

state of Wisconsin.

Gabel's explanation of monopoly emphasized

sunk costs and economies of scale and thus conformed to the natural
monopoly tradition.

Nevertheless, the study contained an excellent

descriptive treatment of the relationship between interconnection,

competition and monopoly.

Gabel traced the history of physical

interconnection laws in Wisconsin (a leader in this area) and

independent toll line development in the state.

He accumulated

detailed evidence about the extent and effects of Bell's
sublicensing policy.

His analysis of the debate over the telephone

regulation bill of 1907 showed that independent leaders, and to a
certain extent the state legislators, saw the lack of
interconnection between the competing systems as a spur to system

development.

Both groups supported competition and

noninterconnection even when they thought the process eventually
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would culminate in interconnected monopoly.

Most importantly,

Gabel examined the effects of the legally-mandated interconnection
of the competing systems in Janesville and La Crosse after 1912.
The implications of his case studies will be discussed in the
narrative.

III
Theories of Interdependent Demand.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, a new branch of economic theory
devoted to the special features of the demand for communications
networks developed.

This theory developed independently of the

natural monopoly tradition and in the opinion of the writer
represents a more promising approach to the issues of
telecommunications monopoly, competition and interconnection.

The

literature began with attempts to model the demand for telephone
service.

Later, similar issues turned up in economic analyses of

standardization and technology adoption.

As of now, no single

label covers this literature and its subject.

Some refer to it as

the "network externality," while others refer to "standardization"
or "interdependent demand."

The subject of the theory is the way

one consumer's demand for a product is affected by the behavior of
other consumers.

It is particularly concerned with cases in which

a product becomes more valuable as more people use it.

As long ago as the 1880s, the promoters of the telephone had
remarked that the value of an exchange increased as more people

joined it, and that the demand for telephone service by one person
depended upon who else also subscribed. [46] This observation, in
fact, formed part of the basis of Vail's argument for universal

..
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service. [47] The literature on interdependent demand gave these
intuitive observations formal definition in the language of
economic theory.

It began in connection with attempts to model the

demand for telephone service.

In 1973, ArtIe and Averous showed that the extra value created
by adding new subscribers to a telephone system can generate
continuous subscriber growth in a fixed population with stationary

income levels. [48] A year later, the Bell Labs economist Jeffrey
Rohlfs published what must be considered the definitive economic
model of interdependent demand. [49] ArtIe and Averous's model had
been based on the simplifying assumption that each telephone
subscriber is equally likely to call any other subscriber (the
uniform calling pattern).

When this is assumed, the value of

service depends on the number of subscribers but not their

identity.

Rohlfs' model was based on the more realistic assumption

of a nonuniform calling pattern:

an individual's demand for

telephone service depends on who subscribes, not just the number of
subscribers.

His treatment of the subject is based on the notion

of an "equilibriwn user set."

This is defined as the set of

telephone subscribers consistent with all individuals (both
subscribers and nonsubscribers) maximizing their utility.
Rohlfs derived several important observations about the
behavior of network demand from his model.

He showed that at any

given price, there can be many different equilibrium user sets.
The actual set one ends up with depends on "the disequilibrium
adjustment process;"

up to the equilibrium.

i.e"

the specific historical events leading

Different starting points or different

sequences of events will lead to completely different levels of
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telephone subscribership.

The final result is path-dependent.

Rohlfs' model also called attention to the importance of the
"start-up problem," that is, how to attain a desired level of

subscription starting from a small or null user set.

Even if a

group of a certain size can be served profitably at a given price,

a completely different price may have to be charged to acquire
enough subscribers to attract a user set of that size.

Rohlfs'

paper also supports the nonhomogeneity argument made in Section

2. [50]
The early economic models were concerned with optimal pricing,

not industrial organization.

They assumed a single telephone

system and did not assert or imply that there was any relationship
between the monopolistic character of the telephone industry and
demand interdependence.

The analysis of interdependent demand took

on significance for industrial organization indirectly, via the

economic analysis of standards.

Standards are a broad and

fascinating topic, encompassing everything from the adoption of a

uniform railroad gauge, [51] money and units of measurement, [52] and
the technical compatibility specifications coordinating product
design.

Economists began to take' an interest in the process of

standardization in the late 1970s.

The immediate motivation was

the study of the strategic manipulation of compatibility relations.
Many industrial products consist of separate components which
must work together:

players.

e.g., cameras, lenses and film, or CDs and CD

By deliberately designing products so that they do not

work with the components or systems of other manufacturers, a

producer can attempt to lock buyers into his product line and shut
other producers out of the market.

In his history of the U.S.
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computer industry, Gerald Brock showed how IBM repeatedly made its
mainframe computer CPUs incompatible with the peripheral devices of
other manufacturers in order to protect its dominance of the

computer peripheral market. [54J James Brock uncovered a similar
pattern in the photography industry. [55J These two works underscore
the extent to which theories of compatibility, unlike the highly
formalized natural monopoly theory, were grounded in empirical or

historical research.
Compatibility standards possess the same interdependent demand

characteristics as communication networks. [56J A standard's ability
to coordinate product design or behavior improves as more people

adhere to it, just as the communications value of a given network
improves as more people join it.

In both cases, value depends not

on the use of the standard as such, but on its use by everyone else
as well.

As an isolated piece of equipment, a telephone is

basically useless;

what matters is who it connects one to.

Likewise, the QWERTY keyboard arrangement is not the most efficient
one available;
to use.

it just happens to be the one that everybody learns

The process of standardization shows the same properties

Rohlfs, ArtIe and Averous identified in networks.

There is a

"start-up problem" that may require deviations from cost-based
pricing.

The equilibrium reached is path-dependent, and once a

certain critical mass is attained, adoption can take on a momentum

of its own.
Unlike the works on telephone demand, the standards literature
has devoted a lot of attention to the impact of demand
interdependence on the competitive process.

Gerald Brock's The

Telecommunications Industry, written in 1981, explored the
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competitive uses of interdependent demand throughout the 135-year
history of the telegraph and telephone. [57] As a work of history,
the book is a synthesis of readily available secondary sources.
Its importance lies in its reinterpretation of the established
sources in the light of new economic theories about demand
interdependence (he used the term "systems effects"), regulation

and barriers to entry.

Brock's treatment of the subject cemented

the conceptual link between communications networks and standards

by treating interconnection as a compatibility relation.

He showed

that interconnection in telecommunications markets is the direct

analogue of compatibility in equipment markets. [58] Once
interconnected, networks can be used as complementary products.

Competitors need not duplicate the entire network of their rival to
be able to compete.

In a firm's competitive strategy, the denial

of interconnection rights will occur under the same conditions and
for much the same reasons as the strategic selection of

incompatibility.

A producer with a large market share has less to

gain from interconnection (compatibility) than one with a small
market share and limited capital resources.

The refusal to

interconnect can signal an intention to monopolize the market, for

it means that all consumers must join the dominant network if they
are to obtain access to most other customers.

Brock stopped short of attributing the monopolistic character
of the telephone system to demand interdependence per se.

In his

view, telephone monopoly vIas a product of economies of scale in

ufinal distribution,1I the last mile of wire into the customer's

premises.

He also asserted that systems effects cannot operate as

barriers to entry by themselves if there are no other barriers to
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entry.
Later works drew more explicit links between compatibility
relations and the convergence of the market toward a single system
or standard.

Farrell and Saloner (1987) outlined several unique

characteristics of competition with interdependent demand. [59] In
conventional competition there is typically a stable outcome with
multiple product designs produced by separate firms in optimal
proportions.

In standards-oriented competitions,

lithe typical

outcome is for OTIe good or the other to take over the market.

II

The

competitive process is often characterized by what they called
"bandwagon effects:!!

the emergence of one standard or system as a

clear leader will cause consumers to flock to it, making its
success self-reinforcing.

They also noted that once a standard has

become established it acquires a certain amount of "inertia.

1I

People may not change to a new system or standard even if it is
more efficient, because they are reluctant to sacrifice the

benefits of universal compatibility, and the coordination problems
involved in organizing a large-scale change are too forbidding. [60]
The persistence of the QWERTY keyboard design is the quintessential
example of what Farrell and Saloner call lIexcess inertia."

A

better design exists, but despite the efforts of its promoters and
institutions as powerful as the U.S.

Navy, it has never been able

to establish itself. [61]
All of the economists involved in this work cling to the
notion that standardization occurs because it leads to economies of

scale.

Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1987), Kind1eberger (1983), David

(1985), and Farrell and Sa10ner (1987), to cite the most important
cases, all describe standards as either having, or resulting from,
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what they call "demand-side scale economies. "[62] A demand-side
economy of scale would mean that the product would become less
expensive to consume as more of it is consumed.

However, an alternative language of coordination has begun to
creep into the vocabulary of economists.

This is most evident in

Farrell and Saloner's recent survey of the literature.

Among other

things, they use human language as an example of a "standard" and

discuss the effects of imperfect information and various levels of

uncertainty on the ability of large groups to arrive at a common
standard.

Many of their examples of the "economics" of

standardization really involve a logic of coordination or
communication. [63]
One of the most successful attempts to model the process of
standardization, in fact, dispenses with the normal economic

apparatus altogether and relies on a probabilistic model.

W.

Brian Arthur (1983) was the first to use a Polya urn scheme to
mathematically model the process of technology adoption. [64] Arthur
formulated the problem in this way:

We consider an infinitely large number of managers adopting
some new technology which occurs in two types, A and B. We
assume that each manager is guided by the following
considerations: he analyzes which technology has been
adopted by r randomly selected managers and if not less
than m of them use A, then he also selects A, otherwise he
selects B.

Arthur was specifying the interdependent demand condition, in which
technological standards or networks are more likely to be selected
as more people use them.

He showed that these kinds of processes

can be described by imagining an urn of infinite capacity
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containing white and black balls.

The urn is sampled with

replacement, and every drawing of a ball of a specified color
results in a second ball of the same color being returned to the

urn.

The probability that a ball of one or the other color will be

added is therefore an increasing linear function of the proportion
in which the colors are represented in the urn.

A probabilistic approach to network externalities was
elaborated further in Arthur's "Competing Technologies, Increasing

Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events" (1989).[64] This work
explored the way random events affect societal adoption of one of
two competing technologies when the returns associated with using a
particular technology increase as the number of users increases.
The meaning of Arthur's "increasing returns" is basically the same
as the network externality:

the same technology.

utility increases as more users adopt

The concept has broader implications, though:

Arthur is also concerned with the efficiencies that occur when

general social adoption of one technology increases the level of
knowledge about its operation.

In both cases the benefits derived

from adoption depend on the number of other people who have adopted
the same technology.

The use of the "increasing returns" label is

unfortunate because it is easy to confuse Arthur's "increasing
returns" with the "increasing returns to scale" of traditional

natural monopoly theory.
phenomena.

In fact, they represent distinct economic

(This confusion seems to underlay economists' decision

to label standardization as a product of IIdernand-side economies of
scale'.")
When there are no lIincreasing returns ll to technology adoption,

either technology can end up with a stable share of the market.
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The presence of increas~ng returns, according to Arthur, makes the
market converge on one technology.

In this case, the essentially

random events that control the sequence of adoption can "lockl!
users into one technology even if it is not the most socially

efficient from a classical economic point of view.

II

Increasing

returns ll create "positive feedback" that magnifies random variation
and pushes it in the direction of one of the two technologies.

"Insignificant circumstances become magnified by positive feedback
to tip the system into the actual outcome selected.

The small

events of history become important."[65]
Arthur's work characterizes the process of technology adoption

with increasing returns as a "random walk with absorbing barriers.
The

lI

II

absorbing barrier II is the point at which the nwnber of users

adopting one of the two technologies exceeds the number adopting
the other by a large enough number to attract all users.

Arthur

showed that the difference in the number of adopters of two
technologies must eventually cross one of the barriers:

the two technologies cannot coexist indefinitely:

II

therefore

one must exclude

the other."[66]
Arthur's approach provides a formal, probabilistic
demonstration of many of the same properties of network competition
described by economists.
ArtIe and Averous's

II

Arthur's IIlock-inTl is the equivalent of

se lf-sustaining growth," Rohlfs' "critical

mass" and Farrell and Saloner's "bandwagon effect."

His

"increasing returns- absorbing barrier" model confirms Farrell and

Saloner's observation that standards competitions lead to the
exclusion of one standard by the other rather than an apportionment
of the market.

And his demonstration that the process is
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influenced by random factors such as the sequence of decision
making confirms Rohlfs' finding that the arrival at any given
equilibrium user set is path-dependent.

In Chapter 3, a

probabilistic model that elaborates on and modifies these
conclusions is constructed.

IV
Overview.

The dominant interpretation of telephone monopoly has gone
through three phases.

In the first phase, it was abundantly clear

that monopoly was brought about to achieve universal
interconnection.

Monopoly was an essentially pragmatic response to

the problems of subscriber fragmentation and the difficulties
inherent in the financial and administrative coordination required

to interconnect competing companies.

There was also a feeling that

competition, as in other utility industries, was economically

wasteful and destabilizing.

From the 1930s to the 1970s the

economic aspect of the progressive rationale for monopoly totally
displaced the emphasis on universal interconnection.

Monopoly

became a product of "scale economies" or a related supply-side cost

characteristic of the telephone business.

The '70s and 'SOs

brought a revival of interest in competition and the beginnings of
an analysis of the role of interconnection in telephone history.

The treatment of interconnection effects that has emerged from this
period, while insightful and valid in many respects, stands in an
uneasy, ambiguous relation to economic theory.

Interconnection of

people within a communications network was discussed within the
framework of a theory of interdependent demand by some, as an
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economy of scale by others, as part of a theory of barriers to
entry by still others.

At other times economists relied on

metaphors of communication or coordination.

Of these theoretical

approaches, probability-based models of group coordination appear
to have the most validity.

Yet these theories point beyond

economics to a much broader range of social phenomena.

The

monopoly riddle arises from its refusal to conform to disciplinary
boundaries.

We have an essentially noneconomic force--the relation

of reciprocal compatibility required by social
communication--exerting a powerful influence over the structure of
industry and the nature of competition.

The historical literature has always been attentive to
interconnection issues, but here the problems are empirical as well
as theoretical.

"Interconnection ll has been made to carry a heavy

explanatory load in the absence of systematic knowledge of who was
connected to whom at any given time.

With the exception of D.

Gabel's study of Wisconsin, none of the histories of the

competitive era adequately layout the changes in interconnection

arrangements and laws during the period.

There is little

information in the literature about the functioning of dual service

at the local exchange level.

Assertions about the strategic

advantage of Bell's long distance connections are not backed up

with information about how many people actually made long distance
calls, to whom they generally made them, and how the connections
available through the independent network and the Bell system
compared.

The same problem confronts various theories about the

competitive effects of Bell's interconnection policies.

The

literature contains assertions to the effect that Bell's refusal to
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connect and its agreement to connect helped to thwart the

competition.

The apparent inconsistency makes it clear that the

strategic power of interconnection depended upon very specific
conditions.

The study's use of access mapping is intended to

provide the empirical basis for addressing these issues.

49

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2.

[1] Under antitrust pressure from the federal government, the
Bell System in 1913 made an agreement (the "Kingsbury Commitment")
not to acquire any more competing independent exchanges.
From
about 1910 on, state regulatory commissions were using certificates
of public interest, convenience and necessity to prevent companies

from setting up competing exchanges in towns with an established
exchange.

In cities with competing exchanges, utility commissions

and city councils encouraged consolidation.

See Chapter 9.

[2] The Justice Department filed a Sherman Act antitrust suit
against AT&T and Western Electric on January 14, 1949. The suit
was based on the evidence gathered in the FCC Investigation of
1934-1939. The 1956 Consent Decree ending the suit restricted AT&T
to regulated activities and required it to license its patents to

others on request. In late 1974 the Justice Department filed a new
suit against AT&T. This suit led to the agreement to divest its
operating companies and the Modified Final Judgment of 1982.
[3] J. Warren Stehman, The Financial History of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925).
[4] Ibid, p.

234.

[5] Ibid.
[6] Henry Carter Adams, "The Relation of the State to
Industrial Action,1I Publications of the American Economic

Association, Vol.

1, No.

6 (January, 1887), p.

465-549.

[7] Farrer's criteria of monopoly were: 1) What they supply
is a necessity. 2) They occupy peculiarly favored spots or lines
of land. 3) The product or service they supply is used at the
place where and in connection with the plant or machinery by which
it is supplied. 4) The product or service can be increased in
supply without a proportionate increase in plant and capital. 5)
The business requires a "certain, and a well defined harmonious

arrangement, which can only be attained by unity."
(1973), n. 8, p. 18-19.

Cited in Lowry

[8] Thomas Lowry, "Justification for Regulation: The Case for
Natural Monopoly." Public Utilities Fortnightly, November 8, 1973,
p. 19.

50

[9] Richard T.
1937) .

Ely, Outlines of Economics (New York:

10] The average cost of telephone exchanges in large cities
was double that of smaller cities. Within a city, however, growth
in the number of stations resulted in decreases in per station

expenses when the additional subscribers led to more efficient
utilization of outside plant. Such growth also increased the
average costs associated with sWitching. See IIGost of Exchange
Telephone Service," memo from Joseph P. Davis to Frederick Fish,

October 14, 1902, AT&T archives. For a history of the diseconomies
of growth in switching technology, see Milton Mueller, "The
Switchboard Problem," Technology and Culture, July 1989.
York:

[11] Jones and Bigham, Principles of Public Utilities, (New
MacMillan, 1931), p. 89-90.

[12] G. Lloyd Wilson, James M.
Public Utility Industries (New York:

Herring, Roland B. Eutscher,
McGraw-Hill, 1936); James M.

Herring and Gerald C.

Gross, Telecommunications:

Regulation (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1936) p.

Economics and

189.

[13] C.W. Thompson, Wendell R. Smith, Public Utility
Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941), p. 91.
[14] Herman Trachsel, Public Utility Regulation (Chicago:
Irwin, 1947).
[15] James Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Regulation
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 14-16.
[16] Lowry, n. 8 above, p. 22. See also Richard Posner,
"Natural Monopoly and its Regulation," Stanford Law Review,
21:548-643 (February 1969).
[17] William Baumol, John Panzar and Robert Willig,
Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982); William Sharkey, The Theory of
Natural Monopoly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
[18] David S. Evans amd James J. Heckman, "Natural
Monopoly," in Breaking up Bell (New York: North-Holland, 1983).
[19] "There is natural monopoly in a particular market if and
only if a single firm can produce the desired output at lower cost
than any combination of two or more firms." W. Sharkey, n. 17
above, p. 54.
[20] Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation:
Institutions Volume 2 (New York: Wiley, 1971).
[21] Kahn, n.

20, p.

Principles and

123.

22] Melvyn Fuss and Leonard Waverman, The Regulation of

51

Telecommunications in Canada Technical Report No.7, Economic
Council of Canada, March 1981;

David Evans and James Heckman,

ITA

test for subadditivity of the cost function with an application to
the Bell System," American Economic Review 74, 1984 p. 620.
[23] Baldev Raj and H.D.

Vinod, "Bell System scale economies

from a randomly varying parameter model," Journal of Economics and

Business February 1982, pp.

247-252;

J.B.

Smith and V.

Corbo,

IIEconomies of Scale and Economies of Scope in Bell Canada,1I Working
Paper, Department of Economics, Concordia University, March 1979.

[24] Stephen C. Littlechild, Elements of Telecommunications
Economics (London: Institute of Electrical Engineers, 1979).
[25] Stehman, n.

3 above, pp.

[26] Stehman, p.

65.

80-104.

[27] Federal Communications Commission, Investigation of the

Telephone Industry in the United States (Washington: GPO, 1939;
reprinted by Arno Press, New York, 1974); Noobar Danielian, AT&T:
The Story of Industrial Conguest (New York: Vanguard Press, 1939;
reprinted by Arno Press, 1974); Horace Coon, American Tel & Tel:
The Story of a Great Monopoly (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries
Press, 1939).
[28] Harry B. MacMeal, The Story of Independent Telephony
(Chicago: Independent Pioneer Telephone Association, 1934).
MacMeal's book consists mainly of extracts from Telephony Magazine

and presents no coherent interpretation of the events. For that
reason it is not discussed in the literature review although it is
used as a source throughout the narrative.

[29] FCC Investigation report, n.

27 above, p.

133.

[30] James Herring and Gerald C. Gross, Telecommunications:
Economics and Regulation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p.
189-190, where the authors state why they believe that both
exchange and long distance service are best provided by one system.
Herring was a member of the FCC staff.
[31] FCC Investigation, n.
Danielian, n.

27 above, p.

139.

See also

27.

[32] Gerald Brock, for example, states that the "acquisition
of the Telephone, Telegraph and Cable Co. together with the
acquisition of the Pup in patent rights at about the same time
stopped interest in a competitive long distance company.1I

Brock, n.

53 below, p.

Gerald

120.

[33] Claude Fischer, "The Revolution in Rural Telephony, 1900
1920," Journal of Social History (Fall 1987) pp. 5-26; Robert
W. Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise: The Evolution of the Bell
System's Horizontal Structure (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985);

52

George David Smith, The Anatomy of a Business Strategy: Bell,
Western Electric and the Origins of the American Telephone Industry
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985); Neil H. Wasserman, From
Invention to Innovation:

Long Distance Telephone Transmission at

the Turn of the Century (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins, 1985).

[34J Richard Gabel, "The Early Competitive Era in Telephone
Communication," Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems 34:340-359
(1969) .
[35J Ibid, p.

354.

[36J I do not mean to imply that Gabel was personally
responsible for creating and implementing this philosophy, only
that he was expressing and reinforcing a new view about
interconnection and competition. a view that eventually became the
basis of new regulatory policies.

[37J John V. Langdale, "The Growth of Long Distance Telephony
in the Bell System, 1875-1907," Journal of Historical Geography 4:2
145-159. I have cited the title as it appears, although the first
date in the title must be a typographical error. AT&T began long
distance development in 1885; the telephone itself had not been
invented in 1875.
[38J Langdale's article was nowhere near as influential as
Gabel's. It was published in a journal of historical geography and
never came to the attention of economists and policy analysts.

Langdale is not cited by Brock (1981) or by Bornholz and Evans
(1983) .
[39J Langdale lists five reasons why the independents failed,
four of them related to interconnection.

First, price competition

prevented them from making enough profit to be self-financing.
Second, they failed to obtain access to key cities such as Chicago,
New York, and Boston. Third, the independent network "was
fragmented by the Bell System's policy of taking over strategically
located companies whose removal disconnected important parts of the
independent network." Fourth, the Bell System continuously
improved the technical. quality of its long distance lines in
response to competition. Last, a growing number of independents
chose to connect with Bell.
[40J Robert Bornholz and David S. Evans, "The Early History
of Competition in the Telephone Industry," Chapter 2 in Breaking up
Bell (New York: North-Holland, 1983).
[41J Ibid, p.

32.

[42J Ibid, p.

33.

[43J Bornho1z and Evans claimed that the scope of competition
was "extremely narrow" because there was usually no more than two

exchanges in a town (as if there could have been five or six).

53

They argued that the cO"I.npeting companies "failed to interconnect
because there was too little rather than too much competition. II

[44] A network's use of its control of subscribers as a
II

s trategic bottleneck ll can occur·at the local exchange level as

well as at the local-long distance interface. For an approach to
telecommunications competition similar to that advanced by Bornholz
and Evans, see John T.

Wenders, The Economics of

Telecommunications: Theory and Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Ballinger, 1987), pp. 171-183.

[45] David Gabel, "The Evolution of a Market: The Emergence
of Regulation in the Telephone Industry of Wisconsin, 1893-1917."
Ph.D.

Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987.

[46] See, for example, George Bartlett Prescott, The Electric
Telephone (New York: Appleton, 1890), p. 236: "the experience of
the various telephone exchanges in the larger cities throughout the
country shows that as the number of subscribers increases, the
number of their communications increase in a two-fold ratio."

[47] "The value of any exchange system is measured by the
number of the members of any community that are connected with it."

Theodore N.

[48 J S.

Vail, AT&T Annual Report, 1907.
ArtIe and C.

p.

17.

Averous, "The Telephone System as a

Static and Dynamic Aspects."
Economics 4:1 (Spring 1973) pp.
89-100.

Public Good:

Bell Journal of

[49J Jeffrey Rohlfs, "A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a
Communications Service.1t

Bell Journal of Economics and Management

Science 5:1 (Spring 1974) pp.

16 37.

[50J "A general theory of interdependent demand cannot be
developed in terms of the sum Q. It is necessary to work with the
individual qi. The basic analytical concept is not the demand
curve ... but rather equilibrium user sets." Rohlfs, Ibid, p. 21.
[51] George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu, The American
Railroad Network, 1861-1890 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard,
1956); Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Belknap, 1977).

[52J Charles Kindleberger, "Standards as Public, Collective
and Private Goods." Kyklos 36: 377-396.
[53J Gerald Brock, "Competition, Standards and Self-regulation
in the Computer Industry," in Richard Caves and Marc J. Roberts,
eds., Regulating the Product (Cambridge MA: Ballinger, 1975).
[54] James W. Brock, "Market Control in the Amateur
Photography Industry," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State
University, 1981.

54

[55] Michael L.

Katz and Carl Shapiro, "Technology Adoption
II
Journal of Political

in the Presence of Network Externalities,
Economy;

Michael Katz,

liThe Economics of Standardization in

Networks Industries," paper presented before the 14th Annual
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Airlie Virginia,
April 28, 1986.
[56] Gerald Brock, The Telecommunications Industry (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard, 1981).
[57] Brock did not recognize an important distinction between
equipment compatibility and network interconnection, namely the
lack of homogeneity in networks. When equipment interfaces are
standardized, the competing but compatible products (e.g., an IBM
computer printer and an Epson printer) are complete substitutes for
each other.
This is not true of networks.
Interconnected networks

(e.g., the MCI and AT&T long distance networks) give users the
appearance of being substitutes, in that one can communicate with

the same set of subscribers over either system, but their physical
facilities are really being used as complements rather than as
substitutes.

[58] Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, "Competition,
Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and
Lemmings,

II

in H.

Landis Gabel, ed., Product Standardization and

Competitive Strategy (New York:

North-Holland, 1987).

[59] Ibid.
[60] Paul A.

David, "Understanding the Economics of QWERTY:

the Necessity of History,1I in Economic History and the Modern

Economist, W.N.

Parker, ed.

[61] In Kindleberger (n.

(Oxford:

Basil Blackwell, 1986).

52 above, p.

377), standards allow

economies of scale to be realized:
"The more producers and
consumers use a given standard, the more each gains from use by

others through gains in comparability and interchangeability." In
Farrell and Saloner (n. 58 above, p. 7) and in Katz and Shapiro
. (n. 55 above, p. 824), standardization is a form of "demand-side
economy of scale." As Katz and Shapiro put it, "a given product is
more attractive the larger is the in-place base of consumers using
that product." In David (n. 60 above, p. 41-42) economies of
scale drive the process of system use toward a single standard:
"the overall user costs of a [standardized system] would tend to
decrease as it gained in acceptance relative to other systems .
... These decreasing cost conditions--or system scale economies--had
a number of consequences, among which was the tendency for the
process of intersystem competition to lead toward de facto

standardization. II
[62] In explaining the basis for excess inertia, Farrell and
Saloner use the example of cowboys who tied their horses together
while they camped for the night, noting that even though the group
of horses was free to go wherever it wanted they would not wander

b

55

far, whereas a single horse would. "The horses difficulty in
coordinating just where they would move at any given instant
prevented them from moving effectively." They note that standards
can acquire inertia in an analogous way, because users who are

IItied together" via compatibility" will be reluctant to sacrifice
that compatibility. The point is insightful, but is it economics?
If so, it is an economics entirely devoid of prices, costs and
monetary transactions.
Farrell and Saloner's use of language as a

case of standardization is really the reductio ad absurdum of the
position that network unity or universal compatibility are a
product of II sca l e economies,1I for linguistic 11 standards II emerged
long before there was a money economy and in a context in which
"reduced costs I! is at best a bad metaphor for improved cooperation.

[63J W. Brian Arthur, "On Generalized Urn Schemes of the
Polya Kind," Cybernetics 19 (1983) p. 61-71.
[64J W. Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing
Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events." The Economic Journal 99
(March, 1989) pp.116-131.
[65J Ibid, p.

127.

[66] Ibid, p.

121.

56

Chapter 3:

Theory and Method

The following chapter elaborates the theoretical constructs on
which the dissertation's treatment of the history is based.
Chapter will take up three fundamental ideas:
demand-side economies of scope;

The

the notion of

access competition as a form of

rivalry with its own distinct characteristics;

models of interdependent demand.

and probabilistic

The concluding section explains

the methQd of access mapping used by the study.

I

Network monopoly as an economic phenomenon:
Demand-side economies of scope.

The most important theoretical problem raised in Chapter 2 was
that of defining the output of a communications network.

The

literature review exposed a major anomaly surrounding this issue in

the existing theory regarding telephone monopoly.

Natural monopoly

theory and the newer theories of standardization both rely on the
concept of scale economies to explain the emergence of a single

system.

In natural monopoly theory, telephone monopoly arises due

to supply-side economies of scale.

Scale economies in the supply

of a good exist when the producer's average cost (AC) declines as
the quantity of output (Q) increases.

For the theorists of

standardization, on the other hand, a single system is a product of
demand-side scale economies.

This means that the average cost of

consumption decreases as more of the product is consumed.
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Both of these analyses share a fundamental flaw.

In the

context of conununications networks the whole notion of "scale" is
suspect because it rests on the assumption that the product remains

the same when the quantity of output changes.

The analysis makes

the product a constant and then examines the effects on AC when Q
is increased or decreased.

The assumption of a constant product is

not valid when applied to communications networks.

The most

important output dimension of a network is the people or places it
connects.

From an economic point of view, network participants are

not homogenous, interchangeable units like automobiles or kilowatts

of electric power;

they are all unique and none of them can serve

as a substitute for the other.

Adding subscribers or locations to

a network does not give you more of the same product;
the product itself.

it changes

This fact makes it impossible to understand

network externality phenomena as being related in any important way
to the scale of production.

There is no commensurate output scale

on which networks with different user sets can be arranged.

This problem can be overcome by conceiving of changes in the
output of communications networks as changes in the scope rather

than the scale of consumption and production.

In this view, a

network is not a single product, but a combination of many

different products (connections between subscribers). [lJ A
telephone directory can be viewed as a gigantic menu listing all
the different products that a local subscriber can

picking up the phone.

lI

order U by

The growth of a network or of product

compatibility involves an enlargement of the product's scope--the
addition of new capabilities--rather than an increase in the scale
of production or consumption.

The difference in value between a
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network with more or less subscribers (or a language with few or

many speakers, or a computer that is or is not -compatible with many
other computers and software products) turns on the advantages or
disadvantages of combining many different functions or uses in one
Thus, the idea of lIeconomies of scope" becomes the handle

tool.

with which one can begin to grasp the reasons for the unique
structure of the telecommunications industry.
Normally,

lIeconomies of seope n refers to supply-side

efficiencies that are achieved by deriving multiple outputs from a
single production process.

The concept is used, for example, to

describe the benefits that may arise from the joint use of
facilities by different services (such as the use of telephone
lines to supply fire and burglar alarm services) or from exploiting
the byproducts of one production process to produce another salable
commodity (as when the slaughter of cows for meat also produces
hides and other marketable items).

In both cases there is an

economic synergy between separate products such that producing them
in combination is more efficient than producing them separately.

My use of the concept differs from this norm in two important
ways.

First, I apply the concept of scope economies to

communications networks in a far more thoroughgoing sense than is

usual.

I am asserting that every pairwise connection between

telephone stations represents a separate and distinct output.
Economists who analyze the scope economies of multiproduct firms

generally deal with three or four different outputs.

A modern

telephone system, in contrast, would have hundreds of millions of
separate outputs according to my analysis.

The second difference

is that the economies of scope I am interested in occur on the

59

demand side rather than the supply side.

Under certain conditions,

the ability to access all other users through a single network can
be more efficient for the user whether or not a single network is
cheaper to construct and operate.

In fact, demand-side scope

economies can lead to integration or unification even when there

are significant diseconomies of scope on the supply side.
Distinguishing between scope and scale economies and between

demand and supply side efficiencies makes it possible to simply
explain what in natural monopoly theory was a paradox:

one

telephone system can be more efficient than two when the average
cost of one large system exceeds that of two or more smaller

systems.

This can be illustrated by a very simple model.

Assume a

population of N people, and assume that the cost/subscriber of
supplying telephone service increases as the number of subscribers

approaches N.

The population is equally divided among two

competing networks, A and B, who each charge $4 for telephone
service.

Assume that all N subscribers want access to all other

telephone users and convince A and B to consolidate their
operations into a single system.

Because of the additional costs

imposed by enlarging the systems' scope, the consolidated system
must charge $5 for a subscription.

Although the subscription price

goes up, there is still a significant economy of scope on the
demand side.

One cannot directly compare the $4 price before

consolidation with the $5 price afterwards, because a universally
interconnected system offers a larger scope of service.

To obtain

the same service scope under a dual system subscribers had to pay

$8 before ($4 for A and $4 for B).

Thus, consolidation allowed

subscribers to pay less for universal access.
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The model may make it appear as if a monopoly or fully
interconnected system is prima facie more efficient than the

alternative.

Not so;

the realization of demand-side economies of

scope in this simple example depended on two strong assumptions:

a) All subscribers had to value access to all other subscribers
more than the additional cost created by expanding the scope of
the network;

and

b) The increased average cost created by enlarging the system's
scope had to be less than the sum of the cost of subscriptions
to two or more nonconnected networks.

Some important qualifications center on assumption a) above.

Not

everyone wants or needs a system that is universal in scope.

Each

individual's orders from the "menu" offered by a telecommunications

network are different, some being highly extended and others
localized and restricted.

Under these conditions the elimination

of dual service may save money for some groups (essentially, those
who took out duplicate subscriptions) while raising the costs for
many others, who mayor may not reap net benefits from the expanded
scope of service.

The structure of demand and the politics of the

transition are important empirical issues.

Also, the existence of

a monopoly can restrict the scope of communication as much as, if
not more than, the fragmentation caused by competition.

occur in a number of ways.

This can

The monopoly can charge higher prices

for access than it would if faced with competition, and thus
restrict the number of users.

»

It may be unwilling or unable to
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raise the capital needed to expand as fast as the market demands,
or unwilling to risk its money on marginal markets.

In general, a

system exempt from competitive pressures can be indifferent about
increasing the scope of its service.

The most important contribution of an analysis that equates
output with scope is its ability to explain the unique features of
network competition.

Once it is understood that the output of

networks is defined by who joins them and that adding users makes a
network a different product we can see why the competitive process
deviates from the standard economic models of competition.
In the perfect competition model of neoclassical theory, the

quantity of a good demanded by society (Q) is divided up among
numerous competing firms.

The output of each firm is a perfect

substitute for the output of other firms, and the sum of each

firm's output (Qi + Qj ... Qn) - Q.

In contrast, in markets with

interdependent demand each communications linkage represents a

separate output, and the competing firms assemble different
combinations of these outputs.

The result is not the division of a

homogenous output into additive

II

shares ," but a market structure in

which each competitor offers a different output that is not a true

substitute for the output of its competitors.

The sum of the

output of mUltiple competing networks is not equal to the output of
a single network connecting all users.

To cite an extreme example,

if half of all users choose network A and the other half choose
network B, each network does not have a 50%

II

mar ket share;

II

rather, each supplies access to completely different user sets and
hence is a different service--so different that some consumers may

purchase both of them.

tt

Competition exists--the networks may have
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facilities in the same location and engage in intense rivalry for

adoption by the same users.

As long as they are not

interconnected, however, the rivalry involves a choice between

imperfect substitutes.
To be perfect substitutes, unconnected networks must offer the
same subscriber sets.

Every user, in other words, would have to

join all of the competing networks.

This outcome (universal

duplication) is virtually impossible, not only because of the
diseconomy of scope involved but also because it is self-negating.
If all users joined two or more networks any user would be able to

access all other users on any one of the networks and there would
be no need to duplicate.
competition:

This is a paradoxical feature of network

the greater the percentage of duplication the closer

the networks come to being perfect substitutes;

but the closer the

outputs corne to being identical the less need there is for

duplication.

As a matter of logic (as well as empirical fact),

separate networks or incompatible standards are never perfect

substitutes.

There will always be groups of users who are

exclusive to one of the competing netw'orks or standards.

Choosing

only one competing net involves losing access to the exclusive

users of other nets.

This is one of the reasons why the

competitive process tends to converge on a single, dominant system
or standard.

Imperfect substitution choices set in motion a

coordination game in which users try to assure themselves of access

to all desired parties through joint consumption of the same
network.

Interdependent demand means that control of access to some
persons or locations gives a firm leverage over the choices of

t
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othe_r users in other locations.

A network that enjoys exclusive

control of access to a certain group of users has a competitive
advantage over other networks when it comes to attracting customers
who wish to communicate with that group.

unanimously frown on this practice.

Economists almost

Exclusive control of access is

given the pejorative "bottleneck" label, and the exploitation of

this IIbottleneck

ll

for competitive advantage is denounced as an

exercise of monopoly power. [2] In reality, network competition
based on the exclusive control of access represents a qualitatively
different kind of competition rather than a perversion or
suppression of competition.

In this form of competition, rivalry

takes place over the scope of the product, not just its price.
Throughout the thesis, I will use the label lIaccess competition" to
denote this process.
That access competition does not conform to the neoclassical
model of perfect competition does not necessarily mean that it is
socially undesireable.

One of the most important determinants of a

network's value is its scope.

In the absence of interconnection or

compatibility, firms have a strong incentive to broaden the scope
of their products, because superior scope is the source of a
crucial competitive advantage.

Connecting rival networks can

diminish or even eliminate the competitive advantages obtainable by
increasing the network's scope.

Access competition allows firms to

benefit from superior scope, just as normal economic competition
allows them to benefit from lower production costs, improved
technology or more efficient management.
Rivalry on the dimension of scope produces two incentives that
can stimulate and reward enlarging the Be-ope of a network:
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1) The incentive to be the first to discover and tap new user

groups.

Being the first to develop new markets increases the

scope of the product relative to its rival and thus makes it
more valuable to others.

2) The incentive to match the scope of one's rival as much as
possible.

In access competition, a firm cannot allow its rival

to have uncontested control of too many users.

A firm that

cannot rely on interconnection with another company to obtain

access to subscribers must construct duplicate facilities.

The

presence of separate facilities can lead to more intense price

competition and technological innovation.

It also has the

effect of giving rivalrous networks an incentive to extend
competition to everyone, not just a few heavy users.

There are corresponding disadvantages to access competition.

It is

often a transitory process--someone wins the competition and ends

up with a monopoly, posing problems of inertia and regulation.
Once a certain level of development has been achieved, the
existence of separate networks can restrict rather than expand the
scope of the system.

The substitution choices users face are

inherently imperfect.
The line of anlaysis developed here also can provide the basis
of an economic analysis of competition between interconnected
networks.

Interconnection makes the scope of competing networks

identical and therefore shifts all rivalry to the dimensions of
price and service quality.

Access becomes a homogenous good.

A

65

network derives no competitive advantages from larger scope and

there are no disadvantages associated with possessing a smaller

scope.

It allows disaggregation of the combination of products

comprising a network.

By dis aggregating the product's scope,

interconnection allows perfect substitution to take place along the

individual outputs that together make up the network.

A firm can

offer a substitute for one output--for example, a long distance
link between one pair of cities--without necessarily offering a
substitute for the entire network.

Any competitor can benefit from

a larger network's facilities while invading anyone of the routes

or subscriber markets that looks profitable.
Interconnected networks have a strangely dual status:
are both complements and competitors.

they

Part of their value is

derived from the links to the other network;

yet at the same time

they present themselves to users as substitutes for each other.
Interconnected nets can offer the same user set and hence are

perfect substitutes for each other, yet their physical facilities
are not perfect substitutes.

As a result of this dual status, the

issue of what interconnected but competing networks charge each
other for access becomes the central economic issue.

II
Network monopoly as a communicative phenomenon:

Probabilistic models of interdependent demand.

While the notion of demand-side economies of scope captures

the economic logic behind network monopolies, the application of
the concept is conditioned by how wide a scope of communication the
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group in question actually desires.

The existing models of

standardization and network demand proceed from the simple
assumption that networks or standards become more valuable as more

people use them.
of the truth.

This assumption is at best a rough approximation

To any given network participant, the issue is not

really which of two systems has a larger scope, but which system
includes more of one's desired group of communication partners.
The communicative scope demanded by each network user is different
from that demanded by every other user.
never uniform.

Communication patterns are

In both linguistic and telecommunications networks,

users interact with some points very frequently, others rarely,
others not at all.

Access to some users and locations is very

important, while access to others is dispensable.

To complicate

matters further, one can never know in advance with whom or with
what locations one will need communications access.

Access to a

remote part of Idaho may seem unimportant to a resident of New York
city, but if a friend moves there or one's car breaks down nearby a
communications link may become very important.

At best, one can

say that the need for communications access to certain points is

very unlikely.

Another limitation of the existing models of

network externality phenomena is that they do not incorporate any
concept of duplication.

They assume that users are confronted with

a choice between two mutually exclusive networks or standards.
Given these two critical assumptions, uniform demand and complete

exclusivity, the tendency has been to stress the inevitability of
convergence on a single system or standard, even when the outcome
is economically irrational.

What happens when probabilistic models of interdependent
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demand reflect the heterogeneity of communication patterns and also
incorporate the possibility of duplicate users?

How is the

modelling of network growth and competition affected by these
altered asssumptions?

What, in particular, happens to the tendency

to converge on a single network or standard?

In order to answer

these questions, this section constructs a probabilistic model of

interdependent demand.

It modifies the classical Polya urn scheme

to reflect nonuniform communication patterns and to make duplicate

users a possibility.

A verbal description of the model is followed

by a more formal elaboration of its properties.
The model assumes a population of 20 members.
member can have one of four values.

Each population

It can be a member of one of

two competing networks (NETl or NET2) , a nonsubscriber (NS), or a
duplicate subscriber (DUP).

Any initial state can be specified.

For each individual member, the rest of the population is sampled a

specified number of times.

The composition of the sample

determines whether that individual will be returned to the
population at the end of the sampling cycle as NS, NET1, NET2, or
DUP.

As in the classical urn model, this process is repeated and

the changing composition of the population is observed.
The urn population can be thought of as representing a city,
country or neighborhood with a distinct communication pattern.

The

sampling process represents their actual need for telephone access

at a given moment, which is generally predictable but is also
subject to random variations.

The composition of each member's

sample determines whether it joins or quits one of the networks,
switches from one to the other, or remains the same.

The model

allows one to experiment with the way the possibility of
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duplication and various assumptions about the way communication

patterns are distributed affect the viability of two networks.

It

does not incorporate price or cost differences but is intended to
isolate the properties of demand interdependence as such.

The crucial difference between this model and the urn scheme
used by Arthur concerns the sampling process.

The classical urn

scheme relies on a uniform sampling distribution:

there is an even

chance that one will select any individual bead in the population.
Translated into the terms of telephone demand, this corresponds to
the "uniform calling" assumption, i.e., the assumption that any

user is equally likely to call any other user.

In this model, the

heterogeneity of communication patterns is captured by means of a

nonuniform sampling distribution.

Though randomly selected, each

population member's sample is controlled by a probability
distribution that makes it more likely to select some members than
others.

This nonuniform sampling probability is intended to

represent the fact that each person communicates

~ith

some people

more frequently than others, or attaches more importance to access

to some people than others.

The model relies on a 20 by 20 matrix

to fix the frequency with which any two population members will
sample each other.

Any values can be put into this matrix, as long

as each row adds up to l.

The probability of sampling another

member can be very large or very small.

zero.

It cannot, however, be

This is intended to reflect the fact that while there are

certain people and locations with which one is unlikely to

communicate, it is always possible that one will need to
communicate with such people or locations.
The status of any population member (NS, NET I , NET2, or DUP)
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is determined by decision rules based on a simple principle:

the

individual selects whichever status would have maximized its

communications access to the sample that was drawn.

If the

majority of its sample consisted of nonsubscribers, for example, it

will become a nonsubscriber for the next sampling cycle.

If its

sample consisted of 3 members of NETl and 2 nonsubscribers, it will
be returned to the population as a member of NETl.
Of course, when two networks exist a duplicate subscription

will usually afford access to the most people.

At the same time,

duplication is not always an option for many people because of its

cost.

Although the model is not intended to incorporate notions of

cost, it does handle the problem of duplication in a way that
reflects the reality that duplication may be an option for only
part of the population.

The model allows any sample size between 1

and 20 to be set for each population member.

If its sample size is

greater than 6, the population member is eligible to be a duplicate
subscriber;
duplicate.

if it is 6 or less, that member is ineligible to

Thus, large-sample members choose whichever of the four

options (NS, NETl, NET2, DUP) maximizes their contact with the
sample drawn, while small-sample members are restricted to the

options NS, NETl or NET2.

Thus, the model allows one to experiment

with various assumptions about what levels of duplication are

economically possible.

A population member will duplicate only

when it can increase the scope of its communications access by
doing so.

If a sample consists of four duplicate subscribers and

one member of NETl, for example, the individual obtains the same
access scope by choosing NETl or DUP.
join NETl.

The person will therefore
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The model can be described more formally as follows.
Population P has N members.

An individual population member P(i)

draws a sample from the group P(j,k,l ... N) a specified number of
times.

The frequency or probability with which P(i) will draw any

other member of P is controlled by a MATRIX file M(N,N).

The value

in cell M(i,j) represents the probability that P(i) will call P(j).
If M(i,j)

~

.60, for example, P(i) will on average draw P(j) 6

times for every ten times it samples the population.

If the cell

value equals .05, P(i) will on average draw P(j) once every twenty
times it samples the population.

Because they represent

probabilities, the cells must sum to one across rows.

The matrix

values can be as concentrated or as uniform as the user of the

model cares to make them, subject only to the rule that the
probability that any two subscribers will call each other is
greater than zero.

The model user also specifies the size of the sample V(i)
taken by each population member.

If V(i) is greater than 6, P(i)

is eligible to be a duplicate subscriber.

If V(i) is less than 6,

P(i) cannot be a duplicate subsciber.
After P(i) samples the population V(i) times, the program
counts the number of times P(i) sampled nonsubscribers (NS), users
of Network 1 (NET1), users of Network 2 (NET2), and duplicate
subscribers (DUP).

The decision rules governing the network status

of P(i) are based on these values.

The decision rules are as

follows:
1.

If NS > (NETl + NET2 + DUP) then P(i) will be returned to

the population as a nonsubscriber (NS) at the end of the entire
sampling cycle.

In this case the number of Nonsubscribers sampled
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exceeds the combined total of the number of users of both networks
sampled.

In other words, P(i)'s communication activity brought him

into contact with nonsubscribers more often than with the

subscribers of both networks combined.

Since most of his

communication is with nonusers, he will not subscribe to either

network.
2.

Decision rule 2 applies only if the first Decision rule

does not apply, i.e., if NS < (NETl + NET2 + DUPS) , and only to
population members who are eligible to duplicate, i.e., for whom V

> 6.

In this case the status of P(i) is determined by whichever of

the following three values is largest:

a) NETl + DUP
b) NET2 + DUP
c) NET I + NET2 + DUP

If a) is largest, P(i) is returned to the population as a
subscriber to NET I at the end of the sampling cycle.

If b) is

largest, P(i) is returned to the population as a subscriber to NET2
at the end of the sampling cycle.

If c) is largest, P(i) is

returned to the population as a duplicate subscriber (DUP) at the
end of the sampling cycle.

The idea behind this decision rule is

that P(i) selects whichever status would have maximized his
communications access to the sample that was drawn.

A subscriber

to Network 1 would be able to communicate with all NET I users and
all duplicate subscribers in the sample.

A subscriber to NET2

would be able to communicate with all NET2 subscribers and all
duplicate subscribers in the sample.

A duplicate subscriber (DUP)

72

would be able to communicate with all NETI, NET2, and DUP sample
members.

Thus, P(i) will join NET I , NET2 or will duplicate

depending on whether a), b) or c) is greater.
Note, however, that if both NET I and NET2

~

0 in the sample

and all of the networks users sampled were duplicate subscribers

then a), b) and c) will be equal.

In this case P(i)'s

communications access will be the same whether he subscribes to
NETl, NET2, or both.

As the user does not gain access to

additional users by duplicating, the program contains a special
check which randomly assigns these cases to either NET I or NET2.
3.

Decision rule 3 applies only if the first two Decision

rules are inapplicable.
and V < 6.

In these cases, NS < (NETI + NET2 + DUPS)

When both of these conditions are true, the status of

P(i) depends on whichever is larger in the sample, NETI or NET2.
If NET I is larger, P(i) is returned to the population as a member
of NET I at the end of the sampling cycle.

If NET2 is larger, P(i)

is returned to the population as a member of NET2 at the end of the
sampling cycle.

This rule is based on the simple principle that a

network user who is unable to duplicate will choose the network
whose users made up a larger portion of its sample.

As with rule

#2, if the values are equal in the sample the user is randomly
assigned to one of the two networks.

The value of P(i) is not changed until all other members have
sampled the population also.

Then all of the new values of Pare

substituted for the old ones, the results are output, and a new
sampling cycle can begin.

It should be noted that the subscriber

status of the population at any given moment reflects their sample
of the previous population values.

73

The model can be used to demonstrate several interesting

points about network growth and competition.

One of the first

issues a model of interdependent demand must confront is that of
network growth.

If the value of a network depends on who else uses

it, how does one ever get started?

appears to present itself.

A chicken-and-egg conundrum

In the early stages of network growth,

the majority of the population is bound to be composed of
non-users.

Thus, probabilistic models based on uniform sampling

will always return samples in which nonsubscribers greatly
outnumber subscribers, and therefore all population members will

elect to quit the network.

This problem is closely related to the

problem of lIexcess inertial! raised by Farrell and Salouer.

If a

group of users has already converged on a single network or

standard, an urn model would suggest that it is impossible for them
ever to get out of it.
The only way to overcome this problem is to ensure that
certain popUlation members are more likely to sample some members
than others.

In order to generate self-sustaining growth, networks

must begin with the most regular and most frequently used
communication linkages.

They must tap into loci of concentrated

demand before they can spread.

The conditions which can and cannot

generate network growth are illustrated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2.

In

both of these runs of the urn model only a minority--four
population members--are specified as initial users.
the communication pattern is not uniform:

In both cases,

each population member

has two other favored popUlation members, and these two favored
members are different for each individual.

pattern is used in both cases.

The same communication

In Figure 3.2, however, the
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sampling probabilities are more highly concentrated on the favored
parties than in Figure 3.1.

In 3.1, the probability that the

population member will sample one of the two favored parties is
.350, whereas in Figure 3.2 the probability is .966.

As the

diagrams show, in 3.1 both networks die out completely after three
cycles.

In Figure 3.2, NET 1 dies out after 10 cycles but NET 2

continues to spread.

The system reaches an equilibrium after 26

cycles, when NET 2 includes all but four members of the population.

This could be seen as a IItrickle down
growth.

II

theory of network

Networks take root at the top of communications

hierarchies, where usage is frequent and the need for a link
certain, and gradually spread to embrace less concentrated, less

probable acts of social communication.

This aspect of the model

accords with some intuitively obvious empirical features of the
adoption of new communications networks.

New networks have begun

where there were established links between users with a known,

regular need to communicate with each other.

The first telephone

lines, for example, were set up between retailers and their
wholesale suppliers and between stock brokers and their clients.
Of course, once a network is in place it changes the communications
probabilities by opening up access to users with whom communication

may have been impractical or difficult before.

One of the

weaknesses of the model is that it does not account for the fact

that joining a network does not merely fulfill preexisting demands
for communication but also redefines that demand in unpredictable

ways.
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Figure 3.1:
No network growth with evenly distributed communication
probabilities.

Figure 3.2:
Network growth with concentrated communication probabilities.
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The distinction between concentrated and evenly distributed
conununication probabilities has important implications for the

viability of dual service competition, too.

Figures 3.3 and 3.4

begin with the population evenly distributed betwen NET 1 and NET
2.

There are four duplicate subscribers, five exclusive

subscribers to NET 1, five exclusive subscribers to NET 2, and five
nonsubscribers.
duplicate.

Only four subscribers (#1-#4) are eligible to

The same matrices used in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 were used

for Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

Every population member has two other

members who are favored in its sampling, but in Figure 3.3 the
probability that one of these two will be sampled is .350 and in
Figure 3.4 it is .996.

The diagram of the results shows that

despite the possibility of duplication, the more evenly distributed
calling probabilities of Figure 3.3 lead to convergence on NET 1
after only 8 cycles.

In Figure 3.4, however, the two networks

appear to be able to coexist indefinitely.

With the demand for

communication concentrated heavily on specific partners the
tendency to converge on one network dissipates in favor of an

unending series of unstable combinations.
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Figure 3.3
Convergence with evenly distributed communication probabilities

Figure 3.4
No convergence with concentrated communication probabilities
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Figures 3.5 and 3.6 explore the effects of duplication on
convergence.

In this case, the population has been divided into

three different groups, A, Band C.

Groups Band C, which both

have 8 members, are fairly self-contained:

they sample their own

members 77 percent of the time and the other group only 1.5 percent
of the time.
the time.

Group A, with four members, samples Band C with equal

probability.
below.

Both Band C, however, sample group A 22 percent of

The complete distribution is set out in the Table

The communication pattern between A, B, and C might be

likened to residential users in different neighborhoods (B and C)
who communicate with the other neighborhood infrequently but are
both in fairly frequent contact with the same city businesses (A).
Or Band C might be compared to two cities which communicate with
each other infrequently but call the same third city fairly often.

Table 3.1

AlB

A
B
C

1

C

1

1------1------1------1
1 .024 1 .488 1 .488 1
1------1------1------1
1 .216 1 .768 1 .016 1
1------1------1------1
1 .216 1 .016 1 .768 1
1------1------1------1

In this run of the model, all of group B was assigned to
NET 1 and all of group C to NET 2, and A was evenly divided among
both.

With these initial values, two different outcomes can occur

depending upon whether or not duplication is allowed.

If no users

are eligible to duplicate, the whole population eventually
converges on one of the two networks.

group A assumes the decisive role.

(Figure 3.5) In this case,

Although it samples Band C
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with the same probabili~y, random variations will sometimes make

its sample unbalanced, and hence its members will not always be

evenly divided between NET 1 and NET 2.

If by chance a majority of

A swings to one of the networks the sample of the minority network
can be influenced enough to make it lose some of its members.

As

Arthur demonstrated, random variations tend to be reinforced by
positive feedback until the system converges on one value.

If group A is allowed to duplicate, however, the system does
not converge on either NET 1 or NET 2.

All of group B remains on

NET 1, all of group C remains on NET 2, and all of A duplicates.
This pattern is extremely stable.

Random variations at most

produce an occasional movement of one population member from one

network to the other for one cycle.

(Figure 3.6) Dual service can

be maintained indefinitely under these conditions. [3J The
duplication of the strategically placed A group neutralizes the
positive feedback that would otherwise lead to convergence.

Small

variations in the samples taken by the members of group A do not
change its members' status.

Only in the extremely improbable event

that A's sample included no members of NET 1 or NET 2 would it
cease to be a duplicate subscriber and throw its weight in with one
of the two networks.

This event is so unlikely that even if it did

happen it would remain an isolated event.

Thus sample variations

in A cannot affect the sample of the Band C groups.
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Figure 3.5:
Convergence on a single network when no duplication is possible.

Figure 3.6:
No convergence when duplication is possible.
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In the preceding case duplications prevented convergence.
other conditions duplication can facilitate convergence.

In

Assume a

population made up of two groups who communicate mostly with each

other and not with the other group.

In Case 4, population members

5, 11, 14 and 20 form a cluster of users 98 percent of whose
traffic is with each other.

These four subscribers are assigned to

NET 1 and the rest of the population is assigned to NET 2.

(Figure

3.7) If no duplication is possible and the urn model is run, this
pattern will be maintained indefinitely. [4] The two networks serve
separate user clusters whose members interact so infrequently that
the presence of one is not able to affect the subscriber status of

the other.

Now assume that all members of the population are

allowed to duplicate.
NET 1.

The whole population eventually converges on

(Figure 3.8) Duplication leads to convergence by making the

samples of the two groups more sensitive to variation.

When no

duplication was possible, NET 1 members were always a small

minority of the sample taken by NET 2 members and vice-versa.

The

presence of the opposite network in the sample was never large
enough to affect anyone's subscription decision.

When duplication

is possible, the presence of only one other network member in the

sample is enough to change one's status from NET 2 (or NET 1) to
DUP.

Population members who got the other network in their sample

became duplicators.

Once they duplicated, they diminished the

predominance of NET 2 in other samples, setting in motion a gradual

migration to NET 1.

Although NET 1 began with a smaller number of

members, its core users' demand was so strongly concentrated on

each other that it was able to gradually attract the rest of the
i

t

l

population.
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Figure 3.7:
No convergence on a single network without duplication.

Figure 3.8:
Convergence on a single network when duplication is possible.
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In conclusion, there is no iron law of convergence.

The

tendency of networks to converge depends on the -specific pattern of
communication, the extent to which demand is concentrated or
dispersed, and whether duplication is possible for all, few or no

members of the population.

The model proves that the tendency of

users to converge on a single telephone system depends on the way

the demand for telephone calls is distributed among the members of
a population.

The (unrealistic) assumption of uniform demand will

always result in convergence.

Other assumptions, however, show

that separate networks can be a stable outcome of user decisions,

particularly when duplication is a possibility.

If as a matter of

historical fact convergence did take place, then we are given some

valuable clues about the way the demand for telephone
communications among the population was structured.

III
Access Mapping Methodology
The maps on pages 134 - 144 are representations of the
telephone calling universe of three cities between 1894 and 1920.
The cities selected for mapping were Fort Wayne, Indiana, Los

Angeles, California and Utica, New York.

The maps show which

cities could be called by a Bell or independent subscriber in the
selected city.

Cities are represented by circles, the sizes of

which are proportional to their population in 1910.

The circles

are color-coded to show whether the city was served by a Bell,
independent, or a Bell-connecting independent exchange.

Cities

with competing exchanges are represented by pie graphs showing the
proportion of Bell and independent subscribers.

The map does not
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represent the mere

prese~ce

of telephone exchanges or the physical

configuration of telephone lines.

It is an attempt to show which

cities could be called by a Bell or independent subscriber in the
selected city at various points in time.

To be shown as orange on

the map, a Bell subscriber in the city chosen as the point of

reference had to be able to call the exchange in question.

Cities

shown as yellow had to have an independent exchange that could be
called by independent subscribers in the city of reference.
The relativity of the representation to a specific city is the
key to the concept of access mapping.

The access universe offered

by today's telephone system is perfectly homogenous.

That is, a

user in anyone city can call the same people and locations as a

user in any other city.
1920.

This was not the case between 1894 and

When a telephone system is imperfectly interconnected the

points accessible to a user are different for every city.
system had an individual IIperspective," as it were:

The

which cities

could be called depended on where one was calling from and the
network to which one subscribed.

That is why individual cities

were selected for access mapping and why the maps are only valid
for those individual cities.
The scope of the maps is limited to a relatively small
geographic area.
Indiana and Ohio.
California.

The Fort Wayne map shows the states of Illinois,
The Los Angeles map is confined to Southern

The Utica map is limited to New York state.

With the

exception of the independent exchange in Los Angeles, which did not
make any interstate connections, the range of communication of both

Bell and independent subscribers extended beyond the geographic
area shown.

A more extensive map, however, would have imposed
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unmanageable data requirements.

The limitation is justifiable,

moreover, because the maps do show the area that would have been

most important to subscribers in the selected cities.

All the

available evidence suggests that the ability to place calls to
points more than 400 miles away was a negligible factor to an
overwhelming majority of telephone users at that time.
The concept of "telephone access ll is not unambiguous.
Documents in the Bell Labs archives show that around 1900 it was
fairly common for Bell operators to manually repeat messages over
long distance circuits if the speakers' voices were too faint to be
heard unaided. [5J In a purely technical sense, the speakers were
inaccessible to each other, hut the intervention of a human
IIrepeater" allowed a conversation to take place.

Both Bell and the

independents often placed public toll stations in cities where they
lacked exchanges;

thus, although all the exchange subscribers in

that city could not be reached by one of the two systems, they were
able to place outgoing calls on either system.

It was also

possible for independent exchanges to be connected physically by
long distance lines but still be inaccessible if the call had to
pass through an excessive number of switching offices to get to its
destination.

Each transfer increased attenuation and waiting time,

and beyond a certain number placing a call was either physically
impossible or so inconvenient as to be worthless.

This was more of

a problem with the independents than with Bell, for after 1900 the
Bell system began to consciously organize the relationship between
local feeder lines and through circuits in ways that avoided these
problems.

For the purpose of constructing the access maps, the

following operational definition of lIaccess li was used:

a city was
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included as accessible by telephone only if there was a telephone
exchange there (toll stations only don't count), and only if a
direct, real-'time connection was possible.
account for waiting time.

No attempt was made to

For independent exchanges, only

connections that required 5 or less switches were counted as

accessible.
The maps graphically display developmental patterns that are
described in greater detail in the narrative.

It is apparent from

the 1894 maps that prior to the expiration of the patent the Bell
system concentrated its development on major cities and neglected

small towns.

This pattern is particularly evident in the Ohio,

Indiana and Illinois territory.

A white circle means that no Bell

exchange was established in the town, or, if there was a Bell
exchange, that it was not accessible from Fort Wayne because of

inadequate toll facilities.

The large number of unoccupied or

unconnected small towns in the area around Fort Wayne in 1894 is

apparent at a glance.

That Ohio and Indiana became the financial

and organizational heart of the independent movement should not be
surprising.

The reader should also bear in mind that the maps do

not show any towns with populations less than 2,500.

If these were

shown, the lack of coverage would be even more apparent.
From 1894 to 1913 the Bell system dramatically extended its
system.

The maps show that many new exchanges were established in

smaller towns and that Bell entered into interconnection
arrangements with independents in other'areas.

These

interconnected or "sublicensed" (see Chapter 6) independent
exchanges are color-coded black.

The maps show that successful

independent exchanges which had attained a dominant share of a

..
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city's subscribers were after 1906 induced to join the Bell system,
thus decreasing the scope of independent access.

The Utica

independent exchange, for example, was cut off from connections to

independents in and around Albany when the independent in Auburn
was bought out by Bell and other exchanges that once formed part of
the independents' link between Utica and the cities to the east
were sublicensed.

In the Los Angeles area, independent exchanges

that had beaten their Bell rivals in exchange competition were
sublicensed and brought into the Bell system.
The urn model can be used to analyze and interpret the maps,

but the model itself cannot be directly confirmed or refuted by
them.

The model isolates the effects of interdependent demand on

network competition.

By eliminating all factors except for

interdependence, the model attempts to illustrate network

externality behavior in its purest form.

In the model, the only

issue affecting sameone's subscription decision is who else

subscribes.

It does not take into account whether one network has

lower or higher prices or better or worse service, whether a

network is profitable or not, or whether a network has liberal or
restricted access to capital.

These factors, of course, all played

an important role in the actual historical process.

Being based on

empirical data, the maps reflect these influences in addition to

the effects of demand interdependence.

Thus, there can be no

simple, isomorphic correspondence between the processes of the

model and the developmental pattern shown in the maps.
There are two other reasons why the urn model cannot form the

basis of a rigorous social science test.

The model requires that

the actual communication probabilities of all users be known.

That
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kind of detailed and complete historical data is simply not
available.

Also, the model assumes that the said communication

probabilities are fixed.

In fact, the communication patterns of

early Twentieth Century Americans changed dramatically over the 25
year period covered here, as populations shifted, urbanization and
industrialization took hold of the economy, and new communication
and transportation technologies were adopted.
If the model is not a Uhypothesis" which can be "confirmed" or
"refuted ll by the maps and the historical data, what is it?

The

answer is that it defines a kind of process which can be compared
to the empirical data and used to interpret and analyze it.

Demand

interdependence may not account for the whole story of telephone
competition, but it was certainly an important part of the story.
By identifying the dynamics of access competition in the abstract,
the model makes it possible to recognize certain patterns and to
ask more precise questions of the historical record.

The model suggests, for example, that highly interdependent
(i.e., evenly distributed) communication patterns among a large
popUlation lead to convergence on a single system, whereas dual
service competition can be sustained for a long time among users
whose communication activity is strongly concentrated on a small

but diverse group of other users.

While this does not tell us that

convergence will or will not take place in any specific historical
instance, it does clarify what kind of empirical data would be
needed to properly investigate the matter.
Looking at the maps in the light of the urn model does provide
some interesting clues as to how demand interdependence entered

into the Bell-independent competition.

The maps show clearly that
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when convergence did take place it was quite localized.

Either it

was confined to a single city and its immediate -suburbs, or, when a

major urban center was involved, it occurred over a radius of about

50-80 miles.

It did not occur over the nation as a whole.

Telephone communication patterns, then, may have been increasingly

interdependent at the regional and local level, but long distance
communications at this point in history still conformed to the kind
of matrix values that would sustain dual service.

The Southern California map, for example, shows that despite
the Bell system's connections to northern California and

neighboring states, the independent exchange in Los Angeles was
able to hold onto half of the city's subscribers for an extended
period of time.

The Los Angeles independent did not make any

interstate connections and for most of its existence had no access
to San Francisco, Oakland, or points north.

Prior to 1898, the Bell system had established very little
presence in Indiana's small towns.

The independents (shown in

yellow) rushed in to fill the gap.

By 1898 the Fort Wayne

independent exchange controlled the majority of that city's
subscribers.

By 1913 this lead had become an overwhelming one.

From 1906 to 1913, Bell sublicensed many of the independent
exchanges in Fort Wayne's vicinity, giving it access to these

cities and denying it to the independents.

While Bell's lack of

access to the surrounding territory made it possible for the Fort
Wayne independent exchange to grow rapidly at Bell's expense, once

Bell improved its position in the surrounding areas it failed to
erode the independent's dominance in Fort Wayne.

With the bulk of

telephone communication being local, the expanded short and long
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distance connections offered by the Bell system were not enough to
overcome the inertia associated with the Fort Wayne independent's
near-monopoly control of local exchange service.
The situation is quite different in the regions surrounding

the major urban centers of New York and Chicago.

There convergence

effects seem to have been felt over a 50 to 80 mile radius.
Independent exchanges in medium-sized towns within 50 miles of
Chicago, such as Peoria, Elgin, and Aurora, have by 1913 begun to
shrivel, because of their lack of access to the great metropolitan

hub.

Independent exchanges further downstate, on the other hand,

continue to hold on to respectable portions of the subscriber
market.

Likewise, Bell's monopoly control of exchange service in

New York city seems to have had a stultifying effect on independent
exchanges over an 80 mile radius, affecting independents in

Northern New. Jersey (not shown on the map) and well into New York
state.

This can be interpreted as evidence that the formation of

large urban centers created a regionally interdependent
communication pattern.

Whether dual service would have been viable

had there been a competing exchange in New York city we will never
know--but it is clear that the absence of competition in New York
itself thwarted dual service competition in the surrounding areas.
The maps conflict with the common belief that Bell's superior
long distance technology was instrumental in defeating the
independents.

The patented technologies would only have given Bell

an advantage in providing calls over 200 miles in length.

Both the

historical data and the example of the model suggest that such
ultra-long distance connections were a negligible force in leading

to convergence at the local level.

11.&;%,

Mil.

,

" ;:uo.

The demand for long distance
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connections would be concentrated on a small number of users rather

than evenly distributed over many users.

The model showed that

this kind of demand structure can sustain dual systems.

When the

communication patterns of a minority group are strongly
concentrated on a small number of users outside the majority
network the tendency to converge on a single system can be

nullified.

The maps provide some empirical support for this

viewpoint.

In many cities one of the local exchanges controls 75

to 90 percent of the subscribers.

This did not, however, lead to

total elimination of the competing exchange in all cases.

A small

sliver of the subscriber pie remained with the minority exchange.
These diehard subscribers were business users who wanted long

distance connections that the dominant system did not offer.

In

Fort Wayne, for example, the near-total dominance of the

independent did not lead to the loss of all Bell subscribers.
demand of the Bell remnant was almost certainly concentrated on

long distance points that could not be reached through the
independent system.

_@tpd
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ACCESS MAPS:
b!,;;§!,;;~Q·

Red: accessible to Bell system subscribers
through a Bell-owned exchange.

Black: accessible to Bell system
subscribers through an independent
connecting

e}~change~

Yellow: accessible to independent
subscribers through an independent
e>:change ..

Pie charts: dual service cities.
Colored
areas indicate proportion of telephone
subscribers controlled by Bell (red),
Independent (yellow), and Bell-connecting
sublicensee (black).

Pie charts with white areas: dual service
cities in which an independent exchange
controls the white portion of the market
but is not accessible to independent
subscr ibers in the city of reference ..

o

Uncolored cities: telephone

e}~changes

accessible to either the Bell or
independent subscribers in the city of
reference ..
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
[1] A similar argument was made in Gerald Brock, "Telephone
Pricing to Promote Universal Service and Economic Freedom," Federal
Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policies, Working

Paper #18 (1985). A telephone network is described as N*(N-l)
different products, where N is the number of persons and N"(N-l) is
the number of potential conversations.

I thank Professor Marvin

Sirbu for bringing this paper to my attention.
[2] See John T. Wenders, 1987, The Economics of
Telecommunications (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger) p. 171-190, where a
telephone company's use of its control of local exchange
subscribers to exert leverage over the long distance market is

described as an abuse of monopoly power.
[3] The system failed to converge after 50 sampling cycles.
[4] The system failed to converge after 200 sampling cycles.
[5] On the use of human repeaters, see Doolittle to Cochrane,
January 16, 1901, "Hudson River Telephone Co.--Toll Requirements."
Box 1330, AT&T-BLA. Doolittle observed that many of cancelled
calls were from "-women who do not seem to talk loud enough and
[who] declined to have the messages repeated. Men, as a rule,

agreed to have the call repeated."

(p.

8)
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Chapter 4
Prologue.

The telephone war that erupted in 1894 had been gathering
force for fourteen years.

There had been a brief bout of

competition from 1878 to 1880, when the Western Union telegraph
company attempted to enter the business using instruments invented

by Thomas Edison and Elisha Gray.

The national Bell Co.

defended

itself against the telegraph giant by filing a lawsuit claiming
that Western Union's telephones infringed its patents.

Late in

1879, the two companies reached an out-of-court settlement which
ceded the telephone business to the Bell Company while leaving
Western Union's telegraph monopoly undisturbed. [1] The agreement
cemented Bell's control of the business from 1880 until 1894, when
the last patent protecting Bell's original invention expired.

This

experience with monopoly set the stage for the superheated rivalry
that followed in three distinct ways.
1.

A Legacy of Suppression.

The Bell patents did not automatically give it a monopoly.
Alternative companies sprang up like crabgrass all through the
1880s, and Bell had to actively suppress them.

The usurpers could

be small, local enterprises or nationally organized stock
promotions.

Any inventor, backyard mechanic or charlatan who

claimed to have invented a telephone could and did serve as the
front men for entrepreneurs who needed a-patent to enter the
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business. [2] The tel~phone instrument was a fairly simple and
inexpensive device to make once the principle of voice transmission

by electrical analogue was understood.
Some of the Bell challengers swore that they had beaten Bell
in the race to discover the telephone.

Daniel Drawbaugh, a

self-described "prac tical machinist" from rural Cumberland County,

Pennsylvania, was thrust forth as the telephone's true inventor by
the backers of the People's Telephone Company.
Myron Baxter, Dr.

James W.

Others, like Dr.

Rogers, Antonio Meucci and the maker

of the "Molecular" telephone, introduced slight modifications in
the design or asserted that their device was based on a
fundamentally different principle that did not infringe the Bell
patents.
The real subject of this litigation was not who invented the
telephone, but who would get to profit from its commercial
development.

The high price of Bell telephones aroused the enmity

of many subscribers and the avarice of many a potential competitor.
A rival patent claim, no matter how spurious, gave promoters the
pretext they needed to organize a company, sell stock and begin to
install lines and phones. [3] And there was always the chance that
their claims might be sustained by the courts.
when the U.S.

Not until 1887,

Supreme Court upheld the controlling nature of

Bell's patents in a case combining many challenges to his rights,
was the issue clearly settled. [4] In the interim, the electrical
journals of the 1880s routinely published notices of non-Bell
telephone companies being formed--as well as notices of their being
closed down after a few months for infringing the Bell patents. [5]
All told, the Bell Company was involved in 600 separate
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infringement cases during those years. (6] To the extent that it had
a monopoly, its exclusive control was a product of constant,

aggressive legal action against alternative companies.

Two specific cases from the mid-1880s illustrate the nature
and consequences of this strategy of suppression.

In May, 1884,

two promoters paid $15,000 for the telephone patents of one Dr.
Myron L.

Baxter.

They formed the Baxter Overland Telephone and

Telegraph Company and began construction in the city of Utica, New
York.

By October of that year the Baxter Company was operating a

telephone exchange with 300 subscribers, and had built up the
physical capacity to serve 800.

Whatever the merits of Dr.

Baxter's patent, the operating company was not a fly-by-night stock
promotion scheme but a serious effort to provide telephone exchange
service.

The construction and service quality of the new Company

were reputed to be exceptional, and its rates were less than half
those charged by Bell.(7] During the winter of 1884 the Bell
exchange began to lose subscribers while the Baxter exchange grew.
The national Bell organization finally took notice, and on May 17,
1885, the Baxter exchange was shut down by an infringement suit.
At about the same time, an Indiana farmer named John Crump
obtained non-Bell telephones from Canada and set up a private line
between his house and the home of one of his tenants on an
adjoining farm. (8] Crump was not selling telephones or telephone
service--the line was for his own personal use.
line or exchange anywhere near him.

There was no Bell

Had he gone to the nearest

Bell licensee for his phones he would have had to pay $100 a year
to lease them, and he still would have had to set up the line at
his own expense. (9] Nevertheless, Crump was soon visited by Bell
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agents.

They warned him that he was in violation of the law, and

then confiscated his telephones.
Examples such as these could be multiplied.

Throughout the

1880s, scores of local and national business interests had been

willing and able to compete with Bell in the supply of telephone
equipment and service.

Thousands of farmers had always been eager

to take the technology into their own hands.

For fourteen years

these forces of spontaneous development were held in check by
injunctions, fines, and confiscations.

For all that, the shoots of

illegal competition were never completely exterminated.

As late as

1889-1891, well after the decisive Supreme Court decision, it is
not hard to find reports of independent local telephone companies
either starting up or being closed down by injunction. [10]
The expiration of the Bell patents should not, then, be viewed
as the beginning of the competitive movement;

it was more like the

disintegration of a dike that for many years had protected the
Boston corporation from a raging flood.

The suppression of

independent activity prior to patent expiration also helps to
explain the ideologically charged character of the later rivalry.
Here was a distant, impersonal corporation growing rich by
maintaining a legal strangehold on a popular, useful device.

The

scenario could not have corresponded better with the archetypes of
Evil promoted by populism.

The publicity organs of the independent

movement ceaselessly reminded their readers of what it was like in
the bad old days of monopoly.

Even the names of the early legal

independents often mirrored those of the suppressed companies of
the l880s:

the Peoples Telephone Co., the Citizens Co., etc.

The experience also deeply impressed itself upon the attitudes

,

,
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of the national Bell'company.

As one independent propagandist put

it, after fifteen years of skirmishes with patent violators, Bell
managemement "had come to believe, and believe honestly, that
anyone who attempted to enter the telephone field, no matter
through what gate, was a lawbreaker--an infringer--an
interloper." [llJ

2.

Rate Wars.

Bell's successful defence of its patent gave it the power to
make monopoly profits on its telephones.

The national company was

not at all bashful about exploiting this power.

It required its

licensees to lease rather than buy the telephones manufactured by
its Western Electric subsidiary at an annual charge of $14 for each
set.

Since the machinery itself cost about $4 to make, American

Bell guaranteed itself large profits on every telephone in service.
As protected monopolies, the operating companies were able to
recover these costs in their subscription rates.

The instrument

lease price paid to American Bell accounted for one fourth to one
half of the subscription price in small and medium-sized exchanges.
There was, however, some concern that high prices were

restricting the number of users.

Some operating company managers

complained that the royalty payment should be reduced because it
was retarding public adoption of the new technology. [12J Theodore
Vail, American Bell's general manager, agreed.

American Bell's

ability to pay stockholders high dividends had come at the expense
of development, and in the long run underdevelopment threatened
Bell's control of the market. [13J
Bell's attempt to reap monopoly profits on telephones fueled
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public suspicions that the company was gouging its captive market.
But the price of the telephones themselves was only one source of
discontent over rates.

Far more important in the long run was that

the licensee companies' operating costs steadily increased

throughout the l880s.

The resulting rate increases were not abuses

of monopoly power, but were legitimately rooted in the economic and
technical characteristics of the telephone exchange.
In 1877, Bell managers had assumed that the local companies
were basically in the business of leasing telephones.

The

telephone did not catch on, however, until the invention of the
exchange, a place where the users' wires converged to allow any two

of them to be interconnected. [14] As switching became more
important, the licensees' functions changed.

They were no longer

there just to lease out machines and collect the rent.

They became

operating companies with a large labor force and huge investments
in switchboards and outside wires and cables.

The telephone

transmitter and receivers themselves had become the least prominent

part of the operation.
As the business underwent this transition, Bell managers made

a disturbing discovery:

the average costs of telephone exchanges

increased as they grew.

Until 1881 the rates of the licensee

companies were still based on the idea that they were leasing out
telephones.
$40.

Most companies charged flat yearly rates of $20 to

Like their subscribers, Bell managers had expected their

operations to realize economies of scale as more subscribers joined

the exchange.

In fact, the reverse was true.

Increasing the size

of an exchange made it more expensive to rUn. [15] Large, urban
exchanges incurred average costs three or four times those of

w_

.. ;
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exchanges in smaller cities.
The primary source of the problem was the switching process.
As the number of subscribers grew, the number of possible
connections among them grew much faster--rough1y as the square of
the number of subscribers.

Consequently, switchboards became

increasingly expensive to construct, and the operations needed to
make connections increasingly complex and slow, as more people
joined the exchange. [16] Growth created diseconomies for other
reasons. too.

It usually meant longer per subscriber wire mileage

and more expensive cable and pole construction.
By 1881, Bell managers had come to a rather grim conclusion:
expansion had to be accompanied by rate increases.

Edward J.

Hall, President of the Buffalo exchange and later the Vice
President of AT&T, made this explicit in a report before a
conference of telephone managers.

Only three or four of the more

than 300 exchanges in operation in 1881 were able to pay for
themselves at then-existing rates. [17] Hall claimed that "the rapid
and unexpected growth of the exchange system gave no time for
deliberation or study. and forced the adoption of rates which must
be changed for our self-preservation, even although it places us in
the light of a monopoly taking advantage of its position.n[IS] In
noting that it would probably be necessary to raise rates $5 for
every 100 new subscribers,

H~ll

added:

"any system which does not

provide for that expansion is going to be involved in continual
conflict with the public. "[19J
What was intended to be a warning turned out to be a prophecy.
The need for growth-induced rate increases did involve the Bell
companies in "continual conflict with the public" throughout the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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l880s.

Users responded to higher prices with outrage and

frustration.

They expected a bigger exchange to offer lower rates,

as in any other normal business ·endeavor.

As one report of a rate

controversy observed, "As surrounding towns with but 50 or 100
subscribers were getting service for $48 and $36, they could not
see why a subscriber to an exchange of 350 should pay more."[20]
With no alternative to the Bell company, they felt helpless and
exploited as rates went up.

Characteristically, the telephone-using public of the l880s at
first responded to rate increases with "combinations of citizens;"
that is, organized boycotts of the service.

A rate increase

announcement in Rochester, New York late in 1886, for example,
provoked a series of protests and mass meeetings among telephone
users, who agreed to order out their phones until the increase was

revoked. [21] Evansville and Terre Haute, Indiana were also the
scenes of widely publicized telephone boycotts. [22] In Terre Haute,
nearly half of the city's users removed their telephones on the
same day in protest of a rate increase.
The boycotts failed to have any lasting impact on rates,
however.

Most users found that the telephone had become

indispensable to their business.
it was only a threat.

A boycott was most effective when

If the telephone company called their bluff,

users found that the attempt to do without telephones was very
costly.

During the Terre Haute boycott, for example, "loud

complaint was heard from the surrounding towns, which were unable
to get the usual connection with Terre Haute merchants.
Considerable trade in consequence went to Indianapolis."[23] Within
a month or two, most users had restored their service at the higher

X m·W!
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rates.

With boycotts eliminated as an effective check on rates, some
states turned to legislation.

The Chicago exchange, for example,

had raised its rates from $75/year to $125/year in 1882, leading to
a temporary decrease in the number of subscribers. [24] In 1889 a
bill to reduce rates in Chicago to $72/year was introduced in the
Illinois legislature.

Similar attempts to limit or reduce rates by

state law were introduced in 1891 and 1895.

None of these bills

passed, but the recurring attempts at control indicate that there
was concern with rising rates.

In the state of Indiana, conflict

over rates did lead to legislation.

A state law passed in 1885

established detailed control over subscription and toll rates. [25]
The legislated rates were so low that the Central Union Company
informed its customers that it would close down all operations in
the state as of June 3D, 1886.

For the next two and a half years,

all exchanges in the state save that in Indianapolis were shut
down.

The decision stood until the maximum rate law was repealed

in February, 1889.
Ultimately, neither legislation nor boycotts gave the
telephone-using public the kind of redress it desired.
were a costly and ultimately ineffective weapon.
too clumsy, arbitrary and drastic.

Boycotts

Legislation was

In this context, the idea of

starting an alternative telephone company backed by local capital
and managed by local businesspeople looked very attractive.

As we

have seen, hundreds of localities chose this option during the
1880s in flagrant disregard of its illegality.

Most, however, were

forced to acknowledge that any conceivable form of competition
would infringe the Bell patents.

So the local telephone users
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swallowed their frustration, paid their bills, and looked ahead to
a time when challenges to the monopoly would be legal.
Yet the link between exchange growth and rising costs would
return to haunt Bell's competitors.

Independent exchanges found it

easy to undercut Bell rates when they first entered the field.
They soon attracted so many customers, however, that their unit
costs increased.

Because many localities conceived of competition

as a method of rate regulation, they wrote provisions fixing rates
into the new company's franchise.

As the independent grew, it was

forced either to lose money or to ask for a rate increase, thus
reneging on its promises and calling into question what many
citizens saw as the justification for its existence.

3.

One System, One Policy.

Conflicts over rates, service and patent infringement all

contributed to the simmering public resentment on which the
independent movement capitalized.

But two other factors,

pertaining to the organization and goals of the Bell sys'tem itself,
were equally important in setting the stage for the competitive
struggle.

These were, first, the national Company's contractual

relations with its local operating companies, which were
consciously designed to protect its control of the business by
weaving its members into an integrated system;

and second, the

Bell Co's vision of the telephone system as a substitute for the
telegraph system, a network of voice communication designed to

serve business users in the principal towns and cities.

The

development plan that flowed from this vision left most of small
town and rural America without telephones or exchanges.
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Looking'back on'the early years of the Bell System after it
had weathered fifteen years of competition, Theodore Vail claimed
that the Bell System had been organized to achieve universal
service all along.
of 'One System,'

"The Bell System was founded on the broad lines

'One Policy,'

'Universal Service,'

11

he wrote in

AT&T's 1909 Annual Report. [26] Around 1918 he made the same claim
"From the commencement of the business,

even more emphatically.

II

he wrote, lIone system, one policy, universal service is branded on
the business in the most distinctive terms."[27]

If by "One System, One Policy" Vail meant that Bell intended
to establish a centrally coordinated monopoly, and by "Universal
Service" he meant nothing more than that Bell aimed at a physically
integrated system whose subscribers could all communicate with each
other, then his claims are undoubtedly true.

Vail was recruited

from the Railway Mail Service in 1878 to serve as the national Bell
Telephone Company's first general manager.

As general manager,

Vail consciously pursued a vision of a nationwide, fully
interconnected system.

"Tell our agents,1I he wrote sometime in

1878, "that we have a proposition on foot to connect the different
cities for the purpose of personal communication, and in other ways

to organize a grand telephonic system."[28] Vail's intentions were
also revealed duri.ng his involvement in the negotiation of a
settlement with Western Union.

Which company would control toll

lines was a major source of contention between the two parties.

Western Union wanted Bell to confine itself to the local exchange
business and allow the telegraph company to control all
interexchange connections.

Vail's biographer credits him with

adamantly rejecting this proposition and insisting on Bell's right

£ .
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to construct and opetate long distance lines. [29]
The contracts defining the relationship between the national
Bell organization and its licensed operating companies provide even

stronger evidence of the nature of Vail's vision.

The Boston

headquarters did not have the capital or the ability to construct
and operate exchanges directly throughout a country as vast as the
U.S.

It relied instead on franchise-like agreements to develop the

business.

Local operating companies were licensed to lease

telephones, raise capital and build and operate exchanges in an
exclusive territory.

These contracts were drawn up under Vail's

direction, and constitute his most important accomplishment as

general manager.
Vail's license contracts were shrewd attempts to reconcile the

need for One System, One Policy with the fact that the system's
actual operations were being conducted by many separate,

semi-autonomous companies. [30] The controlling nature of the Bell
patents were of course the bedrock on which Vail's system of
organization rested, for there was no other legal supplier of
telephones.

In return for the right to lease telephones, the

exclusive Bell licensee in a territory agreed to certain

conditions, the intent of which was to bind them to the national
Bell organization far beyond the life of the patents themselves.
In the perpetual licenses granted between 1881 and 1884, the
licensees agreed to lease only Western Electric-manufactured
telephones, and were prohibited from participating in any telephone
business not licensed by American Bell.

Licensee companies agreed

to give 35-50 percent of all their stock to the parent company.
addition, they had to connect with exchanges outside their

",he 4,

In
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territory through the parent company and were prohibited from
building long distance lines outside their territory.

They also

had to turn over a set portion of all their toll revenues to the
parent company. [3lJ
In his attempt to preserve the control of the national Bell
organization over a unified system, Vail had a very clear

historical precedent to work from.

He had been employed as a

telegraph operator for many years, and was the cousin of Alfred
Vail, an important figure in the early development of the telegraph
industry.

He probably would have known, therefore, that

competitive warfare and fragmentation developed in that industry
when one of the three licensees of the original Morse interests
split with the others and began to operate as an independent,
competing system. [32J The license contract set up the relations
between the parent company and its subordinates in such a way as to
make this a virtual impossibility.
Reserving to the national organization a large share of the
licensee's stock ensured that the former company would always have
a strong voice in the management of the latter.

The Bell Company's

direct control of Western Electric, the only manufacturing outlet
for Bell telephones, erected another safeguard.

The requirement

that the licensee buy equipment from a Bell subsidiary not only
assured the parent company of a steady flow of manufacturing
profits;

it prevented the emergence of alternative manufacturers

who might be able to circumvent the Bell patents.

It also made it

possible to standardize apparatus throughout the system to achieve
communications compatibility.
The same concerns about maintaining control while clearing a
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path for nationwide communication underlay the parent company's
reservation of long distance interconnection rights.

As Vail said

in 1918, "it gave us control of the connection of every exchange
under license with the outside ...

That was the business feature of

the development that we attached so much importance to, because we
believed that no exchange could exist without being more or less
tied up with the others ... "[33J Any licensee company that attempted
to break away from the Bell system, in other words, could be
isolated by its inability to connect with any of the surrounding
Bell exchanges.

Here again, Vail probably drew on the telegraph

industry as a model.

During the l850s, the Western Union had

established control over the western part of the U.S.

by gradually

breaking up its competitor's connecting agreements with companies

in adjacent territories. [34J An increasingly isolated local
telegraph system, faced with a choice of competing directly with
Western Union's larger, more extensive system or merging with

Western Union, usually chose the latter.
Vail's organization, in short, was designed to create an
unified system, impervious to fragmentation and competition, and

capable of connecting all of its customers.

Indeed, monopoly

control and universal interconnection were strongly linked,
mutually reinforcing categories in his mind:
led to one necessarily led to the other.

the conditions which

The supply of systemic

interconnection required centralized control.

Systemic

interconnection, however, was not merely a product to be offered to

customers, it was itself a powerful lever by which Bell's control
of the telephone business could be maintained against centrifugal
or competitive forces.

i%.
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Nevertheless, Vail's claim that the Bell system was founded on
the principle of "universal service ll is only a half truth.

It was

not a conscious distortion on his part, but came from looking at

Bell System organization retrospectively, in the light of twenty
years of independent competition.

Universal service, in the sense

of service everywhere, to everyone,

interconnection within a system.

is not the same as universal

A system can be universal in the

latter sense while being very restricted in scope.

In fact, the

phrase "universal service II never appeared in any Bell documents

until 1907--the peak of the independents' strength--when it became
the rallying cry for advocates of a Bell-controlled monopoly and
the elimination of dual service.

And by that time the scope and

usage of the telephone had been transformed so profoundly that the
concept of an universal system had taken on a meaning far different

from what Vail had meant when he spoke of his "grand telephonic
system" in 1878.
What Vail had in mind during those early years was not the
Ituniversal service II of 1907, much less the ubiquitous network of

1980.

The closest model was the telegraph system of the l870s, a

nationwide, business-oriented message communications network

linking terminals in all the principal commercial centers.

The

telephone would reach largely the same people and places, but
improve the efficiency and speed of communication by relying on
direct conversation instead of written messages and the mediation
of telegraph operators.
That this was in fact the model on which his vision was based
is, to borrow his words,

IIbranded on the business in the most

distinctive terms" if one looks at the pattern of development taken
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by the system in its'first two decades.

In 1894, after seventeen

years of commercial development, the Bell company had installed
only 240,000 telephones, one for every 225 people in the

u.s.

Eighty-five percent of these phones were in businesses. [35] The
remaining telephones were generally in the homes of businesspeople
who wanted to be able to communicate with their offices from their
residences.

A noted Bell agent often assessed the demand for

exchanges in smaller towns by examining its commercial

register. [36] Many new technologies, of course, "trickle down" from
business to the horne as their costs decrease, but in the case of

the Bell system the overwhelming predominance of business users
reflected a deliberate policy, a specific vision of what the
telephone was for and who would be interested in using it.
This conception was modelled after the telegraph system.
Indeed, the telephone operated in a communications environment

dominated by telegraphy for its first twenty years, fulfilling the
role of adjunct to, complement of, or substitute for its

predecessor.

The telephone was first promoted successfully as a

substitute for district telegraphy--an urban signalling service
which allowed users to communicate with the telegraph company from
an outlying call box.[37] The district system served as an
interface between those business and public institutions capable of
supporting telegraph equipment and operators, and smaller users who
could not afford such facilities.

It was, in effect, a local

distribution network for intraurban (as opposed to long distance)
telegraphic communications, aiding in such things as messenger

calling, package pickup and delivery, police and fire alarms, and
collections. [38] The telephone's immediacy and its elimination of

, , 44
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the need for a messenger allowed it to make quick inroads into the
district telegraph market.

Further reinforcing the

complementarity, long distance telephone communications relied
extensively on the local messenger services built up around

telegram delivery to bring their parties together.
The Bell System's conception of itself as a substitute for
telegraphic communication was most clearly revealed by its approach
to the development of long distance communications, and its urban

bias.

From the beginning, Vail was committed to matching the

telegraph network in geographic scope, even though voice
transmission over long distances posed enormous, unprecedented

technical challenges.

(The goal of transcontinental voice

transmission was not reached until 1915.)

Most of the money in

telegraphy was made in intercity communication.

If the telephone

could supersede district telegraphy in local communications, would
it not be even more profitable to replace telegraphy's hold over
long distance business communications?

In 1885, the American

Telephone and Telegraph Company was incorporated in the State of
New York to oversee and promote long distance development.
Until 1889, local and long distance telephone service were
literally two separate, stand-alone systems.

Local exchanges

relied on cheaper Blake transmitters and iron, grounded circuits,

equipment with a speaking range of about 50 miles.

The toll

network used copper metallic circuits and a more powerful
transmitter, and by the late 1880s was capable of transmitting
speech 800 miles.

A subscription to the long distance service,

which was always purchased separately, cost about 35 percent more
than the local service.

The separation of the two networks once
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again reflected a way of thinking modelled on the telegraph
precedent.

Telegraphy lacked the strong demand interdependence of

telephony, because it did not matter whether the sender and
receiver of a message both subscribed to the same telegraph
service.

The message could be delivered by messenger or picked up

at the telegraph company's office.

If long distance telephone

communications required a different kind of technology, it seemed
natural, given this model, for it to be separate from the local
system, just as the district telegraph system was separate from the

intercity telegraph network.
AT&T soon discovered, however, that the development of the
toll business was being retarded by its separation from the local
exchange business.

Most customers did not subscribe to the more

expensive long distance service, and therefore were largely

inaccessible to the users of the toll network in other cities.

In

order to increase the utility of the system as a long distance
network, Bell in 1889 made a conscious decision to integrate local
and long distance telephony. [39] This was to be accomplished by
upgrading the local exchanges to the transmission standards of the
long distance system.

Henceforth, all circuits would be copper

metallic, and only the high-quality instruments would be used.
In this case, the goal of complete system interconnection
conflicted with the goal of encouraging local telephone use by
larger numbers of people.

Upgrading the network increased the cost

of local exchange service. [40]
The transition to metallic circuits proved to be a wise
choice.

The growth of electric street railways and electric power

plants impaired communication over the old, grounded circuits.

The
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utility of a subscription to businesses was greatly improved by the
expanded toll access.

Nevertheless, the decision reveals where the

national organization's priorities lay_

The decision encouraged

intercity communication at the expense of smaller, local users. [41]
Bell was pursuing the goal of a voice communications network that
could cut into the established markets and uses of the telegraph.
A telegraph model is also implicit in the Bell System's
decisions about where to put exchanges.

The United States in 1890

was still a predominantly rural nation.

Over 60 percent of its

population lived in towns with with less than 2,500 people, or on
farms.

The Bell network rather unambiguously ignored this majority

and cast its lot in with urban America.

There were more than 7,000

incorporated towns with populations under 10,000 in 1884, and the
Bell system had established exchanges in only 52 of them.

By 1895,

rural penetration had improved, but the urban bias was still
marked.

(Table 1) In this, Bell was simply following the

developmental trajectory of the telegraph system, which began by
linking urban centers and gradually extended itself to smaller and
smaller towns.
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TABLE 1
Telephone Penetration by Community Size, 1895
Population
Level

1 Number
1 of
1 Places

1 Pct
1 Pct of 1 Pct
1 with 1 Bell
1 of total
1 Exch's 1 Subs
1 U.S. Pop.

-------~--~-I---------I--------I--------I------50, 000 +
1
52
1 100 1 50
1 18

--------------1---------1--------1--------1------10-50,000
1 294
1 98
1 33
1 9
--------------1---------1--------1--------1------2.5-10,000
1 1150 1 49
1 14 1 9
--------------1---------1--------1--------1------Rural
1
1
1
3
1 63
Source: 1900 Census, Bell Labs Archives

The 346 largest cities, representing only 27 percent of the
U.S.

population, possessed 83 percent of the nation's telephones.

What makes this bias revealing is that in many ways, the cheapest
and least technically demanding course of action would have been to
establish many small, local exchanges in the small and medium-sized
towns.

The equipment needed to provide that kind of service was

fully developed and easy to mass produce.

By contrast, the growth

of exchanges in urban centers constantly posed new technical
problems in switching, signalling, operation ~nd maintenance.

Also, because of the diseconomies of growth associated with large
exchanges, small-scale development would have required less capital
investment and fewer workers per subscriber, and less complex
management practices.

Bell was clearly bent on another task.

It was responding to a

specific kind of demand for telephone service:

the demand of urban

businesses for voice telephony as a substitute for, and improvement

upon, the nationwide telegraph infrastructure.

It therefore left

untapped a huge reservoir of public demand for local exchange
service.

.K .,.

Thousands of farm communities and small towns had no
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telephone exchange, and these communities embodied precisely those
conditions which made entry into the telephone business easiest.

The small, local exchanges they wanted required only modest levels
of capital investment and technical expertise.

There were also

hundreds of larger cities in which the demand for purely local
telephone service had been retarded, partly by Bell's monopoly
prices and partly by its preoccupation with a grander vision of
what telephone service could be.

The Bell managers would soon

discover that their attempt to cultivate one grand system had left
open enormous, fertile expanses where hundreds of smaller ones

could grow.
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ChapterS

Access Competition Begins: 1894 - 1897

Alexander Bell's patent on the telephone receiver lapsed on
January 30, 1894.

The event riveted the attention of business and

electrical circles onto the telephone.

The country was in the

midst of a severe depression following the financial panic of 1893.
The electrical trade journals received hundreds of requests for
information about what kinds of telephone instruments could be
manufactured or used without infringing the remaining Bell patents.
"It would almost seem,lI mused the Electrical Review,

Tlthat the

hard-pressed public expect the expiration of Bell's receiver patent
to cure the hard times."[l]
Various interested parties jostled for position, stirring up a
sense of anticipation.

Bell's own licensee companies made it known

that they wanted the royalty payment to ABT reduced or even
eliminated.

State legislators began to draft bills to lower rates.

Full page advertisements from new telephone manufacturing companies
appeared in the electrical journals, offering to "sell telephones
outright" (in contrast to Bell's leasing policy), and assuring
prospective buyers that they had nothing to fear from patent
litigation.

(Figure 5.1) New telephone exchange companies began to

file articles of incorporation--a few of them infringers dating
back to the preceding decade. [2J In what was widely interpreted as
preparation for the coming battle, American Bell Telephone itself
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asked the Massachusetts legislature to increase its authorized
capital stock from $20 million to $50 million, citing the need to
extend its long distance system.

Despite the public's palpable feeling that the era of monopoly
had ended, there was still a great deal of uncertainty about the
patent situation.

The expired patents covered only telephones that

used a metallic diaphragm to transmit speech.

This relatively

primitive system had been long superseded by transmitters and
receivers that operated on the rnicrophonic principle, using a
variable resistance contact.

The microphonic transmitter used by

ABT had been invented by Emile Berliner in 1877.

While Berliner

had filed for protection in that year, for reasons no one quite
understood the application had gathered dust in the U.S.
Office for 14 years, and was not issued until 1891.

Patent

Bell hoped

that the delay in issuing the Berliner patent could be used to
limit independent manufacturers to an obsolete telephone technology
until 1908.

For the next four years it published warnings and

filed infringement suits to harass independent manufacturers and to
intimidate their financiers and customers.

(Figure 5.2) Other

inventions were also used as the basis for infringement suits.(3]

The independents fought bitterly against recognition of the
Berliner patent.

They charged that the delay in issuing it was the

result of illicit Bell influence and that the substance of the
disputed patent was no different than another patent issued to
Berliner in 1880.

If the life of an absolute monopoly was

prolonged by this device, one trade journal thundered, "a monstrous
state of affairs is admitted which, if it cannot be otherwise
remedied, would almost justify the entire abolition of the patent

---
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system."[4] The issue percolated to the highest levels of the
government.

The U.S.

Attorney General took up the independents'

cause, filing a suit to nullify the disputed patent.
reached the U.S.

Supreme Court in May 1897.

The case

The High Court ruled

that there had been no fraud or corruption involved in the delay.
In dismissing the charges of corruption, however, it also refused

to rule on the questions about the substance of the patent itself.
The argument that the invention covered in the 1891 patent was
already contained in the now-expired 1880 patent was, the court

said, "a defense which is open to every individual charged by the
patentee with infringements."[5] To pursue the matter further, Bell
had to litigate against individual infringers.

This it proceeded

to do, but by the end of 1898 the threat of the Berliner patent had
been dissipated by adverse decisions.
Manufacturing telephones was fairly easy.

The real test of

the new companies was their ability to construct operating systems
capable of attracting and holding subscribers.

The anti-Bell

forces embraced this challenge eagerly and, given the complexity of
financing and managing an exchange, rather naively.

By 1897 at

least a thousand new telephone companies were in operation. [6] The
first wave of new entry was not confined to rural areas;

occurred across the board.

it

Hundreds of small towns overlooked by

Bell seized on the opportunity to construct their own telephone
lines.

But there were also attempts to establish competing

exchanges in Brooklyn, New York city, Boston, Chicago and
Philadelphia.

Activity in mid-sized cities already occupied by

Bell was especially vigorous;

194 cities with populations between

5,000 and 50,000 had dual exchanges by the end of 1897.

The fate

175

176

When the first wave of independents did manage to establish a
presence in a major city they were usually ill-prepared to handle
the complex financial and management practices and rate structures

required of a large exchange.

Both of the independent exchanges

started in 1894 in cities with populations greater than 50,000
failed within five years.

The Home Telephone Company of Baltimore,

organized in 1896, offered rates less than half those of Bell but
became insolvent after three years. [10] It was sold to a new
company which had to rebuild the plant and raise rates by 57
percent.

2.

The Rural areas.

Independent telephony is often associated with the small
mutual companies and farmer lines that brought the telephone to
rural America during the early 1900s.

Although both movements were

predicated on the expiration of the Bell patents and their
interests often converged, their identities should not be confused.
Commercial and rural independents were two distinct social

phenomena.
agenda.

Each had its own pattern of development and its own

The commercial independents were engaged in business

competition;

although there was an ideological component to the

rivalry that transcended economic considerations, they strove to
make their systems profitable and to beat the Bell system at its
own game.

The cooperative rural systems, on the other hand, were

organized to bring the telephone into areas that had been deprived
of it and did not consider themselves rivals of Bell.

The

commercial independents preceded the rural movement by about five
years.

According to the 1902 Census of telephones and telegraphs,

774 of the new telephone systems that began operation from 1893 to

,.

.M
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1897 were commercial independents, while only 84 were mutual
companies. [llJ After 1900, in contrast, new mutual systems sprang
up at the rate of 200-300 per year.

Most of the 100,000 or so

independent telephones in operation by the end of 1897 were in
small towns and cities, not in the rural areas per se.[12J
3.

The Excluded Middle.

The real base of the organized independent movement fell
somewhere between the extremes of rural and urban.

The most

successful independents concentrated on building exchanges in small
towns where there were no Bell exchanges, then tied them together
with short-haul toll lines.

Or, they built exchanges in mid-sized

cities and connected them with independent systems in the

surrounding farms and small towns.

The cities on which the latter

kind of independent activity centered usually already had a Bell
exchange.

The independent, however, bolstered its ability to

compete with Bell's local exchange service by supplying superior
telephone access to the surrounding areas.

There was also a distinct geographic pattern to the first wave
of independents.

They were concentrated in what the Census Bureau

labelled the North Central part of the U.S., which included the
states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa,

Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota.

Of the

740 commercial independent systems that were started between 1894
and 1897 and survived until 1902, 424 were concentrated in these
states. [13J This was 57 percent of all independent systems, and
probably accounted for 65 to 70 percent of all independent
telephones. [14J By way of contrast, only six independent systems
were started in the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode

178

Island.

In the thre~ New England states dominated by Bell, 90

percent of the population lived in cities;

in the North Central

states dominated by the independents, only 30 to 50 percent of the
population lived in cities.
The territories and niches occupied by the newcomers

faithfully reflected the gaps in Bell system coverage.

Bell was

rooted in the urbanized, eastern states and had concentrated on

supplying intercity long distance communications of a scope
comparable to the telegraph system.

Its network had started in New

England and gradually spread south and west.

When the patents

expired, AT&T lines were just beginning to extend into Missouri,

Michigan, Kentucky and the South.

The independents, in contrast,

took hold in the cities and towns of the rural, midwestern states
on the periphery of the Bell lines and concentrated on developing
short distance communication between the cities and the country.

While Bell was making it possible for New York to talk to Chicago
and for Boston to talk to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the
independents were making it possible for Massillon, Ohio to talk to
the surrounding towns of Dalton, Beach Grove, Canal Fulton and
Navarre.

Bell had even neglected connections between large cities

and their own suburbs and tributaries. [15]
Believing that exchanges in less populous communities could
not support themselves, Bell usually just ran circuits out from a
larger city and cut in one public station in each small town along
the way.

Such perfunctory service made telephone communication

less than convenient.

Users in these locations had to leave their

office and go to the public station;

and while they could place

calls to other cities on the Bell network, it was not possible for

u

;;;-;
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people in other cities to call them.

Worse, a single circuit

serving public stations in five to ten towns was technically the
equivalent of a gigantic party line.

A call in anyone of the

towns tied up the line for all of the towns along the circuit.
Anyone talking on the line had to contend with constant
interruptions from people in other towns who picked up the phone
and tried to signal the central office. [16]
When the independents established exchanges in towns where
Bell had only a public station, Bell learned quickly that it had
vastly underestimated the demand for and profitability of
short-distance toll service.

It discovered, too, the demand

interdependence of exchange and toll service.

The primary value of

a telephone in small towns was the link it provided to nearby towns
and cities.

Once they were connected to neighboring centers with

toll lines of adequate capacity, exchanges that were not profitable
in and of themselves often generated enough toll business to
support themselves.

The presence of exchanges stimulated intercity

traffic by making the termination and origination of toll calls
more convenient. [17]
There were plenty of examples around for Bell to draw lessons
from.

In West Virginia, new companies started exchanges in the

rapidly growing towns of Grafton, Fairmont, Morgantown and
Clarksburg in 1895.[18] Although Bell exchanges had just been
started in all of those locales, the independents were able to
attract subscribers, according to the Bell manager, "by reason of
the great extension of toll lines.

1I

The towns were situated in a

30 square mile area, each one being about 10 to 15 miles apart.
"We cannot afford to cover that territory with toll lines of the
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character of construction which we have adopted as a standard,1I the
manager wrote.

He concluded:

III must confess to a feeling of

discouragement, and am at a loss to determine what we can do ... to

break down the opposition in our territory."[19] The much-vaunted
superiority of the Bell long distance system was of little help
here.

What was needed most, from the point of view of the average

telephone subscriber, were local and regional connections to the

places with which he had regular commerce.
That this kind of development had the capacity to make serious
inroads into Bell's business had become obvious by the end of 1896.
Companies such as The Western Electric Telephone Company of Britt,
Iowa, the Western Illinois Telephone Co., and The Farmer's
Telephone Co.

of Massillon, Ohio constructed extensive networks of

grounded iron toll lines connecting rural subscribers to city and
town exchanges.

The Farmer's Company used its control of access to

rural telephone users in Stark County to establish a successful
exchange in Massillon (pop.

12,000), the county's second largest

city. [20] The Horne Telephone Company of Ft.

Wayne, Indiana was

connected with over 50 towns by the middle of 1896.[21]
Independent concentration on intensive regional exchange and
toll development was particularly powerful when it took place
within 150 miles of a major metropolitan area occupied by Bell.
The increasingly prominent independent presence in the areas

leading into the city would later (1898-1902) provide the
independent promoters with the leverage needed to open up the city
to a competing exchange.

The ability to supply termination in the

hub cities in turn increased the value of the exchange properties
in other parts of the state.

It was the Bell strategy in
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reverse--a case of the periphery advancing on the center.

As an

independent spokesman put it, where Bell had worked from the top
down, the independents developed from the bottom up.[22] In
contrast to the early independent attempts to wire the cities,

large urban exchanges that were the culmination of four or five
years of prior development in the country and small cities
generally turned out to be the financially strongest and longest
lasting.

Buffalo, St.

Louis, Indianapolis, Kansas City,

Louisville and Minneapo1is-St.Pau1 all followed this pattern.

A

competing exchange was not established in Buffalo until 1901, but
by mid-1896 the Electrical Review reported that all of the
principal towns surrounding that city were connected by independent
systems. [23] Kansas City did not admit an independent exchange
until 1902, but by 1897 independents were thriving in Leavenworth,
Topeka, and Ft.

Scott, Kansas, and St.

Joseph, Carthage, Webb

City, Joplin, and Nevada, Missouri, and many other smaller towns
within 150 miles for whom Kansas City served as the regional
center.

The State of Michigan affords an example of independent
development compressed into an unusually short period of time.

By

1895, competing exchanges had been established in 13 of the state's
39 mid-sized cities (pop.

5-20,000).

Fueled by lower rates,

better rural connections and public hostility to Bell, these
exchanges met with quick success in attracting subscribers.
Cadillac (pop.

In

5,000), Bell held on to only 15 subscribers,

compared to the independent's 120.

In Ispheming, Bell had 100

subscribers at the end of 1897, the independent 400.
Encouraged by the success of smaller cities, independent
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entrepreneurs organized new companies to serve the state's two

largest cities, Grand Rapids and Detroit.

The Citizens Co.

of

Grand Rapids grew from 400 subscribers at its opening in mid 1896
to 2,300 by the end of 1897, surpassing the number of Bell
subscribers by 1,000.

The path to a Detroit franchise had been

paved by a reform mayor, who declared that since telephone service
cost $25/year in Canada and $65/year in Detroit, he would drive
rates down or drive the telephone company out of the city. [24J The
Detroit Telephone Co., which began operating in December 1896, had
little trouble attracting 5,000 customers, offering as it did rates
half the size of the Bell company's.

Eighty percent of the

independent's initial subscribers were said to be refugees from the

Bell exchange. [25J
Then, early in 1897, the New State Telephone Co.

was

organized to "spread low-rate telephone service to all parts of the
state," beginning with the towns surrounding Detroit. [26J Both the
New State Co.

and the Citizens Co.

eventually assumed the role of

a long distance company, connecting their dispersed exchange
holdings in the state with high-grade, metallic circuits.
New State Co.

By 1898,

lines connected Port Huron, Grand Rapids, Lansing,

Grand Ledge, and Lake Odessa. [27J
Bell responded to this flood of competition by suing the
Citizens Co.

and the Detroit Co.

for infringing patented

telephone and switchboard apparatus. [28J When the lawsuits failed
to intimidate the newcomers, it initiated price wars in Muskegon,

Grand Rapids and Detroit.

Business and residential subscription

rates and toll usage charges were cut in half, to match or even
undercut the rates of the competition.

These costly moves,
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however, failed to put much of a dent in independent subscriber
growth.

Independent subscribers remained loyal to the local

company even when they could secure service from Bell for less.

In

many cases Bell was reduced to giving away service for free in

order to prevent subscribers from deserting its system.

The

Detroit exchange failed by 1900, but the Grand Rapids-based
Citizens Company dominated its section of the state until its
merger with the Bell system in 1916.

4.

The refusal to connect.

From the perspective of the 1980s the most striking feature of
the telephone war was the absence of interconnection between the

Bell system and the independents.

The Bell organization had always

intended to maintain absolute control over its own system, and thus
resisted any attempts to make it cooperate with outsiders.

The

independents, too, soon came to see themselves as a mutually
exclusive enterprise, a nationwide movement bent on displacing the

Bell monopoly rather than coexisting with it.

The two interests

thus conducted their rivalry as separate, closed systems, with the
subscribers of one unable to place calls to the subscribers of the
other.

In Chapter 3, this form of competition was labelled "access

competition" in order to distinguish it from price competition.
Access competition consists of rivalry over the scope of a network.

This kind of rivalry gave the Bell-independent contest a special
dynamic.

Every subscriber who joined the independent exchange was

lost to Bell subscribers, and vice versa;

every location that was

reached by Bell but not by the independents (or vice-versa) gave
the former a special kind of leverage over telephone users who
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needed to call that location.

The overall effect was to encourage

both systems to duplicate or surpass the other's access universe.

The decisions that fomented·access competition were made in

the first three years after the expiration of the patents.

The

newly arrived independents were just beginning to organize
themselves and settle on the best approach to relations with Bell.
The eruption of access competition was the cumulative product of
three factors:

the business policy of the Bell system, the

prevailing interpretation of cornmon carrier law, and eventually, a
consensus among the independents that interconnection was not a

desireable goal.

Matters came to a head in March of 1896, when

three separate lawsuits pertaining to interconnection consumed the

attention of the national Bell management.

By 1897, the course of

telephone rivalry was set for the next fifteen years.

Although

legislative efforts to interconnect the opposing interests

persisted, without support from either Bell or the independents
they could make little headway.
From 1893 to 1897, many independent exchange operators
requested physical connections with Bell toll lines so that their
subscribers could speak to telephone users in other cities. [29] The
early demands £or interconnection took two distinct forms.

First,

there were formal requests for the installation of a trunk line
connection between Bell and independent exchanges.

The independent

might propose to extend a line into a Bell exchange at its own
expense, and offer to pay a toll or some division of toll revenue
for each incoming or outgoing call. [30] In other cases, a competing
independent exchange would simply subscribe to the Bell exchange
and install the telephone in its own central office. [31] Then it
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would either orally relay messages between independent and Bell
subscribers or, what was more significant and dangerous from Bell's

point of view, physically connect the subscriber line into its own
swi tchboard.
In the first case, the demand was for a joint operating

agreement that would enable Bell and the independent to exchange
traffic at prescribed rates.

The second tactic effectively erased

the boundaries between the Bell and independent exchanges, allowing
the independent to offer access to Bell subscribers without paying
anything more than the regular subscription price.
A typical request for trunk line interconnection was made in
Mt.

Sterling, Kentucky, a small town about thirty miles from

Lexington, late in 1894.

The manager of the independent exchange

there wrote a cordial letter to the manager of the Bell licensee in
that area proposing to build a line to the nearest Bell exchange so
that his subscribers would be able to call Lexington over Bell toll
lines.

If necessary, he would build his own toll line to

Lexington, but he preferred that the Bell Company "run a line right
into our central office, and let us transmit your business for you

and increase your business here."[32J
When the operating companies referred these requests to the
national organization, they were invariably informed that licensee
companies were not permitted to connect with tloppositionTl

companies, nor could they permit opposition companies to forward
messages over their lines. [33J This blunt dismissal was both
predictable and logical.

While joint operating agreements with the

independents might have been mutually beneficial in isolated
instances, their overall effect would have been to completely
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unravel Vail's plan 6f -organization.

In effect, interconnection

would have made independent companies part of the Bell system
without their having to sign a license contract.

Thus, Bell would

have been helping to build up telephone companies over which it had
no financial, managerial or technical control.

Independent

connecting companies could not be required to buy Western Electric

equipment;

nothing could guarantee that they would route their

toll traffic over Bell lines;

nothing could prevent them from

later building their own, competing toll lines or competing
exchanges.

Later on, the task of technically integrating and

organizing long distance connections would have been greatly
complicated.

American Bell saw the license contract as the only

way to maintain an integrated system under its control--and

integration was also the bulwark of its strategy to control the
telephone business itself.

Now that the patents had expired,

interconnection was the only way to induce operating companies to

become Bell licensees.

Bell management really had no choice but to

resist these early, casual attempts to integrate its operations
with independent companies.

To do otherwise would have corroded

the foundations on which its whole organization was based.
The Kentucky case, moreover, demonstrates clearly the economic
consequences of the two approaches to interconnection.

Had the

independent been allowed to interconnect, it would have had no need
to build an additional line to Lexington.

With interconnection

denied, the opposition companies had to build their own facilities
in order to match the scope of telephone access available through
Bell.

Refusal to interconnect was "anti-competitive ll only in the

sense that it prevented new companies from starting out on a level
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playing field.

In a far more meaningful sense, however, it was the

refusal to connect that encouraged robust competition, because it

impelled Bell's rivals to set up lines and exchanges that
duplicated and competed for subscribers· and traffic with Bell's

own.
When it became clear that overtures for voluntary
interconnection would be spurned, some independents turned to the

courts and the legislatures.

The telephone was already regarded as

a common carrier cast in the same general mold as the telegraph and

railroad companies.

The law regarding the relations between

competing telephone companies was still unclear, however.

The

technical characteristics of the business differed enough to make
the application of statutes and case law based on railroad and
telegraph precedents less than obvious.

It was true, for example,

that state laws required telegraph companies to accept and deliver
messages brought to them by other telegraph companies. [34] Early
telephone interconnection bills in Michigan (1893), Ohio (1895),
Indiana (1895), Illinois (1897) and Wisconsin (1897) seemed to have
been drafted with these precedents in mind. [35] But the transfer of
telegraph messages did not necessitate physically linking and
jointly operating the competing companies' wires.

All it required

was a willingness to accept a hard copy message from one company
for transmission at the second company's convenience.

Telephonic

communication, on the other hand, involved a real-time link between
two parties, and thus would have necessitated integrating the

facilities and operations of rival companies.
Some proponents of interconnection sought to base their claims
on the common carrier status of railroad, telegraph and telephone
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companies.

Common carriers were required to serve all members of

the public without discrimination.

If the concept of the

nondiscrimination could be stret"ched to include service to

competing companies, it could form the legal rationale for
interconnection.

Rivalry between separate systems had existed for

some time in both the telegraph and railroad industries, however,

and the courts had drawn a fairly sharp distinction between
nondiscriminatory service to the general public, an obligation

which was clearly imposed by the law, and contracts with connecting
companies, where special arrangements favoring one company over

another were considered normal prerogatives of business
~anagement.

[36] Compulsory connections that allowed one company's

facilities to be occupied or used for the commercial benefit of a
rival company were considered an unconstitutional "takingll of

private property prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. [37] Still, the
Bell Company had no guarantees as to how the law would be
interpreted in this case,

The first legal challenge came from a financially shaky
independent exchange in Waukesha, Wisconsin.
Telephone Construction Co.

The National

had attracted about 75 subscribers in

Waukesha. [38] In the Fall of 1895, the Wisconsin Telephone Company
discovered that the independent, which subscribed to Bell's long
distance service, had linked the Bell line to its switchboard so as
to allow its exchange subscribers to be patched into the Bell toll
network. [39] When Wisconsin Telephone threatened to remove its
phone and discontinue service, the National Co.
succeeded in obtaining an injunction.

filed suit and

"This will evidently be a

test case," a Wisconsin Telephone official wrote to American Bell,
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"and will have great~weight in similar proceedings which must arise
elsewhere. "[40]
While the Waukesha case was pending, the Norwalk Telephone
Company, an independent exchange competing with the Bell company in
Norwalk, an Ohio town of 7,000, submitted a notice to the Central
Union Company requesting permission to build a trunk line
connecting its telephone exchange with the Central Union's.

The

letter was "carefully and formally drafted, with legal skill for
its purpose," Central Union's lawyer observed.

"It is of value in

showing on what lines the attack on us in Ohio may be expected to
come."[41] News that this gauntlet had been thrown down soon
reached President Hudson in Boston, who went about securing the

best legal assistance available. [42]
Simultaneous to the Norwalk case, an independent exchange in
Madison, Wisconsin sued the Western Union telegraph company in an

attempt to compel it to place one of its telephones in the Madison
telegraph office. [43] Wisconsin Telephone already had a telephone
in the Western Union office, allowing it to call in messages to be

sent over telegraph lines.

The cooperative arrangement between

Bell and Western Union was a product of the 1879 patent settlement.
Because telegraphy was still a far more prominent mode of
communication than the telephone at this time, the Madison
independent's inability to place calls to the Western Union office
limited its value to potential subscribers.

Twice the independent

company asked Western Union to allow it to put one of its phones in
the office at no charge to Western Union.
ignored.

Both times it was

Charging discrimination and injury, it filed suit in the

State Circuit court February 20, 1896.
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It was already well established in law that telephone
companies were required to supply service to all telegraph
companies who requested it.

The Madison case, however, inverted

this doctrine, de~anding in effect that telegraph companies be
required to accept telephone -service without discrimination.

The

AT&T counsel working on the Norwalk, Ohio case recognized that the
principle at stake was closely related to the right to compel
physical connection of telephone companies:

The telegraph company is threatened with the establishment
of a rule of law which might enable not only telephone
companies, but also district messenger companies, and other

similar companies, to compel the furnishing of facilities
for delivering messages to a telegraph company on the
premises of the latter, different from those allowed to the
general public; and, going further, might enable other
telegraph companies to compel a rival telegraph company to
at least allow [theirJ wires ... to be carried into the
office of the defendant company, so that messages could be
there repeated and forwarded; and the next step, of
course, is to compel actual physical connection of the

lines of the two companies. [44J

American Bell was not optimistic about the outcome of the
Wisconsin cases.

In 1882 the Wisconsin legislature had passed a

law requiring telephone companies to "receive and transmit without

discrimination messages from and for any other company ... upon
tender or payment of the usual or customary charges therefor." [45J
This was a straightforward application of telegraph precedents to
the telephone system.

An unfavorable decision might lead other

states to pass similar laws.

Bell looked for a way to avoid taking

the case to its conclusion.

It uncovered rumours that the Waukesha

independent was eager to sellout, and began to make overtures to
its management. [46J When the interconnection issue threatened to
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erupt into litigation in Wausau, another Wisconsin town, Bell
offered to put its own long distance instruments into the offices
of independent long distance users for free in order to preempt the
demand for linking the two systems. [47]
Attempts to avoid the issue notwithstanding, Bell's lawyers
prepared a strong legal defense against compulsory interconnection.
They asserted, first, that its status as a common carrier required

it to serve the general public without discrimination, but not

other telephone companies. [48] This reasoning had been upheld by
the courts before.

In Postal Telegraph Cable Co.

v.

Hudson River

Telephone Co., 467 Supreme Court (1887), the Judge's opinion held:

Now while the rule is well settled that a common carrier
must serve its public impartially, still it must be borne
in mind that its duty is to the public, and not to other
and competing common carriers.

One common carrier cannot

demand as a right that it be permitted to use a rival
common carrier's property for the benefit of its own

business.

This defense, however, relied on the interpretation of statute

law and thus could be superseded by new legislation.

A more

fundamental argument was that the requirement to connect with a

rival company was an unconstitutional "taking" of private property.
This argument had two separate nuances.

Connection involved

physically entering the premises of the company, attaching wires to
its switchboard, and engaging its workforce in the operations
required to connect subscribers.

Such intrusions seemed an

invasion of one company's property rights by another.

But there

was another element to the argument more directly related to the
unique circumstances of the telephone business.

The telephone
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company, its lawyers'asserted, had expended large sums of money and
energy on the construction of a telephone system linking
subscribers allover the state.
small, local exchanges.

Its competitors had built only

If the two exchanges were interconnected,

the small exchange would be able to profit from the sale of
widespread access without running the risks or assuming the burdens

of building a large-scale system.

To allow a competitor to benefit

from the involuntary use of these facilities was nothing more than
the expropriation of its property.

In this argument, the

"property" at issue was not so much the physical facilities of the
telephone company, but the access to subscribers it had created by
constructing those facilities.

In the middle of 1896, this view of the interconnection issue
scored some important victories.

In Waukesha, Bell mooted the

issue by buying out its competitor.

In the Madison lawsuit, the

case for compelling the telegraph company to accept service from an
independent telephone company was rejected.

Relying on the

precedent of the Express cases, the Judge ruled that a common
carrier who makes special cooperative business arrangements with
another company need not extend the same arrangement

indiscriminately to all other companies.

The principle of

nondiscrimination applied to consumers only, not to business
rivals.[49] The same reasoning was used two years later in a case

involving telephone interconnection in New York State. [50]
In Norwalk, the independents themselves suspended the
litigation--not because they feared losing, but because they feared
they might win.
F.R.

According to an intelligence report gathered by

Colvin, a Bell agent working under cover in the independent

...
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ranks,[Sl] most independent exchange operators in Ohio opposed
compulsory interconnection.

The Norwalk case was the first item of

business when the Ohio Independent Association met in March of

1896.

The Ohio meeting was also attended by a delegation from

Indiana.

According to Colvin's sources, "every delegate at the

meeting rose one after the other and roasted Mr.
Norwalk Co.

Graham [the

representative] alive for commencing the

litigation. "[S2] Already, the Ohio independents had exchanges in
seventy five small towns.

(Bell, in contrast, had only 31

exchanges in Ohio towns with populations under 10,000.)

Most of

the towns with non-Bell exchanges were connected, or were in the

process of being connected, with independent toll lines.
Norwalk Co.

If the

won its case, they feared, the Bell Company would be

able to demand and get access to these lines.

This would increase

the scope of Bell's access in the state and undermine the incentive

for telephone users to subscribe to an independent exchange.
According to Colvin, "the whole convention to a man then entreated

Graham to have Judge Wickham withdraw the suit."[S3] After some
soul-searching, Graham returned to Norwalk and became a dues-paying
member of the state independent association.

The Ohio independents

pursued a strategy of building exchanges and toll lines in areas
not served by the Central Union Company. [S4] Nothing more was heard
of the Norwalk Company's lawsuit.
Proposals to interconnect Bell and independent telephone
exchanges continued to surface sporadically in various states

throughout the l890s and early 1900s.

They failed because the

weight of legal precedent was against them and because of the
political opposition of the Bell and independent interests.

From
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the skirmishes of 1894-96 a common doctrine regarding the effects
of connecting competing telephone companies had emerged.

Its

essential tenets were accepted by both the Bell companies and by
most of the organized independent movement, and were bolstered by

the U.S.

Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.

The basis of this doctrine was a distinct way of applying the
concept of property rights to the telephone business.

The

telephone companies were asserting ownership over the relations of

access created by their toll lines and exchanges.

For both Bell

and independent, "competition" meant separate systems supplying

different subscriber universes, each vying with the other to
attract customers.

The subscriber universe itself was their most

important product, the valuable resource they offered to sell to
the public.

Competition was a matter of making that resource

better than one's rival's, which in this case meant more universal.

Interconnection destroyed that form of rivalry by eliminating the
differences in their access universes.

It thoroughly undermine,d

the competitive advantage to be gained by attracting new
subscribers, building competing exchanges and constructing toll
lines.

J.W.

Gleed of Bell's Missouri and Kansas Co., speaking

against a physical connection law proposed to the Missouri
legislature in 1907, put it this way:

My opponent has built up a telephone system of 1,001
subscribers. I have an exchange in which each subscriber
has access to 6,000 other persons. Now assume this
[physical connection law] to have taken effect. Where
before my competitor owned an exchange which gave each of
his subscribers access to 1,000 persons only, now my
competitor owns an exchange in which each subscriber has
access to 7,000 persons. What I may call the 'access
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value' of my competitor's exchange has simply been
multiplied by seven ... without a penny of expense or a
particle of increase in his rate.[55]

The Ohio independents' reaction to the Norwalk case makes it clear
that they too conceived of telephone competition in these terms.
Their plan was to control telephone connections to towns neglected
by Bell, and eventually to attract subscribers away from Bell in
other areas through its control of these connections.

Even the

independents who supported compulsory interconnection comprehended
the issue in the same terms.
unpopular.

Bell, they reasoned, was politically

It won subscribers because its lines reached places and

subscribers that the independents' didn't.

If telephone

subscribers did not have to choose between two mutually exclusive
subscriber universes, one controlled by Bell and the other

controlled by the independents, but could instead obtain access to
Bell toll lines and subscribers while subscribing to an independent
exchange, Bell would lose most of its customers.

One independent

spokesman predicted that with interconnection, IIwe can obtain at

once everyone of their exchange subscribers."[56] American Bell
felt the same way about its toll network linking exchanges in the
larger cities.

Giving independents access to its extensive toll

network would eliminate its leverage over the subscription

decisions of telephone users in the local exchange.
As a commodity around which property boundaries could be
drawn, however, access had an unusual feature.

When independent

companies subscribed to a Bell exchange and then connected the Bell
line into their own switchboard, they acquired the ability to sell
access to Bell subscribers.

Technically, there was no distinction
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between Bell's sale of access to a normal customer of the exchange
and the sale of exchange access to a competing telephone company,

which could then profit from the resale of the subscriber set Bell
had created.

In order to maintain system boundaries, a legally

enforceable distinction between these two classes of users had to

be drawn.

From a property rights standpoint, the situation was

analogous to copyright and patent protection.

Patent and copyright

laws allow the creators of new information to sell access to it

without losing their proprietary control of it.

In prohibiting

unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material or unlicensed use
of patented inventions, intellectual property law distinguishes

between buyers who benefit from the use of the information itself,
and those who use the access to information created by the initial

sale to profit from its resale.
Both sides' unWillingness to interconnect stemmed in part from

their recognition of this unique economic characteristic of
telephone access.

Merging the subscriber universes of competing

telephone companies via interconnection, in their view, undermined
their control of the basic resource ori which their business was
founded:

communications access.

To the Bell interests, interconnection would encourage "all

sorts of small, parasitic companies [to] spring up to sap the
revenues of large companies already estab1ished."[57] The
independent opponents of interconnection emphasized not parasitism
by small companies, but interconnection's deleterious effects on

their own attempts to construct an alternative system.

If Bell

subscribers could obtain access to independent exchanges through
Bell toll lines, who would invest in and who would subscribe to an
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independent long distance system?

If a large city occupied by a

Bell exchange was enabled to gain access to the surrounding towns
dominated by the independents, why would the city franchise a
competing exchange?

By the end of 1897, most of the organized

independent operators were willing to take up the gauntlet thrown
down by Bell's refusal to connect with them.

They confidently

looked upon the thousands of small communities lacking Bell
exchanges and the hundreds of new independent exchanges springing
up in them.

In the two hundred cities with dual service, they saw

independent exchanges undercharging Bell companies and attracting
as many subscribers in six months as the Bell exchange had gathered
in the previous seventeen years.
powerful foe;

They knew they were up against a

their public pronouncements and trade publications

exhibit that blend of strident defiance and paranoia typical of an
underdog unsure of its success,

By embracing access competition as

their modus operandi, however, the independents signalled their

willingness to make it an all-or-nothing battle.
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Chapter 6
The Independent Tide: 1898 - 1906

"There is no longer such a thing in this country as a
telephone monopoly. There are now two large telephone
interests.
One, a mere bantling scarcely more than four
years old, which has not yet fully come to a realization of
its own strength and importance. The other an elderly,
sedate and somewhat reflective sort of monopoly, making
what mayor may not be an honest effort to atone for the
numerous indiscretions of its past. lI [l]

Competition between Bell and the independents took a variety
of forms.

They competed for investment capital and for the

political support needed to get franchises.
relations battle.

They fought a public

They tried to offer more attractive rates and

more efficient service to subscribers.

The primary concern of this

study, however, is the peculiar kind of competition set in motion

by their refusal to connect with each other.

Although price

competition was often foremost in the minds of contemporaries, it
was access competition that established the distinctive economic,

political and social parameters of the process and had the most
far-reaching effects.

One cannot understand the business

strategies adopted by the two interests, the rate policies and
practices that were adopted, the reasons for the growth and
eventual decline of competition, or the problems that ultimately
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had to be addressed by regulators without reference to the fact
that two mutually exclusive networks were at war with each other.

During the first four years of the rivalry dual service had
gained an unbreakable grip on the towns of the less urbanized
states.

Independent exchanges had the financial backing, patronage

and sympathy of many local citizens, and often controlled access to
a larger number of telephone users in a county.

Bell exchanges

attracted business users with more geographically dispersed calling
patterns.

Thus Bell and independent exchanges, even when they

overlapped and competed, were offering quite different products.
Their ability to win subscribers away from each other was limited
by this factor.

Sometimes the independent was acknowledged to

offer superior service, facilities and rates, yet Bell held on to a
core of subscribers because it and it alone offered connections to
certain desireable locations.

At other times the independent

service was poorly maintained and operated, yet was still

patronized for its links to local farmers and businessmen, many of

whom were stockholders in the independent system.

This disparity

encouraged the two networks to duplicate each other.

Substitution

of one network for the other was possible only when both had access
to the same places.

Starting from its foothold in the middle,

then, access competition pushed dual service upward into some of
the nation's largest cities, and outward to the rural extremities.

Table 6.1 shows the growth of dual service between 1898 and 1906.
The independents did not suffer much from their lack of
connections to the Bell system--not yet.

On the contrary, their

exclusion from Bell exchanges and toll lines encouraged them to
invade Bell territory with new exchanges and to organize themselves
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in ways that would facilitate the interconnection of all anti-Bell
users.

The supply of telephone facilities was so far below the

demand for them that there was plenty of room for carving out new
subscriber universes.

While the aggregate number of Bell

telephones grew at a rate of 26 percent a year, the number of
independent subscribers doubled every 18 months.

Much of this

torrid rate of increase stemmed from the establishment of new
exchanges.

Independent exchanges that already existed, however,

usually doubled in size in the first few years of their existence.
When independent exchanges failed, and many did, it was rarely for
want of subscribers.

By 1902 there were 1.3 million Bell telephone

subscribers, about three times the number that had existed in 1897.
But there were nearly a million users of independent telephones.
As a result of this unchecked growth, Bell was forced to make major
adjustments in its non-interconnection policy.
1.

Dual service in the cities.

Until 1898, direct telephone competition had been confined
mainly to small towns, and to medium-sized cities in parts of the

country underdeveloped by the Bell system.

From 1898 to 1903 the

wave of new competition swept into the urban centers.

Table 6.2

shows the starting dates of independent exchanges in cities over
50,000 in population.
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TABLE 6.1
The Growth of Dual Se'-vice.!._1§j'~=12Qj'
-------------------------By E;:change
1894

1898

1902

1906

1909

:~================================================:
A

B

451
22
249
449
466
:---------1---------;---------:---------:---------:
2%

30%

57%

55%

;---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:

A

=

No. of U~S. cities over 5,000 in population with
competing telephone e>:changes

B

=

Percentage of cities c.ver 5,000 in population
with competing e;:changes

By Population

C

1894
1898
1902
1906
1909
:=================================================l
.399
6.189
14.617
15.263
15.0BS

:---------;---------;---------:---------l---------:
D

23%

1%

54%

57%

56%

~=========:=========:=========;=========:=========:

C

=

Cumulative population of communities with
competing e>:changes (in millicons).

D

=

Population of communities with competing
exchanges as a percentage of total population
of all cities over 5,000 in population.

(Sources: Bell Labs Archives, 1900 Census)

TABLE 6.2
starting Dates of
Dual Service in Cities over 50,000 in Population,
1898-1904.
Numbers in Parentheses Indicate City's Population
Rank in 1900 Census.

(7) Cleveland, OH

1898
======
(52) Wilmington, DE
1899
======

(43)
(21)
(12)
(4)

(27)
(65)
(24)
(62)
(30)

Atlanta, GA
Indianapolis, IN
New Orleans, LA
St. Louis, MO

Allegheny, PA
Duluth, MN
Rochester, NY
Savanna, GA
Syracuse, NY

(2 ) Chicago, IL
(19) Minneapolis, MN
(11) Pittsburgh, PA
(68) Wilkes-Barre, PA
1900
======
(28 )
(55)
(64)
(23 )

Columbus, OH
New Bedford, MA
San Antonio, TX
st. Paul, MN

1901
(8) Buffalo, NY
(45) Dayton, OH
(38) Scranton, PA

======
(51) Camden, NJ
(33) Fall River, MA
1902

(40)
(69)
(18)
(50)
(26)

Albany, NY
Harrisburg, PA
Louisville, KY
Reading, PA
Toledo, OH

======
(13)
(22)
(3)
(48 )
(56)

Detroit, MI
Kansas city, MO
Philadelphia, PA
Seattle, WA
Troy, NY

1903
======

(36) Los Angeles, CA
(54) Oakland, CA
(60) utica, NY

(37) Memphis, TN
(61) Peoria, IL
1904

(55) New Bedford, MA
(63) Salt Lake City, UT

======
(70) Portland, ME
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A handful of major .cities repelled the pressure to establish a
competing company.

Of the cities over 100,000 in population, only

Boston, New York, Washington D.C., Cincinnati, Milwaukee and Denver

managed to retain a single telephone system throughout the
competitive period.

Of these, only Washington and Cincinnati

refused to franchise a competitor;

the other cities authorized a

new entrant but the independent failed to raise the capital needed
to build a competing exchange.
Quincy, Illinois typified some of the causes behind the
independents' advance into the cities.

A city of 36,000 in 1900,

Quincy sits on the western edge of Illinois on the bank of the
Mississippi river.

At the time of patent expiration, the 500

subscribers of the Bell exchange there could call Springfield (102
miles away), Peoria (132 miles away), and many other distant cities
in Illinois.

In the city's own county of Adams, and in neighboring

Brown, Hancock and Pike counties, however, there was practically no
Bell presence.

New, independent exchanges grew up in these areas

very rapidly after 1894.

They remained isolated until 1895, when

the Western Illinois Telephone Company of Augusta began to
construct toll lines connecting the independents in the region.
January of 1896 the Western Illinois Co.

In

obtained the city's

permission to bring its lines into the building of a grocery supply
company in Quincy, where a toll telephone was set up.

From

contemporary newspaper accounts it is clear that the line served

small town merchants in the farm counties who ordered supplies from
wholesalers in Quincy. [2] This short-distance service was very
popular with the local merchants and farmers;

it represented a

type of usage that had been utterly neglected by Bell.

The
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convenience of the Quincy telephone line was noticed immediately by
the wholesale merchants of Newark, Missouri, a town of 400

inhabitants forty miles to the west.

They began to raise money to

construct a line crossing the Mississippi river linking Quincy,
Newark, and thirty other points in Lewis, Knox and Marion counties,

Missouri.

Word of the proposed new telephone line spread through

the county newspapers and was received with great enthusiasm. [3]
The money was raised by local stock subscriptions and by advance
purchases of toll tickets.

A submarine cable was laid before the

end of the year.
The Western Illinois Co.

was just one of many independent

companies in the area, albeit one of the largest.

By March, 1899,

it owned exchanges at Macomb, Rushville, and Carthage, Illinois.
It operated 700 miles of toll line in six counties, and maintained

toll stations at 59 towns.

Through its submarine cable across the

Mississippi river it connected with points in Missouri and Iowa;

another cable across the Illinois river at Beardstown linked users
to the farming areas around Springfield. [4] Still, there was no
independent exchange in Quincy itself, the largest city within 100
miles.

The Bell exchange there was closed to independent

connections.

The only way to obtain access to the independent

systems surrounding the city was to pay an independent line to
install a private line and toll station.

The number of these

private, independent toll stations in Quincy grew from one in 1896
to at least 8 in 1903, illustrating the growing demand for
independent connections. [5] These private lines were more expensive
than a subscription to an exchange, and were becoming increasingly
difficult to set up because the lines had to pass over private

210

property in order to avoid the need for a franchise.

The

burgeoning independent presence outside the city lent support to
the idea of establishing a competing exchange.
began to approach the city for a franchise.

Several promotors

Soon Quincy was forced

to debate the merits of dual service.
Independent control of a majority of telephone users outside a
city did not guarantee that it would franchise a competing company.
In cities where public sentiment was overwhelmingly against Bell
(as in Indianapolis or Detroit), or where state laws made it

possible to enter the city without a municipal franchise (as in St.
Louis), there was little debate and only a year or two of
preparation was needed.

In other cities, (e.g.

Chicago and

Milwaukee) public debates about franchising a new company dragged
on for years.

Quincy was one of the latter cases.

Public

discussion of dual service seems to have begun in 1899.

Some

objected to the inconvenience of fragmentation and duplication

while others stressed the need for access to the country.

The

editors of the Quincy Herald apparently had been following the
debate in Chicago, where several proposals to franchise competing

companies had come and gone since 1893.

In March 20, 1899, it

reprinted an editorial from the Chicago Evening Post:

Of what advantage will a telephone rate half as large as
the present be, if one has to have two telephones in order
to keep in touch with the busines world? That is a problem
which is troubling a good many people just now. Of course
the answer is that in time one company or the other would

be forced out.
The new company with the low rate
would begin to absorb the old company's business, and in
the end the old company would be forced to meet the new
rate. With equal rates, there would be a brief struggle
for supremacy, and the one that succeeded in getting the
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larger share of the business in that contest would have
little difficulty in acquiring all of it afterwards. But
how long would this take? And what kind of a time would
the subscriber be having while both were doing business? A
commercial house must have a telephone that belongs to the
company its customers patronize, and if its customers
patrdnize two companies, it must do likewise.

The argument is framed from the perspective of a business user.
The emphasis on the extra expense of a duplicate subscription for
business users is typical of both the early and the later debates
about dual service.

At this early stage, most telephone users

probably were businesses.

But the public debate followed the same

lines much later, when the majority of the telephone users in the
country were non-duplicating residences.

The editorial went on to

express some qualifications about its criticism of dual service:

"The future benefits may be sufficient to justify the costly and
disagreeable interval, but the immediate outlook is unpleasant
enough to cause some hesitation .

. .. the arguments on this case are

not all on one side."[6] The position taken by the newspapers
always played an important role in encouraging or discouraging
competition.

In some cities, the newspaper owners were financially

involved in the independent company.

In Quincy, the weekly Herald

defended what it referred to as Bell's "excellent system.

1I

When

reporting on the growing number of proposals for competing
companies in 1902, it commented sardonically on the duplication

problem by noting that with all the new systems "we will be able to
have a telephone in every room in the house."[7]
The arguments in favor of a new exchange also reflected the
interests of business users.

of a nearby town argued:

In a letter to the Herald, a citizen
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There are only eight or ten business houses in Quincy that
have direct connection with t.hese' country lines and it has

been an effort of great labor on the part of the telephone
managers to even get access to these few places, all the

wires to reach the different outlets had to run over
private property. If the City Council wants to do the fair
thing, instead of running around with foreign promoters and
schemes, let them give a liberal franchise to their own

county system. An exchange at Quincy with 200 or more of
the principal business houses ... would be of immense benefit
to Quincy merchants, besides a matter of greatest
convenience to the country merchants and farmers who do

their trading almost exclusively in Quincy. [8]

ITForeign promoters and schemes ll referred to the proposals Quincy

had received from companies headquartered in Chicago and Macomb.
Localism was always an important factor in the franchising of
competing companies.

Applicants had to obtain the backing of

important local citizens if they expected to succeed.
After five and a half years and at least three separate
applications to establish competing exchanges, Quincy's City
Council franchised the Quincy Home Telephone Co.
1904.

September 19,

Quincy Home was the brainchild of Charles Wheat, a local

promoter who managed to win the support of several prominent
citizens.

The company's automatic exchange system opened in the

summer of 1906.

It replaced many of the older independent toll

lines with copper metallic circuits, and arranged interconnection

with the association of small independents.

In the Fall of 1906 it

organized a separate company, the County Home Telephone Co.
acquire and connect independent lines in the farm areas.

to

In the

first year after the entry of the Quincy Home Co., the presence of
a competing exchange did more to stimulate new subscribership than
to take subscribers away from Bell.

tuc:. ,,,A-,

The Bell exchange, which had
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been growing by about 300 a year since 1902, canvassed for new
subscribers and grew at the same rate.
In larger cities, the dual service debate centered on rates.

City councils approached competition as a way of controlling or
reducing charges, often contrasting it with municipal rate

regulation or measured service as a means to this end.

Cities also

used the threat of a new franchise to attempt to extract rate
concessions from the Bell company.

To the independent movement, of

course, building an access universe comparable to Bell's was the
paramount consideration.

The state associations lobbied city

governments to open their municipalities to an independent exchange

by arguing that businesses in the city would benefit from the
availability of connections to their subscribers.

The Chicago City

Council was told by independent spokesmen that there were "more

telephones within 500 miles of this city which have no telephone
access to Chicago than the total number of Bell connections within
the same territory."

The businessman in the midwest, claimed the

independents, will talk to the jobber or manufacturer in
independent cities from his own office in preference to going out
of his office to a toll station and waiting fiftenn minutes to two
hours to talk to Chicago.

"The inevitable result is that Chicago

businessmen lose a large volwne of business."

The Indiana Mutual

Telephone Association, the state independent organization,

submitted a resolution to the city of Indianapolis in 1898 stating:

The independent telephone exchanges throughout the state of
Indiana have no telephone connection with the city of
Indianapolis, which fact retards the free business
intercourse between the citizens of the towns of the state
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and the capital city . . . . A large percentage of the
business which ought to be carried on within the state is
being sent to outside cities.

These arguments were usually effective ways to prod city councils
into franchising new exchanges. [9] When the city governments were
unwilling to open up their cities, independents were often

successful in winning the support of the public.

In Oregon and

Washington, for example, independent promoters who had been blocked
by city governments obtained franchises by means of the public
initiative and referendum. [10] Voters in Denver and Omaha also
approved competing franchises in 1906.
Still, the independents were often forced to make rates rather
than access the basis of their franchise pitch in major cities.

In

order to gain access, they promised rates half the size of Bell's

and a variety of free services to the city government.

The outcome

depended on how satisfied the local business community was with the
Bell service.
Between 1893 and 1906, nine different companies were organized
to provide competing telephone service in the city of Chicago. [11]
The early applicants (1893-1898) vanished with little to show for
their efforts.

After 1898, however, the prospect of competition

could hardly be ignored.

There were more than 300 exchanges

unconnected to the Bell system in Illinois and Indiana clamoring
for connections to the city. [12] There is also evidence that the
business community thought Bell's telephone service was too

expensive.

A bill that slashed telephone rates in Chicago by more

than half passed the Illinois House unanimously in 1899. [13] As the
newspapers pointed out, the bill was a little more than a public
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relations gesture by the legislators;

its rate reductions were so

extreme that it was certain to be invalidated by the courts.

But

it did allow the politicians to appear as if they were doing
something about telephone rates, which evidently were the source of
widespread discontent in Chicago.
Three well-organized independent attempts to enter Chicago
were mounted between 1899 and 1906.
victory and two defeats.
was franchised Feb.

They resulted in one partial

The Illinois Telephone and Telegraph Co.

20, 1899.

Electric manufacturing company.

ITT was the owner of the Automatic
Using the slogan IIPrompt. Private,

Perfect," it offered automatic switching of the Strowger type and
all single-line metallic circuit service.

The company's rates were

usage-sensitive, charging for each switch up to a maximum of $85

for businesses and $50 for residences, well below the Bell rates.
These rates were fixed as the maximum in its franchise.

It is not

clear when its service actually began, but by August 1906 it had
about 6,000 subscribers.
ITT never lived up to its potential as a competitor of Bell,
however.

The financial interests backing the project were really

interested in developing an underground subway system to transport
mail and parcels.

The telephone business was seen as an easier way

to get the underground tunnel privileges needed for this
purpose. [l4] In 1905 it changed its name to the Illinois Tunnel
Company.

The Tunnel Co.

had to keep up its telephone business to

prevent its franchise from being invalidated, but never

aggressively developed it.

It also failed to connect with the

independent toll lines and exchanges outside Chicago until 1911.
The other two did not get that far.

• ,on

The United Telegraph,
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Telephone and Electric Co.

was franchised to serve Hyde Park

before that neighborhood was absorbed by the city of Chicago.
exchange at 47th and Cottage Grove operated 600 telephones.
December 1900 an ordinance allowing the United Co.

Its
In

to extend

facilities throughout Chicago was introduced in the City
Council. [15] In 1906 another new company with solid backing from
the independent movement, the Manufacturers Telephone Company,
sought a franchise.
In both cases the proposals 'led to lengthy hearings before the
city council committee on gas, oil and electric light.

The reports

that emerged from these hearings tended to support the view that it
was better to reduce rates through municipal regulation or by

introducing measured service than by competition. [16] Both
competing franchises were denied.

Instead, an ordinance imposing

detailed regulation of rates and service upon Bell's Chicago
Telephone Co.

was passed November 6, 1907.[17] The prevailing

attitude was summed up by a Chicago Daily News editorial of 1903,
which opposed dual service as a "scheme to fool the weak-mindedll
but supported action to reduce rates.

"There is no reason why [the

Chicago Telephone Co.] cannot be compelled to give fair rates to
the people when it comes asking for a renewal of its franchise [in
1909].

If that company will not consent to be reasonable let the

city go into the telephone business itself.U[lS]
Indianapolis, on the other hand, authorized a competing
telephone company very quickly.

There were only 2,286 subscribers

in the city of 169,000, and the service of the Bell company in that
city was generally considered to be poor.

A long history of

disputes over rates had marred relations between the telephone

217

company and the state's .citizens;

yet the company's franchise made

no provisions for rate control and contained no expiration date.

In March, 1898, the New Telephone Company obtained a franchise, but
the city Board of Public Works compensated for its lack of control
over the Bell exchange by attaching important restrictions to it.
The New Company franchise fixed maximum rates at $40 for business
and $24 for residences, 55 percent and 50 percent of the respective
Bell rates.

The franchise expired after 25 years and became void

if the new company was consolidated with or purchased by a
competitor.[19] That competition was conceived as a method of rate
control is clear from the franchise itself, which stated in its
preamble that "the principal consideration for the granting of the
franchise ... is and will be the securing of a reduction of

telephone rates to the citizens."[20] By January 1906, the New
Company was serving 9,354 subscribers while the Bell exchange had
grown to 7,670 subscribers.
Independent expansion into the cities was moderated by the
loss of several important exchanges.

The Detroit exchange,

teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, was sold to Bell's Erie system
in 1900.

Contrary to the trend in the rest of the country, dual

service declined in the South.

Due to cheap construction,

unrealistically low rates and a lack of regional cooperation and
interconnection, independents in Mississippi, Louisiana and parts

of Virginia, Alabama and Kentucky were decimated by bankruptcy and
Bell acquisition after 1900.

The Cumberland Co.

was particularly

active in gobbling up financially exhausted independents.

It

acquired twenty noncompeting exchanges and six competing systems in
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Kentucky be.tween January 1900 and April
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1901.

The competing New. Orleans exchange was one of the properties

acquired. [21]
These failures portended financial problems that were to haunt
the urban independent systems.

In large exchanges, the independent

promoter's calculation of the profits that could be made at lower
rates had overlooked two critical considerations:
the diseconomies of growth.

depreciation and

In the first year or two of operation,

the new exchange performed well and appeared to make profits and
even pay dividends.
that the

II

After four or five years, the company learned

pro fits" and udividends ll of the preceding years had not

been profits at all, but should have been retained to renew the
exchange's physical facilities.

They also learned that their costs

increased as they added subscribers, making their initial rates

inadequate.

Compounding the problem, low rates were often locked

into the franchise.

By 1906 the independents in St.

Louis,

Cleveland, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, Toledo, Madison, and many

other cities had been forced to swallow their rhetoric and ask for
.rate increases of 20 to 50 percent. [22] Others began to engage in
acts of financial legerdemain, such as issuing new bonds to pay for
the old ones before they matured, in a desperate attempt to raise

the capital needed to renew and expand.

Access competition

demanded that they expand, become more universal, to remain

competitive, and as the Bell system had learned a decade before,
expansion demanded huge amounts of investment capital.
2.

Dual service in the country.

Around 1900 a new force entered the telephone competition, a
development as important in its own way as the initial wave of

independent competition.

Huge numbers of farmers began to buy

219

their own telephones and wire and set up country telephone systems.

Farmer lines were basically party lines which passed through 5 to
20 houses.

Many were built by cooperative organizations which drew

on their own member-subscribers for capital and operating labor.
Subscribers were expected to maintain their own part of the line,

the poles on their property and their own phone.

Advice on how to

construct them was disseminated to millions of farmers through
periodical publications such as the Farm Journal.

To the large

number of Americans who lived on farms, these neighborhood party
lines provided welcome relief from isolation.

According to one

source, "from the day the second telephone is put on [the line] for
about two months there is never a time when the line is not

busy."[23] Once one line was established in a farming area,
"telephone contagion" struck the whole community.

Nearby farms,

hearing tales of its success, decided to build one of their own.
Initially, each small farm line had its own organization, and

its business had to be submitted to a vote of all of the members.
As the lines proliferated throughout a region, these organizations
made arrangements to interconnect their lines at sameone's house.

Farmhouse Itnodes" usually were not exchanges with switchboards, but
simple serial connections.

They were run by farm wives or

daughters who could be relied on to stay nearby to listen for the
signal bell.

If a person on one farm line wanted to talk to

someone four farm lines away, he or she had to signal and make a
connection through four different homes.

Making a connection could

become a long and socially interesting process.

"I know men ... who

cannot communicate with people in their neighborhood because the
people that keep up the home exchange don't like some of the people
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in the,other neighborhood," complained one telephone company
employee. [24] As the use of the telephone in the area spread, these
small cooperatives often combined and adopted a corporate,
commercial form of organization. [25J Commercial rural systems

averaged about 8 telephones to a line;

the mutual and farmer

systems averaged about 24 telephones to a line.
The telephone Census of 1902 documents the initial phases of a
massive increase in the number of rural telephones.

According the

census, there were 5,979 tiny farmer lines and rural mutual systems

in 1902, and another 15,598 rural lines run on a commercial
basis. [26] Rural lines accounted for more than a quarter of a
million telephones in the U.S., about 11 percent of the total.

As

Fischer has shown, during the next ten years telephone penetration
in the farm areas caught up with and surpassed that of the urban
areas.[27] The growth of farm lines had begun to alter the
longstanding rural/urban imbalance in the distribution of
telephones.
As the farm lines blossomed they were drawn into the
competition.

in the cities;

Farmers wanted connections to markets and merchants

the telephone companies wanted to obtain a

competitive edge by controlling access to rural subscribers.

Thus,

what could have remained isolated, technically unsophisticated and
financially weak systems became connected to and partly supported
by the outside world,

Independent and Bell alike took note of what

came to be known as lithe farm line proposition.

II

This referred to

the negotiations over the terms on which the rural lines would
interconnect with one of the systems.

became a highly sought-after prize.

The once-neglected farmer

One Bell manager who was
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particularly active in urging his local managers to go after the
farmers said, "I say to you managers that whenever you have the

farmers tied on to your exchange you have got the merchants where

you want them."[28] Another Bell manager, decrying the lack of
rural development of the Bell system in the Rocky mountain area,
warned that if the independent got the farmers "he has anchored his
exchange. "[29]
These rural lines are generally counted by economic historians
as part of the independents' "market share," but a large percentage

of them--perhaps half--had no vested interest in competing with
Bell.

Their goal was to bring the benefits of the telephone to

their areas at the lowest possible rate.

They would agree to

connect with whoever offered the best terms, which might be Bell,
the independent, or neither.

Rural telephone systems proved to be

as independent of the Independents as they were of Bell.

When they

became dissatisfied with the toll charges imposed on them by a
connecting exchange, they would frequently disconnect their line
and set up their own terminus in the same town.

Whereas the

organized independents almost never entered into direct competition

with each other, the farmer lines didn't care who they competed
with.

In some cases four different switchboards operated in the

same community due to disagreements over connecting charges.

This

type of competition so exasperated the organized independent
movement that their associations tried to get manufacturers to

refuse to sell equipment to independent companies that initiated
competition when another independent was already adequately serving
the community.

From a competitive standpoint, the farmers were not

independents but "swing voters" who had to be courted by both
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sides.
It was the presence of access competition that gave the

farmers their leverage over the telephone companies.

Dealing with

the farmers was extraordinarily difficult for both telephone
interests because there were no standard terms of trade;

each farm

line had to be negotiated with on an individual basis, and the
farmers were very demanding.

Bell and many urban-based

independents probably would have preferred to ignore them.

The

competition for subscribers, however, forced both Bell and the
independents to seek out the farmers and offer favorable terms for

interconnection.

In 1900, for example, the New York and

Pennsylvania Telephone Co., a Bell licensee, issued a general order
announcing that "during the current year it is the intention of the

company to push the development of telephone service in the rural
districts."[30] The NY & PA Co.

developed two special rural line

contracts, one to establish a small switching station in farm
houses, the other to connect farm lines to a toll station along the

Bell lines.

It was the first time the Bell licensee in that area

had made such an effort.

Not coincidentally, the Company's

territory in western New York and northern Pennsylvania was overrun

with competing independents.

Bell's Cumberland Telephone and

Telegraph licensee of Kentucky, Louisiana, Tennessee and

Mississippi began to offer connections to its system for only
$2/year to farmers who built and maintained their own lines. [31]
This low rate prompted the Mississippi Independent Telephone
Association to charge Bell with predatory pricing before the state
Railroad Commission. [32]
Interconnection agreements could also serve as the basis for
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providing capital or maintenence for farmer lines that had grown
beyond the capacity of the local organization to manage.

Farm

lines were easy and inexpensive to establish, but once they grew
and achieved a wider scope of interconnection the earmers rarely

had the time to maintain them or the capital to upgrade them to
higher technical standards.

When it became necessary to

consolidate the management of many small, separate lines into an
integrated system, a shift from a mutual to a corporate form of
organization usually had to be effected.

This could involve some

form of capital assistance from one of the two telephone interests.

In other cases, the farmers would simply sell their lines to Bell.
3.

Organization of the independent movement.

The anti-Bell forces lacked the centralized management and
common ownership of the Bell companies.

The temptation to refer to

them as "the" independents is irresistable, but the common label
should not obscure the critical fact that no single equipment
manufacturer, business policy, management or financial group held

them together.

Each company had come into existence independently,

and thus any form of cooperation had to be achieved piecemeal
through meetings, negotiations and mergers.

To bring this

cooperation about the independents relied on a variety of methods.
Ideology was one of the movement's strongest bonds.

Independent telephony was a crusade as well as a business
proposition. [33] Its spokesmen capitalized on seventeen years of
smoldering frustration with Bell's rates and service.

In the early

years, patronizing an independent exchange became a cathartic act
of retribution against the trusts, a way of reasserting citizens'

control over the economy.

Independent telephony represented a
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variant of populism which was not anti-business or
anti-capitalistic per se but favored local enterprises over large,
IIforeign" corporations.

The independents appealed to those who

wanted the benefits of the market, industrialism and technology but
were in revolt against the impersonality and abuses of the
large-scale business organizations to which it had given rise.

The

solution to the problems of monopoly and domination was business
competition grounded in the resources and knowledge of the local
community.

Hundreds of independent telephone companies adopted the

name the IIHorne ll telephone company.
the IICitizens" or the "Peoples.

1I

Many others called themselves
The idea of a IIHorne ll company and

of patronizing "home" businesses had a powerful grip on the popular
mind.

Its substance and its appeal were gradually eroded, however,

by the logic of access competition, for in order to compete

effectively with Bell the independents had to tap capital resources
outside the local community and extend their operations to a

countywide, statewide or regional scope.

Independents bent on competing with Bell quickly came to
understand that trans-local coordination was necessary to achieve

physical connections and a common strategy.

As early as 1896 they

began to build voluntary associations, statewide or regional in
scope.

State independent telephone associations emerged first in

the midwestern states of Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania, where
independent telephony was strongest.

These state associations then

assumed a leadership role in organizing a national association.
Representatives from the three state organizations named met in New

York city in March 1897 to discuss the formation of a long distance
organization capable of connecting independent exchanges throughout
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the U.S. [34] Mutual protection from patent infringment litigation
was also part of their agenda.

These consultations resulted in a

nationwide call to attend a preliminary organizational meeting in

Chicago.

The first national convention of the independent

telephone interests was held in Detroit June 22, 1898.

The

convention attracted 500 delegates from 19 states, representing 100
telephone exchanges and 30 manufacturers, and adopted a
constitution and the name liThe Independent Telephone Association of

the U.S.A."[35] The convention proceedings were careful to exclude
Bell representatives from being delegates, even going so far as to
telegraph the home town of a delegate accused of being a Bell
employee for verification of his identity.
The problems inherent in organizing such a diverse group
became apparent at its first meeting.
battles and conflicting agendas.

There were credentials

To some, defense against patent

litigation was the most important goal;

others did not fear such

lawsuits but wanted the association to lobby for favorable
legislation or to help develop toll lines.

The Detroit Telephone

Co., whose city hosted the convention, was so disgruntled that it
announced it was dropping out.

Manufacturing companies,

outnumbered by operating companies, objected when the constitution
assessed dues on them but refused to allow them a vote.

The

constitution was adopted with a "large dissenting element."[36]
Only fourteen states attended the group's second convention, held

six months later. [37]
While long distance interconnection had always been a
consideration in the creation of the ITA, national independent

associations never played a significant role in operations.

At

226

best, they served as a forum for the discussion of policy and

lobbying.

The real work of coordinating independent toll

connections took place at the state level.

The state associations

tried to establish uniform schedules of long distance rates and
establish methods for dividing toll revenues between the
originating and terminating companies.

By 1904, most state

associations had formed clearinghouses to handle these problems for
member companies.

The state associations tried to encourage

uniform technical and operations standards and to enforce a common
For example, it would

business policy regarding its competitor.

expel members who agreed to interconnect with Bell, and urge other
independents to refuse to sell it equipment or exchange traffic
with it.

The independent movement thus relied on its associations

to handle many of the management functions provided for Bell
licensees by AT&T and ABT.
For the independent companies who relied exclusively on state
associations, the lack of a central authority continually

handicapped their attempts to coordinate toll interconnection.

In

November 1904, Telephony Magazine observed that it was "the
exception rather than the rule n that "we are able to offer
competition on messages of over 100 miles.

II

In some cases the

problem was poor construction, in other case-s it was roundabout
routing, in still others it was inconsistent or uncoordinated

operating procedures.

In a speech before the International

Telephone Association, a prominent independent telephone operator
summarized the independent movement's managerial problems:

This is our strength.

. .. we are better able to give

a

227

satisfactory local exchange and "short haul!! long distance
service than companies managed and owned by directors and
stockholders hundreds of miles away. Long distance
service, however, under this kind of management is not
satisfactory. Here is where we are weak:
one company
believes in a three minute time limit, another in five.
One says one half cent per mile is enough;
another
three-fifths cent.
This companies lines are of copper,
that one's mostly iron.
This company uses a code designed

by its own traffic manager, that one the code of its state
association, and the next one no code at all, and so on.
What is the result? Confusion, bad service and

dissatisfied customers. [38]

One response to the disorganization problem was to attempt to
impose a corporate order on the heterogenous mass of independent

activity from the top down.

In 1899, two ambitious attempts to

recast the independents in the mold of the Bell system surfaced.
One was an attempt to merge all of the leading independent
telephone equipment manufacturers into one organization.

The

consolidated manufacturers company, its proponents claimed, would
"standardize telephone apparatus;

... own all patents and employ

the best experts now operating individually and competitively,
under one management, and focus the advantages of all this in one
type of telephone apparatus."[39]
The organizers claimed to have commitments from twenty

telephone makers, representing 90 percent of all independent
manufacturing.

But when the Electrical Review solicited the

opinions of a sample of leading independent manufacturers the
appearance of solidarity dissolved.

Stromberg Carlson of Chicago

and Williams Electric of Cleveland, among others, stated that they
were perfectly satisfied with the prices and the volume of business
they were receiving.

For the companies for whom telephone

production was only one branch of a larger electrical supply
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business, the unification of their competitors offered a chance to

expand their market share.

Companies that produced automatic

equipment saw themselves as a separate market and were therefore
disinclined to join the combination. [40] The independent
manufacturing field at this time included close to fifty firms.
technological or economic barriers to entry existed.

No

Molding this

diverse bunch into a single concern did not prove to be feasible.
An even more ambitious attempt to weld the independents into a

unified force was the Continental Telephone, Telegraph and Cable
Company, organized late in 1899.

The Cable Co.

approached

consolidation from the exchange and long distance operations side

instead of through manufacturing.

Its plan, according to its prime

mover, the Philadelphia capitalist Martin Maloney, was to purchase
stock control of as many independent properties as possible and
combine them into "one great system that would give 'a long distance

service outside of the Bell lines, in any part of the country." [41]
Maloney appeared to have lined up the financial and managerial
support to carry out this plan.

William J.

Latta, a general agent

of the Pennsylvania Railroad, was chosen as its president;

its

financial backers included a Philadelphia group of investors in
street railway properties headed by P.A.B.

Widener, William Elkins

and Thomas Dolan.
The Cable Co.

acquired financial control of companies that

had been organized (but not yet franchised) to run competing
exchanges in Boston and New York.

But it rose to its greatest

prominence when in 1900 it acquired a controlling interest in a
large chunk of the Bell system itself:

the Erie system.

system was a holding company made up of five Bell licensee

The Erie
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companies in nine western states (Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
North and South Dakota, Texas, Arkansas, Kansas and Oklahoma) and

one major city (Cleveland).
Bell subscribers.

It represented about 15 percent of all

The acquisition rocked the Bell system, but

ultimately proved to be the undoing of the Cable Co.

According to

the FCC Investigation, the key Philadelphia capitalists had
withdrawn from the Cable Co.

in the course of making a deal with

the Morgan interests, who did not want to see a nationwide

competitor of the Bell system emerge. [42] This left the company
financially overextended, and within two years it had been taken

over by Bell again.
As previous historians have suggested, the Telephone,

Telegraph and Cable Co.
the Bell system.
planning.

could have become a nationwide rival of

The independents needed both capital and systemic

Whether the Cable Co.

would have successfully provided

those missing links is another question.

Its ability to acquire

financial contiol of independent companies did not necessarily

translate into an ability to combine and manage hundreds of
companies with different conditions and personnel.

The Bell system

itself, with its centralized organization, control of patents and

vertical integration, did not really begin to function as an
integrated system until about 1900.
Cable Co.

There is no evidence that the

ever integrated or even improved the operations of the

independent companies it controlled.

The New York and Boston

corporations it owned never acquired franchises or established
exchanges;

overcoming the enormous Bell lead in those cities would

not have been easy.

The success of the Cable Co., moreover, should

not be equated with a victory for either the independent movement
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or for permanent market competition.

Had its acquisition of the

Erie system succeeded, a large number of its telephone properties
would have been former Bell exchanges locked in direct competition
with independents.

Faced with this predicament it could have

continued the competition, in effect assuming the role of the Bell
system and thereby changing little, or consolidated with the
independents, eliminating competition more quickly than otherwise
would have happened.

David Gabel's study of the Wisconsin

independents has shown that they first greeted the takeover of the
Erie system with enthusiasm because they thought the Cable Co.
part of the independent movement.

was

Letters were sent to President

Latta indicating their willingness to suspend competition in
exchange for interconnection with Milwaukee. [43] The Cable Co.

did

not respond to these overtures, either because it had no clear
policy or because it contemplated competition rather than alliance

with the independents.
Despite the failure of the Cable Co., many independents
managed to integrate their operations and achieve fairly
competitive levels of long distance interconnection.

Once again,

the most successful development strategy proved to be neither a
grandiose attempt to organize the entire country nor voluntary
associations of small, local units, but something in between.

The

strongest independents achieved a scope of operations comparable to

that of a Bell licensee company.

They acquired control of several

exchanges in a region covering several counties or spread across

one to three states.

In a particularly healthy system, the

exchange properties included at least one large city in which the
independent controlled access to 40 - 50 percent of the subscribers
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and the exchanges were supplemented by a long distance company with
circuits connecting all of its owned exchanges and lines to

neighboring independent systems.

Unlike a Bell licensee, the

independent regionals never managed to own all of the independent
exchanges in their territory.

They relied instead on

interconnection agreements with autonomous, smaller exchanges which

remained independent of Bell.

The long distance company would

place toll stations in towns where there was no independent
exchange.

4.

Bell accelerates development.

The Bell system had tried to respond to competition by waging
price wars, blocking independent franchises in major cities, and

buying out its competitors.

It soon became clear that price wars

were costly and not terribly effectual, and that a successful,
growing independent system would not sellout.

Around 1900, Bell

management began to face the fact that its own underdevelopment,

especially in small city exchanges and in the short and medium
range interexchange market, was the primary cause of independent
success.

Its advice to the licensee companies began to stress good

service, rather than meeting independent rates, as the proper
response, and the national organization embarked on a major

development program, raising millions of new capital.

The ensuing

rationalization of operations and growth of connectivity in the
Bell system was a direct consequence of access competition.
The most consistent, committed advocate of responding to

competition with development was Thomas B.

Doolittle of AT&T.

Doolittle was the inventor of hard-drawn copper wire and was
credited with installing the first commercial telephone exchange in
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1878.

He took a special interest in the toll business, and in 1891

received permission to devote all of his time to it.

He began to

travel through the country studying the operating conditions of the
licensee companies.

As Doolittle and his staff passed through the

territories, they studied traffic patterns and volume, rates, and

the operating procedures used in making up toll connections.

They

would then draw up detailed recommendations for exchange and toll
line facilities construction and improved operations.

Working

patiently for fifteen years, Doolittle spearheaded the
administrative rationalization of interconnection within the Bell
system.

When Doolittle began his work, the toll facilities of the
licensee companies generally were poorly developed and

inefficiently run.

The management of the national company and that

of the licensee companies were not well coordinated;

as one of his

reports observed, operating company managers were suspicious of

"the Boston influence. "[44] As noted before, the independents had
exploited the dearth of short-haul toll facilities.

In the New

Jersey and Pennsylvania suburbs of Philadephia, for example, lines
of 15 or 20 people waited an hour for a connection to Philadelphia
and two and a half hours for an open circuit to New York.

The

absence of through circuits clogged the system, making it
impossible for operators to serve their own subscribers without
delaying calls that had to pass through their exchange from other
points:

The business between towns outside of Philadelphia is
practically at a standstill, for the reason that the wires
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for this purpose form a part of some trunk to Philadelphia,
and are therefore overloaded with Philadelphia business.
Nearly all points that do not have direct trunks to
Philadelphia are practically deprived of Philadelphia
service during the busy hours. [45]

Large parts of New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania were in the

hands of the opposition as a result.
Doolittle's toll line development strategy was based on a

clear, explicit grasp of the demand interdependence of telephone
service.

The national management of the Bell company was not

interested in extending exchange or toll line service to places

that would not be profitable.

It therefore needed a rule to

determine what places did and did not warrant telephone facilities.
Doolittle came up with an estimate of the probable average earnings
per person that could be expected from linking a place into the
toll system.

If the population mUltiplied by the estimated revenue

exceeded a certain number, the city would get a line;

if not, it

wouldn't.

After a few years Doolittle's records of toll calling receipts
convinced him that the average revenue that could be expected from
a place increased as it was connected to more places.

This in turn

enabled him to recommend extending toll lines to smaller and
smaller towns. [46] In an effort to convince the Boston management
to invest in exchange and toll line development, he prepared a
diagram illustrating the increased traffic over a toll trunk line
that would result from connecting groups of tributary towns (Figure

6.1).

Our records show that the larger the number of places
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connected, the larg~r will be the percentage of people
interested in the toll lines, both from a social and a
business standpoint, and I expect that as the number of
places increases, we shall so increase the amount [of
business per person] that we shall be able to profitably
extend the toll lines to points which, at present, it will
not pay to connect. [47]
Doolittle's grasp of demand interdependence made him an
advocate of exchange as well as toll line development.

When people

were attached to an exchange they could receive incoming calls in
addition to placing outgoing calls.

His reports on the licensee

companies from 1896 to 1902 always contained long lists of towns
where small exchanges should be placed. [48] In promoting the
development of small exchanges, Doolittle pioneered the theory and
practice of "subsidizing" local exchange access with long distance
revenues.

The company would gain by establishing inexpensive

exchange service in small towns even if the exchange itself lost
money, he argued, because
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giving users in other lQcations access to subscribers in the

smaller towns would stimulate increased use of the toll lines. [49]
His reasoning must have influenced President Fish, who wrote in

1902:

it is at least worth considering whether or not cheap
exchanges in the small towns do not add enough to the toll
business to make them a proper investment ,_ even if there is
no profit in the small exchanges. [50]

Using scientific traffic studies, Doolittle mapped out the
additional lines needed to avoid congestion.

He also pioneered a

method of routing, handling, and accounting for calls known as
"center checking.

1I

Center checking centralized the responsibility

for routing and accounting at designated exchanges. [51] When
implemented, every operator in the region knew where to transfer
toll calls headed to a specific destination, and the operators at

the toll center knew how to get the call to its destination as
directly and quickly as possible.

Rationalizing the process of

toll interconnection reduced the amount of time conswned by making

a connection and resulted in great savings in plant facilities. [52]
The rationalization process also made it possible for the licensee
companies to exploit "phantom circuits," a method of creating a

third voice circuit out of two metallic circuits. [53]
Rate rationalization was another important achievement of

Doolittle's.

He went about systematically simplifying and

reorganizing the licensee companies' toll tariffs by replacing
charges based on route mileage with a more uniform airline mileage
basis.

His reports contain an interesting exploration of, and
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attempt to rectify, the .cracks and inefficiencies in interexchange

service caused by Bell's division of the country into separate
territories under different managements.

He noted that if two

towns were only fifty miles apart but were located on opposite
sides of a border separating two licensee companies, a caller could
end up paying the rate for a 150 mile call due to the way the call
was transferred between the two Bell companies.

Independent

competitors were taking advantage of such rate discrepencies,

offering more direct, cheaper service. [54]
Doolittle consciously thought of his work as scientific
management.

This meant rational organization of toll facilities

and operations based on scientific studies of traffic, rather than

the regimentation of labor.
Taylorism in his work.)

(There is no reference to Taylor or

He believed that there were distinct

principles underlying the telephone business which, when
discovered, could be applied to operations to maximize efficiency.
III have endeavored," he wrote to Vail,

nto attract and retain in my

department men who have been well grounded on the correct lines,
and who are not only able to absorb advanced ideas of the business
but to impart those ideas to others in a manner acceptable and

convincing." [55] A.

Curtis Blood, who was the first to apply

probability theory to telephone traffic, worked on Doolittle's
staff, as did Ernest Gray, another pioneer in the development of

mathematical traffic theory and automatic switching.

In line with

his drive to rationalize toll organization, facilities planning,

and rates, Doolittle brought the managers of AT&T, the licensee
companies, and independent connecting companies together at

conferences which established how traffic should be routed and
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which company's lines should be used.
Doolittle felt that his work was not appreciated or used
appropriately by the licensee companies until about 1905.

As he

admitted in retrospect, "a vast amount of laborious work was
performed, which resulted in a report that was not understood, and

in many cases, not even read ... "

By 1906, however, he felt that he

had gained the confidence and cooperation of the licensee company
managers.

A bracing dose of competition had forced them to pay

attention.

Toll lines, he stressed again and again, were the Bell

system's "most effective weapon" against competition.

Doolittle's

efforts helped to reverse the independents' incursions into the

short-haul toll market.
of the toll calls.
5.

In 1902, independents handled 37 percent

By 1907 this had declined to 24 percent.

Bell is forced to alter its interconnection policy.

Conventional wisdom has it that Bell's refusal to connect with

the independents was a harsh and powerful competitive tactic.

More

generally, theories developed by antitrust economists tend to
classify such "refusals to deal ll as inherently monopolistic.

An

established system which denies access to or makes itself
incompatible with its competitors is, according to this doctrine,

suppressing competition.

Treatments of telephone history also tend

to see the eventual interconnection of Bell and the independents as

a product of regulatory intervention alone.

In fact, the Bell

system's most powerful strategic ploy proved to be interconnecting

with certain independents, and this policy change was made in
response to market rather than political pressures.

Between 1894 and 1901, the national Bell organization adhered
to a policy of strict exclusion.

Independent companies could not
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be connected to Bell exchanges or toll lines even when they
occupied territory remote from any Bell exchange and were not

competing with Bell.

Bell refused to purchase equipment from

independent manufacturers and refused to sell Western Electric

equipment to the independents.
rapid gains in this period.

The independents made their most

Their growth occurred because of,

rather than in spite of, the no-connection policy.

Bell was simply

unable to keep up with the demand for telephone service in
thousands of small towns.

In 1901 there were still 112 cities

greater than 5,000 in population with no Bell exchange (12 percent
of the total), and there were Bell exchanges in only 1,775 of the
5,447 incorporated places with a population between 500 and 5,000
(32 percent). [56] In these conditions, the only accomplishment of
the noninterconnection policy was to cut off Bell from the majority
of telephone users in the areas it had left undeveloped, and to
guarantee its competitors exclusive access to every exchange built

independently of the Bell system.

In the states of Indiana, Ohio

and Illinois, the independents greatly outnumbered Bell and were on
the verge of achieving the kind of critical mass that could result
in mass desertions of Bell exchanges.

By this time it was clear even to the distant Boston managers
that absolute exclusion of independent companies had been a costly
mistake.

Some managers of the licensee companies began to consider

exchanging traffic with independent exchanges that did not directly
compete with those of Bell.
"sublicensing

ll

This policy was known as

because it involved a licensee company extending the

connecting privileges of the license contract to independent
companies within its territory.

Two licensee companies that had

239

been particularly hard hit by competition actually had begun to
implement this policy on their own. [57]
The national organization moved more slowly.

Unlike other

adjustments in Bell practices made in response to competition,
sublicensing involved revising some of the fundamental assumptions

underlying the license contract.

The primary object of the license

contract was to secure profits and control for the national
organization while harnessing local initiative and capital.

But

how could the same level of control be maintained when
interconnecting with independent companies?

If Bell was to

interconnect with noncompeting local exchanges, should it require

them to lease Bell instruments, as it did of its traditional
licensees?

If so, what would induce these independents to lease

Bell instruments when it could obtain independently manufactured
telephones at a lower price?

If not, how could it maintain the

uniform technical standards it desired?

Since Bell would have no

ownership control over the connecting company, there was also the

risk that sublicensed companies might break the connection contract
later.

On September 25, President Fish sent out a letter to the

top executives of AT&T and ABT soliciting their opinions on these
questions. [58]
All of them agreed that the time for some form of sublicensing
had come.
Co.

AT&T Chief Engineer Joseph Davis admitted that the Bell

had had no idea how widespread the demand for telephone

service would prove to be at the time the perpetual license
contracts were drawn up in the early l880s:

[If] it could have been forseen what an extensive
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development of the telephone business would be required to
meet the needs of the people, and the amount of capital
involved, it would have been good policy on the part of the
ABT Co.

to have encouraged i.ts licensees to sublicense to

local people the right to furnish service in country
districts and villages and towns ... , and to have supplied
telephones for this purpose at very moderate rental. If
this had been done the field for opposition companies would
have been very much curtailed and we would now have

friendly instead of hostile people in such places. [59]

Davis's comment underscores the fact that universal service was not

part of the original conception of the business, as Vail later

claimed.

Never in their wildest dreams did the early Bell managers

think that telephone service could be demanded by, and profitably
extended to, as many people and places as turned out to be

possible.
E.J.

Hall, Vice President and General Manager of AT&T, George

Leverett, AT&T General Counsel, and Thomas Sherwin, the ABT Co.
General Auditor, all agreed that Bell should insist on leasing its
own telephones to sublicensees rather than selling them or
permitting them to use independently manufactured telephones.
Interconnection with users of other telephones was objectionable on
three grounds.

First, it reduced the Bell system's control over

its technical standards.

Using only Bell phones promoted

uniformity and compatibility, while leasing encouraged operating
companies to turn in equipment as it became worn or obsolete,

allowing the system to maintain better standards of communication.
Second, the Bell system had publicly opposed physical
interconnection laws on the grounds that independent phones were of

lower quality than theirs, hence their use over the Bell system
would impair the quality of the service.

It seems fairly clear
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that President Fish and the others who made this argument knew that
it was untrue;

the quality of the major independent brands was

equal to Bell's. [60J The real reason for opposing physical
interconnection was the property rights argument outlined in the
previous chapter.

But having used the other argument publicly,

they knew that connecting with independent equipment now would
obviously contradict it and make them look dishonest, and might
thereby lend support to compulsory interconnection.

Last, but not

least, Bell knew that leasing telephones was far more profitable
than selling them outright. [61J
Within this solid consensus in favor of sublicensing, a
significant number of the commenters favored an even more liberal

policy.

Leverett suggested that the requirement to use Bell phones

could be made more acceptable to the independent companies if Bell
offered to furnish them below cost, or even at a rate that was

purely nominal. [62J Davis, on the other hand, believed that while
every effort should be made to induce independents to use Bell
telephones, the benefits of "extending the field of the Bell
interests II via interconnection more than compensated for any

disadvantages that might accrue from the use of non-Bell
telephones. [63 J
What impressed the commenters most were the competitive
advantages to be gained by sublicensing.

Interconnection would

allow Bell to gain access to small to~ and rural locations without
building and operating what were likely to be unprofitable
exchanges.

The small exchanges so connected could serve as feeders

to the Bell toll system.

As it extended Bell connections to

unserved areas, it would also take connections away from the
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exclusive control of competing independents.

Potential

competitors, Leverett observed, would be coopted by the new policy:

telephone companies established in regions which we do not
occupy ... become starting points for attacks upon our system

in other places where such opposition is extremely
undesirable.
[I]f people are willing to venture their own
money and do business in a territory we have not occupied,
we should regard them and endeavor to have them in fact as
allies, and not as competitors.

The new policy was ratified;

henceforth, licensee companies

could sublicense independent exchanges under a standard form of
contract with the blessings of the national corporation. [64] The
new sublicense contract demanded three conditions for
interconnection:

the independent exchange could not be in direct

competition with a Bell exchange;
Electric telephones;

it could use only Western

and it had to agree to connect with only Bell

toll lines.

Officially, Bell charged its sublicensees $2/year per

instrument.

In actuality, the licensees deviated from these

conditions according to the exigencies of the competitive

situation. [65] The beleaguered Central Union Co.

connected with

noncompeting independents from 1904 on regardless of what
instruments they used. [66] Wisconsin Telephone gave its
sublicensees ten years free use of Western Electric telephones
until pressure from the national organization forced it to conform

to the standard contract. [67]
Under these terms, sublicensing progressed, but slowly.

In

Central Union territory, the number of connecting independent
exchanges grew from 194 in 1902 to 253 in 1904.
Union Co.

After the Central

liberalized its terms in 1904, however, allowing
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sublicensed exchanges to retain non-Bell telephones, the number of
sublicensed exchanges jumped to 513 in one year.

By 1907, the

Central Union owned and operated 310 exchanges and 188,000
telephones, while its sublicensees operated 777 exchanges
representing 192,000 telephones.

In other words, the majority of

telephone users in that territory were connected into the Bell
system through independent exchanges. [68]
Given the dynamics of access competition, sublicensing was a

powerful weapon.

It not only provided Bell with connections to the

small locations Bell was uninterested in serving, it also removed

these exchanges from the independent orbit.

Sublicensing could

also be used to withdraw from dual service competition without
losing access to the city's telephone users.

In mid-sized cities

where the independent exchange had established a commanding lead in
subscribers, Bell would offer to pullout if the independent would
agree to become a sublicensee.

If the independent agreed, Bell

gained access to the preponderance of subscribers in the city while
relieving itself of the need to maintain a facility under the
rigors of competition.

The independent gained access to Bell's

toll lines and respite from competition, a chance to raise its

rates.

Thus, what appeared to be an independent success suddenly

became a setback;

a whole group of subscribers was snatched out

from under them.

Such was the case in Middletown, New York, whose

independent exchange had 1,000 users to Bell's 90, and Emporia,
Kansas, whose independent had 1200 subscribers to the Bell
company's 131.

The Middletown independent entered into a

sublicense contract with Bell's Hudson River Co.

in January

1904.[69] The Emporia independent was sublicensed and the Bell
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exchange closed down in 1905.
The organized independents immediately recognized that
sublicensing threatened to disintegrate their movement.

Their

publications and associations assailed the practice in the
strongest terms.

"You cannot be an Independent company and connect

in any way with the Bell,u James Hoge, President of the national
independent association wrote in the pages at' Telephony.

cannot serve two masters.

"You

You must choose between the people and a

greedy corporation. "[70]
In December 1902 the convention of the Interstate Independent
Telephone Association in Chicago was forced to deal with the
problem at length. [71] A delegate from Illinois moved that
companies using Bell telephones be disqualified from membership.
An Iowa delegate opposed the participation of "anybody in any way
connecting with the Bell companies under contract.

II

Connection

with Bell lines destroyed the push for independent growth, added an
Ohio delegate.

In response, the owner of an exchange in Ashland,

Kentucky pointed out that his was the only telephone exchange in
town.

The steel mills and iron works there demanded long distance

connections to New York and Chicago, which could only be obtained
over Bell lines.

He claimed that Bell did not enforce the

exclusive connection feature of the contract in his territory;

they allowed him to send traffic over their lines even though he
was connected to other independent companies.

His company, he

claimed, was lIindependent from the ground up," but if it could make
an arrangement with the Bell companies for long distance

connections and thereby keep a competing Bell exchange out of the
city, he believed it was good business policy.
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A committee was appointed and charged to make a report on the
issue.

Its recommendations made a slight concession to those

independents facing circumstances like the Kentucky exchange, but

basically came out strongly against any form of cooperation with
Bell.

Operating companies or individuals using Bell apparatus tend

to IIdemoralize and destroy the independent movement" and should be
barred from membership in the national, interstate or state

asssociations.

Only companies that connect their toll lines and

exchanges with independent companies should be eligible for
membership.

The committee report added:

We deplore individuals or companies connecting lines and
exchanges with Bell licensee companies, ... as we believe

that no such relation should be permitted, except,
possibly, in isolated cases, which arrangement should be
passed upon and authorized by the state association, ...
the executive committee of the interstate association, or

the advisory board of the national association, the
authority in each case to be granted only by a 2/3 vote.

The resolution passed unanimously.

The independents also countered

sublicensing by starting new, competitive exchanges in cities

signed by Bell, or by buying out a sublicensed exchange.

In some

cases, independents changed their minds after signing a Bell
contract and rejoined the ranks.
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Chapter 7

Dual Service
For the ten years between 1902 and 1912, competing telephone
exchanges operated in more than half of all American cities over
5,000 in population.

When dual service peaked in 1904, it existed

in 483, or 60 percent, of the cities with a population greater than
5,000.

In terms of the total number of competing exchanges in

cities of all sizes, dual service reached its apogee in 1911, when

it existed in 2,290 places.
Because we are all familiar with universal interconnection and

rely on it heavily in our everday life, we tend to assume that its
absence was simply a mistake, a problem crying out for a regulatory
solution.

Exchange competition should not be judged by the

standards of a different era, however.

Dual service was the

deliberate choice of hundreds of American cities, and remained in
place for a significant period of time.

As late as 1907, major

cities such as Boston and Milwaukee decided to franchise new

systems after long public dEiliberations.

New York city came very

close to doing so after extensive studies of dual systems in other

cities.
doing.

It seems unlikely that these cities did not know what they
Besides, we are in no position to assess the significance

of homogenized telephone access unless we know something about what
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things were like when it didn't exist.

Dual service must be taken

seriously in its own right, and its characteristics analyzed as

objectively as possible.

This chapter examines exchange

competition from two angles.

It looks at the way subscribers

divided themselves between the two systems, and then turns to the

public debate about the merits of dual service that occurred
between 1905 and 1910.

1.

The Anatomy of Subscriber Fragmentation.

The analysis of subscriber fragmentation patterns in a dual

system is especially rewarding from the standpoint of social
theory.

The parallels between dual service and bilinguilism were

already suggested in the first chapter.

Like language barriers,

dual service divided communities by communication;

unlike

language, however, the division of the public into two telephone
systems reflected consumer choice rather than cultural inheritance.

By heightening our awareness of who was connected to whom, by
illuminating peoples' choices about who it was and was not
important to have telephone access to, subscriber fragmentation
patterns provide a fascinating road map to the organization of

urban society.

How did dual service work?

The first thing to keep in mind is

that in 1907 the telephone was not yet the dominant mode of
communication for the majority of the people living in cities,
although it was rapidly becoming so.

Only 20 percent of the people

in a large city had telephones in their homes.

The rest of the

public, if they used telephones at all, relied on public stations,
which mayor may not have been pay telephones.

Drug stores and
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saloons, for example, had a very high subscription rate because

they were customarily telephones that could be used by the people
in a neighborhood.

Virtually all large businesses had telephones,

especially if they were national or interstate in scope.

About 50

to 75 percent of the smaller businesses used the telephone, the
rate varying widely depending on the type of business.

All of

these adoption patterns had changed radically since 1894 and were
still in flux in 1907.

In this context, the presence of two

incompatible systems created inconveniences, but they were accepted

as part of the process of growth and

experi~entation,

just as

incompatible bank cards and computer models seem unobjectionable
today.
To provide some historical perspective, it is useful to

compare the telephone system with the city directories of the
period as a communications medium.

City directories listed the

names, occupations and street addresses of all the residents and
also contained listings of the city's businesses, services and

institutions.

Like its successor the telephone directory, these

publications were both a source of useful information and an

advertising medium.

Their publishers made money by selling

subscriptions to the public and display ads to businesses.

City

directories had been an established and profitable genre of
publication for at least 70 years.

Every major city had one;

some

of the bigger publishers, like Polk's, supplied several cities.
After 1920, the street directories of the l800s and early
1900s were totally displaced by telephone directories and yellow
pages.

Every function that the city directories had served was

absorbed by the phone book.

There was one important difference,
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though:

the telephone and the automobile had radically redefined

the nature of urban space.

A directory that emphasized location

was of little use when the bulk of urban commerce was organized
around real-time telecommunications.

The most important thing to

know was not where people or businesses_resided but how to get in
touch with them by telephone.

Communications access was primary;

the street address, secondary.

In 1907, city directories still sold more subscriptions than
the telephone exchange.

Many businesses (not all) listed their

telephone numbers in their directory ads, but for most of the
public the really important information was where things were
located.

Dual service was thus a characteristic of an urban

communications system in transition.

Although rapidly emerging as

dominant, the telephone had not yet absorbed and eliminated older
media such as the telegraph and the city directory.
For many businesses, subscribing to both the Bell and
independent exchanges was a simple way to get around the
fragmentation caused by competition.

As these advertisements from

the Louisville, Kentucky city directory of 1909 [1] show, duplicate
subscriptions were treated as a routine part of doing business.

(Figure 7.1) Both numbers were listed in the advertisements, and
many businesses arranged to have the same telephone number on both
the "Home" (the independent) and the "Cumberland" (the Bell
licensee company) exchanges.

Their duplication, of course, made it

unnecessary for many smaller subscribers to do so, for the latter

were guaranteed access to these services regardless of whether they
were Bell or Home Co.

subscribers.

The decision to duplicate or not can be taken as an indication
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of who did and did not value, and of who could and could not
afford, universal telephone access.

As one might expect, different

categories of users show very different rates of duplication.
Fortunately, the Bell Labs Archives possesses a document with
detailed data about duplication and subscription patterns in one
city.

In 1910, a lawyer for the Louisville Home Telephone Co., the

independent competitor of Bell in Louisville and the surrounding
region, broke down all of the city's telephone subscribers into 214
categories and compiled a list showing how many members of each
category were Bell subscribers, Home Co.

subscribers, or

duplicators. [2] The Tables which follow are based on the data in
this list, which gives us some insight into the way telephone
communication patterns and social structure were related to the

dual telephone systems.
The city of Louisville had 16,263 telephone subscribers in
1910.

Sixty percent of the phones were residential and the rest

were businesses.

2,923 of these users subscribed to both the Bell

and independent exchange.

The aggregate duplication rate is 18

percent, but this number is not very meaningful by itself.

A

breakdown of the subscribers shows that the duplication rate

follows a hierarchy.

This hierarchy of information flow appears in

some form in all social organization.

The demand for communication

is concentrated at the top, where there is a small number of large
users who make up a disproportionate amount of the volume of
calling and also tend to demand communication over a broader

geographic scope.

Thus, among banks, railroads, hotels, and the

suppliers of wholesale farm supplies like plows, seed and
fertilizer, both the rate of telephone subscription and the rate of
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duplication were very high.

(Table 7.1) All of the businesses in

this category had telephones, and 75 - 100 percent of them
duplicated.

Businesses with a duplication rate over 75 percent

accounted for only 1.5 percent of the total telephones in the city
of Louisville, but made up 7.5 percent of all duplicate
subscriptions.

As these enterprises were generally large,

capital-intensive, and highly dependent upon widespread
communications access, a duplicate subscription was just an

additional cost associated with doing business, not much different

TABLE 7.1

: Home

: Bell

: phones : only

: only

o

o

: Both

: Duplic : Subsc
Rate
Rate

======================:======== 1======== 1======== l ==== ====l=======

Telegraph Cc.s.
4
----------------------:-------Mill Supplies
7
----------------------:-------Gas, Electric Light
4

----------------------\--------

1.00

1.00

--------~--------~--------;-------

o
1.00
o
1.00
----_:-._-:--------:--------:-------"
o
o
1.00
1.00
--------~--------:--------!-------

Fast Freight Lines
1
o
1.00
11
.92
----------------------:--------l--------l--------I--------1------2
Railroads & Railways
21
1
.87
1.00
----------------------:--------~--------:--------:---- ----:-------

25
2
2
.86
Banks & Trust Cos.
1.00
----------------------;--------1--------:--------;--------!------6
.8S
Express Companies
1
o
1.00
----------------------1--------:--------1--------1--------;------8
1
.80
Fertilizer Mfrs.
1
1.00
----------------------1--------1--------1--------:--------:------21
6
.78
Hotels
o
1.00

----------------------:--------1--------1--------:--------:-------

Laundries

26

7

1

.76

======================:========1========:========:========1=======
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TABLE 7.2

Both

Home

Bell

phones

only

only

Subsc
Rate

Duplic
Rate

======================l========:========:========;========:=======
Hay, Grain & Feed
34
.54
36
3

----------------------:--------:--------:--------;--------:------Druggists
1.00
83
3
.. 53
69
----------------------{--------:--------:--------:--------1------Coal Dealers
46
42
9
.47
1.00
----------------------1--------:--------:--------:--------:------Insurance
65
46
36
.44
----------------------:--------~--------:--------:--------:------~

Dentists
44
35
3
.42
.63
----------------------:--------l--------l--------l--------:------Liquor Dealers
43
56
18
.37
----------------------l--------t--------l--------l--------:------25
45
Plumbers
.35
.74
1
----------------------:--------1--------;--------1--------:------85
109
Attorneys
90
.30
.78
----------------------:--------1--------1--------:--------:------19
47
Butchers
7
.26
_----------------------:--------:--------~--------l--- -----:-------

15
36
.21
Dry Goods
6
.26
----------------------)--------,--------,--------1--------,------Groceries
182
466
62
.25
•

•

J

J

f

======================:========;========:========1========1=======
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TABLE 7.3

Both

Home

Bell

Duplic

Subsc

clnly
only
Rate
Rate
======================!========:========l=======;:========:=======
Billiard Halls
o
1
5
.16
phones

----------------------l-------~:--------;--------;---- ----l------(>
Bowling Alleys
1
5
.16
----------------------:--------l--------l--------l--------;------==
Carpenters
J,J
11
9
.14
.50
----------------------;--------;--------;--------;--------;------Barber Shops
1
6
1
.12

----------------------~--------:--------:--------:---- ----;-------

Bakers
9
61
9
.39
.11
----------------------:--------;--------!--------:--------;------64
Saloons
487
19
.11
.87
----------------------;--------i--------:--------f--------;------Tai IC1rs
8
.10
60
9
----------------------l--------:--------l--------l--------:------3
12
Churches
14
.10
----------------------:--------~--------:--------:--------~-------

900
5449
3971
.09
.20
======================:========l========:========:========:=======

~Residences
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from ordering an extra telephone extension or another line from a

single system.
In the middle of the hierarchy were smaller businesses who
used the telephone frequently but whose markets and suppliers were
more localized.

Physicians, dentists, coal dealers, druggists and

attorneys--all these retail businesses and professional services

drew their customers from more than one neighborhood but were not

really citywide in scope.

This class of user duplicated at a

fairly high rate, but not as often as the larger businesses.
(Table 7.2) Despite widely varying levels of telephone subscription
there was a relatively consistent duplication rate in the range of

30 - 50 percent.

For these users, duplication was more of an

economic burden than it was to the larger enterprises at the top of

the communications hierarchy_

Telephones in drug stores, it should

be noted, functioned as public telephones for the community,

accounting for both the 100 percent subscription rate and the
relatively high level of duplication.
The relative dominance of the Home Co.

in Louisville made it

much more likely that middle-level subscribers who used only one
phone would be independent subscribers.

There are, however,

interesting exceptions to this rule, such as lawyers and insurance
companies.

Whereas single-phone businesses such as coal dealers,

butchers and plumbers favored the Home Co.

by ratios of five or

six to one, in the aforementioned professions the Bell Co.

almost even.

was

The disparity could be explained in a number of ways,

the data by itself being insufficient to rule out several options.
One possibility is that those involved in law and finance had a
greater need for long distance connecti~ns to Cincinnati and the
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East.

Another explanation is that certain lawyers and insurance

companies formed a community of interest with other Bell users and
saw little need for connection with Home Co.

subscribers.

The final class encompasses what might be called the
neighborhood level of social organization.

(Table 7.3) These users

stood at the bottom of the communications hierarchy, in that there

were large numbers of users with highly localized uses for the
telephone and a relatively low volume of calling.

In addition to

residential users, it included smaller scale businesses--bakers,
barber shops, tailors, carpenters--and local recreational and
cultural institutions, such as saloons, churches and bowling

alleys.

Here the duplication rate is consistently low, averaging

about 10 percent.

Many of the residential duplications were

business-related;

e.g., physicians and dentists who needed to

maintain access to their clients at all times.

On the whole, this

class of subscribers used the telephone over a limited local area
and had little interest in universal access.
Once again, an uneven division of various subscriber

categories suggests that subscription choices reflected other
social boundaries.

There is a marked bias toward the Horne Co., for

example, among "working class" institutions like bowling alleys,
billiard halls and saloons.

The figures for residences and

churches, on the other hand, are not so lopsided.

This suggests

that at the bottom of the hierarchy telephone users were divided by
neighborhood and/or economic status.

The wealthier sections of

town went for the Bell system, which had higher rates and whose
advertising tended to project an image of solidity and
respectability.

Those of more modest means responded to the
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independent's appeal to.localism and its lower rates.

Unfortunately, no statistical breakdown of residential
subscribers by neighborhood or economic status exists with which to
support this hypothesis.

There is, however, an interesting

document dated December 3, 1909 concerning the Bell and independent
exchanges in Quincy, Illinois.

It is a field report on the state

of competition in Quincy written for the Central Union Telephone
Co., a Bell licensee.

It states:

I find that the Central Union Co. is well thot [sic] of by
the large majority of substantial business houses and of
the better class of resident subscribers, while the Quincy
Home Telephone Co.

receives their greatest support from

the interest affiliated with the political and labor
associations in Quincy.

Our subscribers are of the better

class, those more able to meet their bills promptly, while
the Quincy Home Telephone Co. have the poor class and are
running great chances on collecting their accounts. [3]

A report out of St.

Joseph, Missouri also noted that the

independent exchange had attracted a large number of subscribers
considered undesireable by the Bell system.

The Bell manager there

went through the independent company's directory and polled all of
its subscribers by telephone.

It discovered that 80 of the

telephone users who claimed to have switched companies because of
problems with Bell were listed as "No Good" on Bell's cash ledger.
The report also counted 102 Home Co.

subscribers as "undesireablell

on account of their being IIcolored.II[4] In other communities, the

independent, backed by prominent local citizens, may have attracted
the "better class."

Which telephone company attracted which group

is not as important as the fact that the division of the
telephone-using public followed other political, social and
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economic divisions.
As a tool of citywide commerce and communication, then, dual
service required large-scale, high volume users to take out

duplicate subscriptions.

Business duplication gave both Home and

Bell subscribers telephone access to a broad range of the city's
institutions and services.

As one moved down the scale of social

organization from the regional and metropolitan levels to the
neighborhood and the home, the rate of duplication progressively
declined.

In the middle of the hierarchy, there were small

businesses who wanted and often needed universal service, but for
whom a duplicate subscription represented a significant additional

cost.

At the lower levels of this hierarchy, where there were

large numbers of small users, dual service noticeably restricted

the degree of social integration.
or randomly.

But it did not do so arbitrarily

Different classes and neighborhoods divided

themselves into communities of interest with a high degree of
self-contained communication.

There was, of course, always a

chance that one would not be able to call an acquaintance or a

business.

Public telephones on streets and in drug stores and

groceries, however, gave people a chance to use the other system.

The lack of interconnection between the two systems was less of an
impediment to the telephone users of 1910 than it would be now,
precisely because telephone usage patterns and urban organization
had not adapted to the possiblities of universal service.
If one of the two competing exchanges controlled less than 35
percent of a city's subscribers, as many as half of its subscribers
might be duplicators.

In St.

Joseph, Missouri, for example, Bell

subscribers outnumbered Home Co.

subscribers by three to one.

The
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1,048 duplicate subscribers represented only 12 percent of the Bell
list, but accounted for 40 percent of the independent subscribers.
In Philadelphia in 1907, where Bell had 95,000 subscribers and the
independent only 15,000, 65 percent of the independent subscribers
were duplicators.

A small market share was not necessarily fatal

as long as new subscribers were joining the network at a rapid
pace.

If the smaller system had a significant pool of what were

called "exclusives,1I i.e.

nop.duplicating subscribers, it could

attract new subscribers and make it worthwhile for business

subscribers to duplicate.

Once rapid growth in the overall number

of subscribers stopped, however, large disparities tended to
reinforce themselves over time.

More and more subscribers

gravitated to the dominant system and the minority exchange's base

of lIexclusivesll began to shrink.

The presence of two nonconnected telephone exchanges had a
more arbitrary effect on long distance calls.

At the local level,

the subscribers could gather a fairly accurate idea of to whom they
were choosing access when they selected one system over the other.

The need for toll connections was often less predictable and the
factors determining whether Bell or the independent was dominant
were not necessarily the same as those in their own city.

After

1907, legislatures, courts and utility commissions began to enforce
interexchange connection of Bell and independent systems even when

they tolerated dual service at the local level.
For the vast majority of subscribers, however, making calls to

places over 100 miles away was a rare event.

If the Bell system

had the only long distance connections to a city and a subscriber
was attached to the independent system, he went to the Bell central
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office, where there were special booths set up to handle toll
calls, or to a public toll station somewhere in the city.

To

merchants, farmers, and other businesspeople to whom long distance

telephoning was necessary but not routine, going to the Bell office
to place a call seemed no more unusual than going to the post
office to mail a letter.
Mt.

A Mr.

Schleicher, the Bell manager at

Carmel, Illinois in 1904, noted the only toll lines of the

competing exchange in his city ran to a nearby farmer system:

Supervisor:

Are the patrons of the Home Company

complaining of inability to get outside connections?

Mr.

Schleicher:

Supervisor:

our office?

Well, no, sir.

They inconvenience themselves by coming into

Mr. Schleicher: Yes, sir. I had toll business last month
amounting to $250. They will inconvenience themselves by
walking three or four squares to our office. [5]

A vivid (but probably not typical) account of this process is
contained in the correspondence of Thomas Doolittle.

On an

inspection of the Bell facilities in Middletown, New York, in 1901,
Doolittle observed that poor Bell service had left its exchange
with only 89 subscribers to the independent's 400:

It must be remembered that the 400 opposition subscribers
have to come to our office to get long line service. At
the time of my visit there were six people standing in a
dark place less than six feet square, with no place to sit,
and all waiting for a long distance connection.
I entered

the booth to make a call for Albany, and felt compelled to
step outside pending the making up of the connection, on

account of the offensive odor of the place. [6]
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In smaller cities,. access competition made it possible for
organized groups of telephone users to boycott one service in favor

of the other.

Group decisions to patronize one system were

sometimes motivated by a desire to achieve coordination economies,
but more commonly arose to protest and punish a rate increase.

The

instigators could be boards of trade, merchants associations, or

groups of physicians, grocers or druggists. [7] Because their
decision affected the calling habits of other users, the organizers
placed notices in the newspapers advising readers flWe only use the

Home Telephone" or "Call us over the Home.

II

Or they issued cards

with that message and distributed them to their customers. [8]
A particularly effective mass shift of users to one system
took place in Paducah, Kentucky, after a Bell rate increase.

On

June 1, 1911, virtually all of the city's retail merchants ordered
their Bell phones taken out and the independent company's phones
installed.

The grocers, lumbermen and coal dealers kept the Bell

phone until July 1 only because the swamped independent exchange
did not have the capacity to serve them until then.

The number of

Bell subscribers decreased by 700 in two months. [9] In an attempt
to minimize the damage, Bell kept the names of many of the
boycotters in its directory.

Advertisements attacking the Home

Company appeared in the paper, and five full-time salesman were
sent out to offer $1 a month service to residences.

Groups of

doctors and dentists responded with newspaper notices informing the
public that they were no longer Bell subscribers and denying rumors
that they planned to return to the Bell exchange.

(Figure 7.2)
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Figure 7.2)
2.

The Public Debate.

Dual service became controversial as soon as it became

widespread.

A public discussion of the merits of dual service

generally took place whenever a city of appreciable size was
considering franchising a competing exchange.

By the middle of the

decade, however, the issue of telephone competition had seeped into

national forums.

Telephone competition became the basis of a

nationwide public relations battle between Bell and the organized
independents.

Both interests began to formulate their respective

cases for monopoly and competition and find outlets for them in
magazine articles, advertisements and books.

Bell's public relations bureau issued pamphlets and releases
gloating over independent bankruptcies and rate increases. [10] The
object was to depict them as fly-by-night operations whose stock
was worthless.

This tactic met with some success in eastern

centers where there were no independents, but was hardly persuasive

in areas that had been served by competing exchanges for ten years.
It gradually became evident that Bell's most appealing argument
revolved around interconnection.

Bell and Bell alone was in a

position to supply a comprehensive system that would allow any
telephone user in any part of the country to call up any other
user.

Henceforth, the public relations assault on competition

would concentrate on fragmentation, and the allegedly wasteful
duplication that went with it.
service

ll

Bell's adoption of "universal

as its motto came at the peak of the competitive era, and

was the rallying cry of its argument to eliminate competition.
One of the earliest entries in the debate was an article in
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The Atlantic entitled "Telephone Development in the United States,"
by F.W.

Coburn.[lll The magazine was published in Cambridge,

Massachusetts, near ABT headquarters, and took an unambiguously
pro-Bell stance.

The author began by recounting the extraordinary

growth of telephone usage and long distance interconnection.
Engineers, to whom he referred in tones approaching reverence, were

projecting a telephone penetration rate of one telephone for every
five households in the near future.

In the not too distant future,

the telephone would be within the reach of everyone and a "great

national system" would ",enable everybody to reach practically

everybody else anywhere in the United States."

In the author's

presentation, these impressive advances in telephone communications
were attributable to expert engineers, not to business rivalry.
Indeed, the very existence of independent companies was denounced

as an obstacle to "that orderly development of the telephone
utility upon which the engineering experts are basing their
estimates:

II

An enlightened public policy would have prevented their
ever coming into existence, while allowing the Bell
companies everywhere to maintain their monopoly, and

holding them strictly to account for producing satisfactory
results.

The only "proper reason" for the independents' existence was to

occupy territories which no Bell company had ever preempted, and
even then their presence was justifiable only when they agreed to
restrict themselves to local service and rely exclusively on Bell
to provide the long distance connections.

The author condemned dual service as the cause of "manifold
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inconveniences" and "protracted irritation on the part of

citizens:"

If one is a user of the Bell telephone, while one's
correspondent is a user only of the service of an

independent company, the two people are still as far apart
as if Mr. Bell had not invented the telephone. The only
remedy in such circumstances is expensive and cumbersome;
each man must use the service of both companies.

The Atlantic received so many letters responding to the Coburn
piece that it decided to give an independent spokesman equal time.

The response was poorly conceived. [12] It devoted most of its
argument to an attempt to show that many other inventors besides

Bell had come up with a telephone, an irrelevant issue by 1905.
A year later, the Bulletin of the League of American
Municipalities began to carry articles by H.J.

Gondon condemning

telephone competition. [13] The League was an association of reform
city officials based in Des Moines, Iowa.

Its pages explored and

advocated the new managerial techniques pioneered by the
progressive movement:

city government by commission, municipal

ownership or regulation of public utilities, the elimination of
bribery and corruption, etc.

Its strongest ties were to city

governments in Kansas, Nebraska and Iowa.

The independent trade publication Telephony responded
vigorously to the charges in the Bulletin, denouncing its author as
a "Bell hireling. "[14] Bowing to the pressure of the organized
independents, the League's Bulletin ceased its criticism of
telephone competition and reprinted a speech by Francis Dagger, a
Canadian advocate of competition, in the August 1906 issue.

Dagger
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pointed out how competition had advanced the development of
telephony, lowered rates and improved service.

The conflict

probably made the midwestern urban reformers uncomfortable.
their instincts led them toward expert planning:
utility services was wasteful and chaotic;

the ideal.

All

competition in

regulated monopoly was

But they were also critical of big corporations and in

favor of locally responsive government, which tended to make them
sympathetic to independent, local companies.

The fragmentation argument was the key to the political
defeats suffered by the cause of independent competition in large
cities.

In June 1905, the Merchants Association of New York issued

a report to the city franchising authority expressing its
opposition to franchising any independent telephone company.

liThe

effect of two rival telephone systems in one city is to divide the
population into two parts, without means of telephone communication
with each other except at excessive cost."

choice of two evils:

Dual service IIcompels a

either half service or a double price."[lS]

The New Orleans Board of Trade came to almost identical conclusions
in its report of 1908.[16]
An assortment of user groups in Chicago opposed the franchsing
of a competing telephone company because of the inconveniences of
dual service.

The Telephone Users Protective League, which

described itself as a federation of "28 of the largest and most
important business and commercial associations in Chicago," sent a

resolution to the Chicago City Council in November 1907 claiming
that "the greatest possible inconvenience and unnecessary expense

to telephone subscribers would result from the existence of two
competing telephone systems in Chicago." [17] The Chicago Federation
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of Labor, claiming to represent 1I1 arge numbers of telephone users,"

declared that "duplicate telephone systems in this city would be a
calamity to all users."

The Labor Federation also objected to the

Bell policy of refusing to interconnect with independent exchanges
outside of the city. [IS] Throughout the country, socialists
advocated municipal ownership as a third alternative to competitive

fragmentation and private monopoly.
The biggest salvo in the debate was fired in AT&T's 1907
Annual Report, written by Theodore Vail upon his return to the
Presidency.

In it, Vail articulated for the first time the slogan

"One System, One Policy, Universal Service,1I and the philosophy

underlying it.

The 1907 Annual Report was as much political

pamphlet as business report;

it was sent to thousands of

newspapers and opinion leaders as well as the company's

stockholders.

The themes it struck up were repeated with

variations in every succeeding Annual Report until 1914.

In the

Reports, Vail hammered away at the theme that only a single,
integrated system offering connections among all subscribers in all

locations could realize the telephone's potential.

The rationale

for universal service had four components.

First, Vail argued that the value of a telephone network
increases with the number of subscribers.

Universal

interconnection widens one's communications options, bringing
access to parties or locations that one could never have predicted
one would need.

As Vail put it,

Tlthere are times when it is most

necessary to get communication with someone who, until the
particular necessity arose, might have been unknown and unthought

of.

It is this necessity, impossible to predetermine, which makes
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the universal service the only perfect service. "[19]
Second, Vail contended that competition between telephone
networks is always imperfect competition.

His argument was based

on a clear grasp of the inherent nOnhomogeneity of separate
networks.

Rival telephone services are never perfect substitutes

for each other because both will offer access to different
subscribers.

Consequently, competition requires either a duplicate

subscription, which Vail considered wasteful, or restricted

access. [20]
Vail's third argument for monopoly invoked the managerial
imperatives of coordinating interconnection.

Interconnecting

exchanges allover the country required centralized management.
"Interdependence, intercommunication, universality," he claimed,

"cannot be had with isolated systems under independent
control .... They require the standardization of operating methods,
plant facilities and equipment, and that complete harmony and
cooperation of operating forces, that can only come through
centralized or common control." [21]
Fourth, having made the case for monopoly, Vail was willing to
accept the consequences of removing his industry from competitive

pressures:

government regulation of rates and service. [22] In the

annual reports and in an article in the Atlantic published in 1913,
Vail argued for a private monopoly monitored by an expert.
commission, a view that dovetailed with developments in other

utility services. [23]
Vail's powerful vision infused Bell's public image with a new
coherence.

In a series of full page ads which began to appear in

1912, Bell presented itself as a nationwide system linking every
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community in the U.S., eyen though it was years away from achieving

that goal.

(Figures 7.3 - 7.5) "To one who has a Bell telephone at

his lips," one ad declaimed, "the whole nation is within speaking
distance.

II

Comparisons between the Bell System and "the Tree

System" advised readers that:

A noble tree thrives because the leaves, twigs, branches,

trunk and roots are all working together, each doing its
part so that all may live.
This is true also of that wonderful combination of
wires, switchboards, telephones, employes and subscribers

which helps make up what is called the Bell Telephone
System.
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FIGURE 7.2

Doctors Deny Rumor of Change
Padllcan. Ky .. .Tuly I~. I ~II.
'We. the undersIgned. phYRlclnnft or ·aducah. Ky.. certltr
hal. ,1'lf
nnmes. which appear in the Enst Trnncs""8 or Olu tol~"h()n.. Jir~,·:on.
l~sl1et1 .July 1st. 1911. was pnhllBhen "'itt Jut our kno"';rd(~,
<,<,n.pl>
Our Old or East Tennes1'!l?'c telephoTlPt\ wer r orlitHori r"rno,'cd
'0 dur or·
fIres and residences otl J.lne lat. lUll. 1111(\ hn"" not hr"1 u.,' ,"nr" th.1!
dllte. Thero Is 1\ rumor aflont that tho dortors contero!>I.!" rr\n.tnllln~
the 01<.1 or East Tennessee teleph"nl·. In ord~r thul our posltlun may he
tl1oro:lghly understood. we desire (0 MY tllat ""e arp PHr"ctly sat Ian" I
wllh one telephone and do not Intend to Incur tbe expel,"" of Instlllllnll an·
other or second telephono ..
(Signed) S. Z. 1I0lland. )1. D .. n. DllCaa. r , .T. T. n~<lrllrl\. C. 1'. nur
110tt. H. M. Cl:Ildrcs~. M. M. Cooloy. H. T. HlVMS. J. C. Freeland. O. P.
J<ldri. H. B. Pulllnm. H. P. lJlnn ••1eff D. Houcrt8on. W. C. rcuhnnit". ILJb'
.1. Rll'ers. n. E. HeRrne. n. A. W.\~l,burn. Frnnk llo\"rl. 1'. H. Hlcwnrt anr!
.r. W. nass. C. E, Kldct. J. Q. Tarlor, .r. n. Acree. "'. r.. Gral·",. rh·ll"
Galrlwell. C. H. Johnson. Il. F. WillIamson. H. T. He"I". \'el'non nl)":I:r'
H. O. Reynold •. H. ll. Duloy • .11'., J .. G. nroolt~. \\'. n. l'al""ol1 •. lI. L. Bn\'J·
Icy. E. B. WlIlInp:ham. C. E. Purcell •.r. W. Pendle)" .

.Notice
.
.

..

....
..•• .:"' . " ~. ~, '.
Paducah. Xy.. ,Tli1y 19. 1~11.
We, the underatgned, denUsta of Paducah. Ky., cortlry [hat our namu,
whtchappear In the East Tennen!!" or Old telephone dIrectory. is.lIer.l
July lit, 1911, were publlllhed without our knowledge or consent. Our 0111
orEe._t To~euco telellhonea wero ordered romov~d from our offiCe! nod
resldencos on June 1st, 1911, a.nd hn"l' not btXln used alnce that datI'.
There Is a. rUlnor .. nontthat the dC'ntlata contemplate' relnatalllng lhA
Old or ~ARt Tennesseo. telepl1oll.a~ In order that our pOlltlon l1\ay· be thoroughly underalood,' WI· de'lro to cIIY thl\t:wEI are per/eotly' Batl,fled' with
one ·'telephone· and do 'not Intend to Incur lhe expense ot lnatallln, an-

other or ioeond

teIGllhone;~;-

"

. "

...,

.'

.(Signed)' 1, n. Ho,;\,ell,' C. K. loWam. W. I.. Hllllbro, W. V. Owen.
Sydney Smith, O. )1; 11'0 well, E.' W. SlIllnper. J. V. Vorl .. MoJohnlo.. "
OlamUkea, ~ KUl, Drooka, W. H. N~vll1e..
.
.,
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FIGURE 7.3
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Message Bearers Ancient' and Modern
Pheldipgides, the most noted runner of
ancient Greece, made a record and an everlasting reputation by speeding 140 miles
from Athens to Sparta in less than two days,
Runners trained to perfection composed
the courier service for the transmission of
messages in olden times, But the service
was so costly it coqld be used only in the
interest of rulers on occasions of utmost
importance,
The Royal messengerof ancient times has
given way \0 Ihe democratic telephone of
to-day, Cities, one hundred ur e\'en two
thousand miles apart, are cor~neCltd iii a
few seconds, so that m~~:js]ge anu JIl:-;\.'~'r
follow orle another <.~s if two jlcr~O!lS '::eft.:
talking in the same room,

This instantaneous telephone service not
only meets the needs of the State in great
emergencies, but it meets the daily needs
of millions of the plain people, There can
be no quicker service than that which is
everywhere at the com til and of the
humblest day laborer.
Inventors have made possible communicatiun by telephone service. The Bell SYstelll, by
connecting seven million people together, ha~~
made telephone service so inexpensive that it
is used twenty-five million times a Jay,

Captains of war and industry might, at great
expense, establish their own exclusive telephor;c lines, but in order that any person 11,1\'ing 11 teleplione may talk with any t~thl'r I:cr~O!1

having a telephone, there 1l1u:;:.t he OIle

Sy~tem,

One POI:cy and Universal Service.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
AND ASSOCIATED

COMPANIES

F:Very 'Bell oelephone is the Center of the System
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Assua.n Dam, part 01 HI":: Nile sy~tl:m. one of the Il:reatest engineering rrojeets 01 it'> kiT'U.

The Nile System-The Bell System
For thousands of years Egypt wrestled
with the problem of making the Nile a dependable source of material prosperity.

,crvic~ . 1
fllndamcnt<~l prircip!c

To provide efficient telephone
this country, the same

has to be recognized. The enLre counl,;
must be considered within the s'cope of , n,
But only in the last decade was the Nile's 'system, intelligently guided by one p"lici.
flood stored up and a reservoir established
It is the 'aim of the Bell Syst .. to afford
from which all the people of the Nile region
universal
service in the interest of all the
may draw the life-giving water all the time.
people and amply .sufficient for their
business and social needs.
Primitive makeshifts have been superseded by intelligent engineering methods.
Because they are connected and working
Success has been the result of a compre- together, each of the 7,000,000 telephones
hensive plan and a definite policy, dealing in the Bell System is an integral part of the
with the problem as a whole and adapting service which provides the most efficient
the Nile to the needs of all the people.
means of instantaneous communication.

AMERICAN TEi;EPHONE AND TELEGRAP-H COMeANY
'-,

.
.. ,..
,.

AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES
One Policy

One System

Universal Service

276

FIGURE 7.5

The Tree System-The Bell System
"A NOBLE
tree til rives because the
leaves, twigs, branclles, trunk and
routs are all working

together. each

dum;: its part so that JII may live.

This is true also of that wonderful
combination of· wires, switchboards,
telepllOnes, employes and subscribers
wh ich helps make up what is called the
Bell Telephone System.

Neither t:.e roots nor tile branches
can live without the other, and if the
trunk is girdled so that the sap cannot
flow, the whole tree dies.

It is more than the vast machinery of
communication, covering the country
from ocean to ocean. Every part is
alive, and each gives additional usefulness to every other part.

The existence of the tree depends not
only on the activity of all the parts, but
upon their being always connected tugether in the "tree system."

The value of telephone service depends not only on the number of telephones, but upon their being always
connected tOf'ether, as in the Bell System.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
AND ASSOCIATED

One 'Policll

One System

COMPANIES

UnitJersal SertJice
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The independents did not have a large, sophisticated public
relations organization, but they did not do badly.

They relied on

the trade press to monitor the public dialogue and used 'spokesmen
from state and national associations to air their case in public

hearings.

Their national organization adopted a common symbol,

"the shield,1I to mark independent telephones and exhorted all its

members to use it.

(Figure 7.6) In 1906, Telephony magazine

published a propaganda book to present the independents' side of
the controversy, A Fight With an Octopus by Paul Latzke, a writer
of popular magazine articles romanticizing industrial success.

The

essays making up Octopus first appeared in serial form in Success

magazine.

The book extolled the independent movement as a story of

the triumph of honest, enterprising Americans over a greedy,

distant trust.

The publishers of Telephony took care to make the

book IIhigh-grade, dignified and attractive,1I but also inexpensive

enough to reach a mass audience. [24J It was sold in lots of 1,000
for 13 and a half cents each.
The independent movement was initially put on the defensive by
attacks on subscriber fragmentation, but by 1907 had developed a
plausible and interesting set of counterargurnents.

They pointed

out that fragmentation notwithstanding, the rivalry for new
subscribers had resulted in a net increase in telephone access for
most users.

Thus, while a business user had to pay more in

absolute terms for two subscriptions, he was also getting access to
five or ten times as many subscribers for a price that was only a

little higher than the rates of the monopoly period. [25J In
Indianapolis, for example, a business subscriber paid $72/year for
access to 2,286 other users in 1898.

Following the entry of the
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New Company, a duplicating business user paid $94 for access to
21,000 subscribers.

They also cited indisputable evidence that

competition had improved the service offered by the Bell
companies. [26] These benefits, they argued, ,,'ere well worth the
price of some fragmentation.

Editorials in the independent trade press affirmed that
business users in the top and middle of the hierarchy often opposed
the introduction of dual service.

lilt is the merchants and

business men of a community, newspapers and other personal and

impersonal leaders of public thought that are generally found in
the forefront of the opposition to the 'nuisance of two systems' in
towns where competition is first suggested," noted the American

Telephone Journal. [27]
Some independent spokeman responded that the very redundancy
of which the businesspeople complained was of great value:

When a subscriber says that two telephones are a nuisance,

he means that the two instruments sitting on his desk are
an inconvenience, they are irritating to his vision.

He

objects to two bells ringing simultaneously, maybe once a
month or so.

But two telephones on a man's desk, reaching

two different companies in active competition with each
other ... are vastly beneficial to that man. His ability to
reach everyone in two different manners through different
sources is of immeasurable value, as is the ability to have
everyone in the community reach him over two different

ways. [28]

Other independent spokesmen pointed out that businessmen accepted
fragmentation and duplication as a normal and unobjectionable
product of competition in other communications-related areas.

This

argument relied on an interesting analogy between telephones and
newspapers as channels for gaining access to the public.

At this
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time most cities had many· competing daily newspapers.
"What forces the business man to take two telephones?1I

Col.

Powers of the Louisville Home Telephone Co.

asked

"The same thing

that forces him to advertise his goods in two newspapers in a town

instead of one--in order that he may reach the people."[29] In
theory, a newspaper monopoly would relieve the advertiser of the

need to place duplicate ads in two or three different papers and
would relieve the reading public of the inconvenience of buying and
reading two or more newspapers.

In actual practice, the

competition between papers increased circulation, lowered
advertising rates and delivered to the business a larger audience

at a savings:

Take the case of one newspaper in a city with a circulation

of 30,000 copies daily; another is started with a
circulation of 50,000. The poor business man had been in
the habit of advertising in the first paper at an expense
of $100 a month, but by reason of the competition and the
increased number of readers he feels that he is compelled
to advertise in the more progressive paper.
[By] reason of
the competition he can get the same advertisement in both
papers for $150 a year. Now would any sane business man
say that it was a great hardship .... to be forced to
advertise in both papers, and therefore that the new
comer ... had worked a hardship on the citizens of that
place? If men are forced to advertise they do it because
their competitors force them. If men are forced to take
two telephones in order to reach the buying public, it is
because they want to come closer to the people and keep
themselves and their business before the people ...

Thus while the independents recognized the advantages of universal
interconnection, they did not think that it made the telephone
industry exceptional.
In assessing the debate over dual service two elements of the
contemporary viewpoint must be kept in mind.

First, a divided
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subscriber universe was generally seen as an inevitable consequence

of competition.

Thus, eliminating fragmentation was usually

associated with returning to monopoly.

(The debate over physical

connection will be taken up in the next chapter.)

To many, the

inconvenience of fragmentation seemed like a worthwhile price to

avoid subjection to a monopoly, especially with the memory of the
pre-patent expiration period still fresh.

Second, the subject of

telephone rates was always more controversial than fragmentation
itself.

Unification of the systems seemed like a fine idea in the

abstract, but if it would result in a rate increase many preferred
to stick with dual service.

Later on, many states turned to

commission regulation to avoid having to make this trade off.
commission regulation had its problems, too.
Buffalo independent, Burt G.

But

The President of the

Hubbell, contrasted regulation with

dual service as a method of controlling rates, and made a prescient
critique of the former.

In testimony before federal antitrust

authorities, Hubbell showed that Bell's costs in smaller
communities were higher than the independents. [30] The disparity
was not the result of waste or ineffiCiency, but was caused by the
need for extensive recordkeeping and supervision in a large

organization.

The independents being exempt from such requirements

could operate more efficiently in small cities.

The existence of a

separate system using a completely different set of operating
methods thus provided a standard against which costs could be
measured.

If there were only one telephone company, this standard

of cost efficiency would be lost.

Regulatory commissions would

have no idea what it cost to provide telephone service outside of

what the telephone company itself told them.

At best, a commission
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could ascertain what a company actually spent.

They could not

determine whether another company, using completely different
methods or technologies, might be able to supply service at a lower
price.

The argument anticipates the critique of rate-base

regulation advanced by economists half a century later. [31]
With a little historical imagination, dual service emerges as
a perfectly viable way to run a telephone system.

It had its

advantages and its drawbacks, as did universal service.

It

sacrificed a homogenized access universe and the convenience of

integration to achieve the price constraints and diversity made
possible by competition.

The choice was not between a more or less

efficient way of doing things.

It was a contest between two

different sets of expectations, two different conceptions of what
telephone service should be.
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Chapter 8
The Independent Movement is Broken

1907 - 1913

With the return of Vail, Bell had a clearly defined goal:

the

elimination of dual service and the creation of a nationally
interconnected monopoly supervised by regulators.

Monopoly would

bring about universal service and relief from the low rates locked
into place by the fierce competitive struggle.
interconnection was not the sole object;
sure that it administered the system.

Universal

Bell also wanted to make

In order to do so, it had to

prevent physical connection with overlapping systems and maintain
absolute control of inter exchange connections.

There was a place

for independent companies in this scheme, but only as local feeders
to the Bell system.

In the major cities, dual service was to be

eliminated by buying out the independent and physically
consolidating the exchanges.

If the independent was dominant, Bell

would sellout and enter into a connecting contract with the
surviving exchange.

Consolidation would demonstrate the benefits

of a unified service while permitting the companies to raise rates
to their "proper level.

II

In the smaller cities and the country,

competition would be eliminated by an aggressive new sublicensing

effort.

Any overlapping, competing telephone systems that remained

were to be isolated and squeezed out as all others were absorbed

into the system.
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The relationship between interconnection and network
competition was the central preoccupation of this period.
were two distinct aspects to the issue.

There

One was the strategic use

of interconnection in the Bell-independent rivalry.

The other was

the attempt of courts, legislatures and regulatory commissions to

find an appropriate public policy regarding interconnection.
Should competing networks be compelled to connect or not?
interconnection preserve or destroy competition?

Did

Was the strategic

use of interconnection rights an anticompetitive practice or a

legitimate exercise of the right of contract?

Was it necessary to

eliminate competition to hring about universal interconnection?

These questions moved to center stage, but only succeeded in
producing a welter of contradictory decisions.

The watershed event of these years was the Kingsbury
cornrnittment of December, 1913;
correct in that respect.

the conventional histories are

Unfortunately, historians have passed

down a completely erroneous view of that event.

As the following

account will show, the Kingsbury commitment was not a decisive or

even very meaningful change in Bell interconnection policy, and
actually prolonged, rather than shortened, the existence of
nonconnected telephone systems.

The antitrust-inspired commitment

was the product of a legal and regulatory system that had not yet
corne to grips with the fact that its desire for an integrated
telephone system was completely at odds with its commitment to the
preservation of normal market competition.

central contradiction of the period.

Its terms embodied the

Its only positive

accomplishment was to bring Bell's accelerating acquisition of

independent systems to a halt for five years, giving the telephone
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companies, utility commissions, city and state governments, and

federal antitrust officials the breathing room needed to work out a
coherent policy regarding telephone monopoly, competition and
interconnection.

1.

Interconnection as competitive weapon.

From 1898 to 1906 the story of independent development was
largely one of building exchanges and short-haul toll lines.

After

1906, the independents began to exploit their control of exchange
access to develop competitive intercity long distance lines.

While

independent exchange development peaked around 1904, their long
distance activity flourished from 1906 to 1911.

Large regional

independent operating companies, formed through mergers of several
smaller companies, started long distance subsidiaries and went
about constructing access universes comparable in scope to that of

a Bell licensee company.

The presence of competing exchanges in

many major cities made it both possible and necessary to build toll
lines paralleling Bell's most profitable routes.

The independents

generally undercharged Bell and their lines often connected into
exchanges where Bell had only a public toll station. [1] A typical
independent operating company owned exchanges in 10 to 30 key
cities and signed long term, exclusive connecting contracts with

independent exchanges they did not own.

On the borders of their

territories, they entered into agreements with the neighboring
independent regionals for the interchange of traffic.

A sampling

of some of these systems:
Missouri and Kansas.

The Kansas City Home Telephone Co.

was

anchored in Kansas City, Missouri, where it served 20,000 of the
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city's 40,000 subscribers.

Its long distance subsidiary owned

10,000 miles of toll wire in 1909 and offered connections to
Topeka, Lawrence, Omaha and many smaller exchanges in the vicinity.

The Kansas City Co.
St.

Louis and St.

was connected to the competing exchanges in
Joseph over the lines of two neighboring

independent regionals, the Kinloch Telephone Co.
Joseph Home Telephone Co.
subscriber base in St.

and the St.

In 1907 the Kinloch Co.

had a strong

Louis and owned 14 exchanges in eastern

Missouri and central Illinois.

Its toll lines covered an area

bounded by Sedalia, Missouri, Springfield, Illinois, Terre Haute,
Indiana, and Farmington, Illinois. [2] The St.

Joseph Home Co.

had

connecting contracts with 48 companies in the area, giving it

access to 40,000 telephones. [3]
Pennsylvania, Maryland and West Virginia.

Several large

independent regionals competed with the Bell system.

The American

Union Telephone Co., centered in Harrisburg, was formed in 1906

through the merger of twelve independent companies.

It owned at

least 25 interconnected exchanges in central Pennsylvania,

including the competing exchanges in Harrisburg, Altoona,
Lancaster, Williamsport and Chester.

The Keystone Telephone Co.

owned exchanges in and around Philadelphia, including Trenton and
Camden.

The Consolidated Telephone Company covered the territory

to the north and west of Philadelphia, operating exchanges and toll
lines connecting Allentown, Scranton, Wilkes-Barre and Reading.
The Pittsburgh and Allegheny system connected independent exchanges
in the western parts of the state.

The National Telephone Co.

owned exchanges in Wheeling, Steubenville and other towns in the
vicinity.

Each of these systems were connected to each other
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through an organization known as the "Eastern Traffic Association,"

a clearing house which accounted for and divided joint toll
revenues and coordinated maintenance and operations.

Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana.
Telephone and Telegraph Co.

The Inter-state Independent

of Aurora owned 29 exchanges in

Illinois, including the cities of Peoria, Springfield, Joliet, and
Elgin.

Co.

In 1911, it reached an agreement with the Illinois Tunnel

that gave it access to independent subscribers in the city of

Chicago.

Its lines connected with the Kinloch system to the west

and with the Indiana's New Long Distance Co.

to the east.

Centered in Ohio, the United States Telephone Company was one of
the largest and strongest independent long distance systems.

It

owned 22 independent operating companies, including exchanges in
Cleveland, Columbus, Akron and Youngstown, Ohio.
lines covered the state of Ohio.
syndicate controlling U.S.
Telephone Co.

Its long distance

After 1906, the financial

Telephone acquired control of the Horne

of Detroit, the Indianapolis independent exchange,

and the New Long Distance Telephone Co.

The latter connected all

of the sizable independent exchanges in the state of Indiana. [4] In
1908, it furnished long distance service to 800 independent
exchanges in Ohio, Indiana and Michigan reaching 325,000
telephones. [5]
The U.S.

Telephone Co.

required its connecting exchanges to

sign a contract that guaranteed the long distance company exclusive
access to the local company's toll business.

The contract was an

attempt to secure the same kind of control over interconnection

rights that was embodied in the Bell system's license contract.
stipulated that the local exchange was not allowed to make

It
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connecting arrangements with any other long distance company for a

term of 99 years.
Comparably sized independent regionals existed in New York
state, Kentucky, Southern California, Washington and Oregon, and

Minnesota.

By 1910, independent systems extended in an unbroken

line from New York to Kansas along the east-west axis.

On the

north-south axis, they ran from Tennessee to Minnesota.

With the

exception of isolated systems in Dallas, Atlanta, Mobile and
Shreveport, they were all physically connected.

The independents

did not have the technology or the organization to offer talking
circuits over 300 miles in length.

Nevertheless, it was clear by

the time of Vail's return that the independent regionals could
become viable competitors for toll traffic as well as exchange

subscribers.

Independent toll systems had seized a substantial amount of
traffic because of their lower rates and sometimes superior
exchange access.

The incursions into toll business "not only

assist the revenue of the opposition but greatly increase its
prestige with the more important telephone cllstorners,1I noted AT&T's

Pickernell. [6] In upstate New York, the effect of independent toll
line competition was so severe that the Bell toll earnings had
fallen to 1-2 percent.

There was a "pronounced loss of business ll

in AT&T service from Buffalo to Cleveland, Pittsburg and
Jamestown. [7]
Vail's competitive tactics were directly aimed at the growth
of connectedness among the independents.

One of his most important

countermoves was to revitalize Bell's sublicensing efforts.

The

independent companies who directly overlapped and competed with
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Bell accounted for only 40 to 45 percent of all independent
telephones.

The rest of the independent subscribers were in areas

unoccupied by Bell.

These noncompeting independents, Vail

understood, held the balance of power in the competition for
universal coverage.

If they could be tied into the Bell system,

Bell could broaden its coverage without investing in facilities or
engaging in local competition.

In many areas, whoever won

connecting rights with the majority of the noncompeting
independents would have access to the largest number of

subscribers.

Bell's first sublicense contract had limited the exchange to
Bell connections and required the use of Bell telephones.

This did

prevent the independents from running away with the business in the
central states, but by the beginning of 1907 it had induced just 25
percent of the noncompeting independents to join the Bell system.
In order to gain access to more independent systems, Vail

dramatically liberalized the Bell interconnection policy.

Starting

in October 1907, independent exchanges connecting with Bell no
longer had to use Western Electric instruments, but could keep
using independently manufactured telephones as long as they were of
IIfirst class II construction and would not impair the quality of

service offered over joint lines.[8] Followup letters urged the
licensee companies to ITpursue vigorously the policy of

sublicensing l1 in the part of their territory which was "more or
less unrernunerative.

II

[9] These exhortations, however, were followed

by a warning to make s.ure that the Bell licensee controlled all the
toll lines connecting the sublicensed exchanges. [10] Vail also
allowed Western Electric to begin selling telephones to independent
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companies for the first.time. [11]
Armed with its new sublicensing policy, Bell licensees made

grea t efforts to attract farmer. and mutual company lines.

liThe

opposition [Bell] has shown more activity than ever before in
establishing and encouraging rural mutual companies to connect up

with its system," wrote Telephony in 1909.

Bell was promising

rural telephone users service at one-fifth the rate of the
independent companies. [12]
The importance of sublicensing as a form of enlarging the Bell
system's scope was particularly evident in the areas where strong

independent toll systems were developing.

In the Missouri and

Kansas Co.'s territory in mid-1909, sublicensed toll lines
outnumbered the licensee's in mileage, and sublicensed telephones

outnumbered Bell-owned telephones by two to one.[13] The Bell
licensee in the territory around St.

Louis was so dependent on

sublicensing for toll connections that an AT&T agent speculated
that if the sublicensees should happen to break with Bell "the Bell
toll business and the Bell development would disappear, and the
opposition would absoutely control most of the territory outside of
St.

Louis."[14]
Bell went on to liberalize its interconnection policy in a

more radical fashion.

In an attempt to pry independent subscribers

away from the exclusive control of competing independents, Bell
began to interconnect with independent exchanges even when they

already maintained connections with competing long distance lines.
In a few cases, it was even willing to connect its toll lines to an

independent exchange that was directly competing with one of its
own if the independent had a commanding lead in the number of
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subscribers.[lS] This tactic was used in Ohio and Indiana, where
hundreds of independent exchanges had signed exclusive connecting
contracts with the United States Telephone Company (UST).

The new

policy amounted to soliciting the exchanges to break their contract

with UST.

Nevertheless, it was an attractive option for the local

exchanges, as it gave their customers access to the subscribers and

cities controlled by both systems. [16] In 1908, sixteen local
independent companies in Ohio and Indiana entered into connecting
agreements with Bell in violation of their exclusive contract with

UST.[17] UST responded by suing the exchanges.
The dispute over exclusive connecting contracts brings out the
complexity of the relationship between interconnection, competition

and monopoly.

From the viewpoint of the local exchange, an

exclusive connecting contract prevented competition by tying all of
its long distance traffic to one carrier.

From the viewpoint of

the subscriber, exclusivity destroyed their ability to choose long
distance carriers, and made them accept a system with less than
universal coverage.

To the United States Company, however,

exclusive access to independent exchanges was its chief competitive

advantage against Bell.

Opening up its connecting exchanges to

Bell subscribers destroyed its ability to complete with a much
larger system.

Protecting consumers' and local exchanges' right to

choose toll carriers would accomplish little if enforcing that
right left only one carrier in the field.
The legal decisions pertaining to exclusive toll connecting
contracts illustrate both the prevailing confusion about the
competitive effects of interconnection and the extent to which it

was still commonly assumed that telephone service, like railroads
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and telegraphs, would re"main competitive under laws requiring

opposing systems to connect.

The UST suit went first to the Common

Pleas Court, which treated the case as a simple breach of contract.
The court upheld the independent long distance company and ordered
the exchanges to sever their connections with Bell toll lines.
Bell continued the practice and UST was forced to litigate the case
on broader grounds.

It sued Bell under the state antitrust laws,

charging that its new policy was an attempt to drive UST out of
business and monopolize the trade. [18] The decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court, however, found not Bell but the United States

Company guilty of monopolistic practices.

The court invalidated

its 99-year exclusive contracts because they gave the independent
long distance company a IImonopolyl1 of the local exchange's long
distance business.

The decision was based on a broader application of the
principle of "nondiscrimination" than had previously been used in
telephone cases.

In a lively and incisive review of the

application of common carrier principles to the telephone, Judge
Tayler of the Court dismissed the precedent of the railroad express
cases, which for the preceding fifteen years had shielded telephone
companies from interconnecting with other companies.

The practical

demands of railroad operation were completely different from those
attending the making of telephone connections, the Judge wrote.
While it was physically impossible and unsafe to allow railroad
companies to run trains over another company's tracks without the
second company's cooperation and consent, the interconnection of

telephone companies did not pose the same problems.

A long

distance company need not be treated differently than any other
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individual subscriber:

Conceivably, 20 long-distance companies might be connected
with the local exchange with the same simplicity and with
the same absence of confusion which we find in relation to
the local subscriber's lines, and there is no more physical

difficulty, ... in connecting a subscriber with one of the
20 long distance lines than in connecting a subscriber with
another local subscriber served by the same exchange. [19]

As common carriers, telephone companies were required to provide
service to all who applied without discrimination.

Since the

operations required to link subscribers to the lines of a long
distance company were no different from those required to set up a
connection with any other subscriber, the company's common carrier
obligation could and should be extended to long distance companies.
The U.S.

Supreme Court's earlier doctrine that "common carriers II

had no obligation to be IIcornmon carriers of common carriers" was no

longer valid.
The pro-competitive intent of the decision is clear from its

basis in antitrust law and its reference to the possibility of "20
long distance companies ll serving a single exchange.

Indeed, its

reasoning was exactly the same as that underlying the lIequal

access" provisions of the Modified Final Judgment, which paved the
way for long distance competition in the 1980s.

In theory and in

the received version of telephone history, larger networks are
supposed to benefit from the refusal to connect and smaller
competitors are supposed to favor joining their system to the
larger one.

In 1909, however, the dominant network was seeking to

interconnect with companies bound to its competitors, and the Ohio
Supreme Court decision allowing it to do so was correctly seen as a
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setback to the cause of independent long distance competition.
Competition suffered because the court decision interfered
with the competing independents' ability to coalesce a critical
mass of subscribers and exchanges outside of the Bell system.
Joseph Ware, secretary of the national association, expressed the

prevailing view among independents:

Judge Tayler fails to grasp the first great principle in
the telephone struggle and business, that, excepting the
Independent companies are connected together into one
system there can be no competition in the telephone

business. [20]

Competition in the telephone business revolved around the scope of
access.

A few large independent companies were attempting to

construct regional access universes that would be competitive with

Bell's.

In any given region of the country, Bell controlled a far

greater number of exchanges than any individual rival.

Thus, the

many small, scattered independent exchanges held the balance of
power.

Bell had guaranteed access to a larger number of exchanges

to begin with;

allowing it to break exclusive contracts binding

the small independents to competitive long distance networks would
place "50 percent of the Independent force in the doubtful column,"
a Nebraska independent wrote. [21] If all independents did not hold
together as a system, the size of Bell's access universe would

eaSily exceed that of its independent competitors, and Bell would
dominate the industry by virtue of its nationwide presence and

extensive network facilities:

If our faction [the Independents] were made up of one
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organization some uniformity of methods could be followed,
but to compel an interchange of service under present
conditions means elimination of competition in favor of the

larger organization and nothing else.[22]

Ostensibly, nondiscriminatory interconnection would also open

Bell exchanges to UST, but the independents expressed doubts about
whether this would lead to a truly competitve situation:

The second point which the judge fails to grasp is, that
there is no competition where long distance lines are
connected into one exchange--where one operator can put

messages over all lines.

The benefits to the public which

corne from competition ... can only be obtained successfully

by having competitive systems, rather than variously owned
lines into each exchange, with one long distance

company--the Bell. He overlooks the fact that the Bell
company has, or had, a competing local exchange in each of
the towns where connection was made with a local company
having contract relations with the U.S. Telephone Co., and
that, co-incident with the connection of the Bell toll
lines to the local independent exchange, local competition
was eliminated. [23]

The independents were asserting that nondiscriminatory

interconnection was fundamentally incompatible with competition.
If Bell could gain access to local subscribers through an
independent exchange it would not run a competitive exchange.

If

there were competing long distance lines terminating in a monopoly
local exchange, the operators of the exchange would route long
distance calls over their own company's lines rather than those of

a competitor.

The tendency to apply concepts of nondiscrimination to the
telephone business in such a way as to require competing companies

to exchange traffic appeared in other important legal decisions of
the period, and represented one strand of thinking. [24] The Supreme
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Court of New York, on the other hand, upheld the validity of
exclusive contracts on the grounds that it preserved

competition. [25]
Legal opinions notwithstanding, the liberalized connection

policy had a devastating effect on independent competition.

The

number of Bell-connecting independent telephones jumped from about
300,000 at the beginning of 1907 to 1.2 million in only two years.
The competitive impact of the new policy becomes clear when these
numbers are expressed as a proportion of the independent telephones

not in direct competition with Bell.

At the beginning of 1907,

only 25 percent of the noncompeting independents were connected to

Bell.

A year later, 46 percent of them were so connected.

By

October 1909, 79 percent were connected to Bell.[26]
The facts about independent long distance development require
some revision of the conventional view of Bell's success,

Bell did

not win the competition because of its long lines;

i.e., the AT&T

intercity circuits of 500 miles or more in length.

Nor was its

control of the most advanced long distance technology decisive.

At

this time, 99 percent of all telephone calls,.. were to points less
than 100 miles away. [27] A system's ability to offer efficient and
universal termination to points within the 100-200 mile area with
which most of a subscriber's communication took place was more

important than the ability to call cities 800 miles away.

AT&T,

Vail discovered, had no controlling patents on the technology
needed to make connections of this length. [28] For communication
over long distances (say, 500 - 1,000 miles), the telegraph was
still the dominant and by far the most economical service.

as 1909, a telephone businessman wrote that while ultra-long

As late
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distance telephoning "appeals most strongly to the imagination,

it

was still "occasional!! and "of little commercial or social

importance. "[29] The true source of Bell's strength was its
universality.

In any given region of the country, it had a

presence in most cities and was able to set up connections between

all of its exchanges very efficiently.

With the new sublicensing

and interconnection policies, Bell retained exclusive access to
many cities while eroding the independents' exclusive control of
the other areas.
Bell's cooptation of noncompeting independents was

supplemented by a price war against selected independent toll
lines.

The independent long distance companies were able to charge

lower rates because they had lower fixed costs.

Unlike Bell, they

did not attempt to provide complete toll coverage of an area but
concentrated their resources on high volume routes.

Bell toll

lines served both IIfat" and "lean" districts and installed enough

capacity to handle most of the traffic.

By constructing a simple

economic model of these conditions, Pickernell discovered that
cutting Bell rates in half to secure a larger share of the traffic
would hurt the independent more than it would hurt Bell.

The

independent's profit would be "enormously impaired," while Bell's
would fall only slightly. [30] Rate cuts proposed by Pickernell went
into effect in May in selected cities of Ohio, the target being the
U.S.

Telephone Co.

The Ohio rate cuts succeeded in increasing

Central Union's toll traffic by 53 percent, while reducing its
revenue by 12 percent. [31] In New York state, where strong
independent systems in Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester and Erie,
Pennsylvania existed, cuts went into effect in July.
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The price war made major inroads into the toll business of the
United States Telephone Company.

In an attempt to stop the loss of

its long distance business, it tried to get both companies to
restore their rates to their original levels.

It approached the

Central Union Company through the state independent association,
which had corne into much closer contact with the Bell licensee due
to the growing number of sublicensed independent companies.

At the

instigation of James Brailey, president of the United States Co., a

committee of the Ohio Independent Telephone Association met with
the Central Union and argued that the lower rates injured the local
sublicensees by reducing their commissions from toll traffic.

This

argument was merely a cover for the real concern, which was that

Bell's price war was hurting U.S.

Telephone severely.

They asked

that the state independent association be given the right to
approve or disapprove of any change in toll rates made in the state
of Ohio.

This price-fixing offer was refused. [32] As a result,

Brailey took steps to sell off the United States Co.

property.

The United States Co.

Morgan & Co.

ended up in the hands of J.P.

The most direct blows against dual service carne from Bell
buyouts of competing exchanges.

The policy of eliminating dual

service in the larger cities through acquisition or sale progressed
rapidly during this period.

At the beginning of 1907, 59 percent

of the Bell exchanges in cities with a population of 5,000 or more
had dual telephone exchanges.

By October 1913, the number of these

cities with competition had been reduced to 37 percent. [33] In
smaller cities, mergers of competing exchanges were often followed
by the franchising and construction of a new competing exchange.
In Marshalltown, Iowa, for example, a new franchise was issued
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within a month of the takeover. [34] In the larger cities, however,
the losses were irreversible.

Independent companies were particularly susceptible to
divide-and-conquer acquisitions.

Their decentralization made it

difficult to weather extended bouts of competition or to adhere to
a cornmon policy.

Selling out to Bell offered an appealing way to

escape from a variety of financial pressures:

the diseconomies of

growth, price wars with a competitor who was willing and able to
sustain losses for an extended period of time, rate restrictions in
municipal franchises, and a constant need to raise more capital.

These problems had always existed, however.

What precipitated the

surge of independent sell-outs between 1910 and 1913 was the
collapse of independent attempts to build regionally interconnected
systems.

This failure was partly the result of Bell's liberalized

interconnection policy and partly a byproduct of the financial
panic of 1907, which made investors less willing to put scarce

capital into dual systems.

The stampede of noncompeting

independents into connecting arrangements with Bell between 1907
and 1910 prompted many of the more profit-oriented independent
system owners to get out while the getting was good.

In 1912, the

consolidation trend began to chip away at the urban strongholds of
the independents.

Competition was eliminated in 10 of the 68

cities over 50,000 in population that had had dual service.

In

that year alone, Bell purchased 136,000 telephone stations and sold
42,650. [35]
The consolidations were not motivated by Bell's ability to
achieve supply-side economies of scale, nor did they result in rate
decreases.

They were effected to eliminate competition and to
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clear the way for a rate increase.

Bell's cost of providing

exchange service was often higher than the independent's. [36] In
competing cities, it openly held its rates below its costs in order
to hold on to subscribers, subsidizing its losing exchanges with
profits from monopolized operations.

Bell looked upon the

elimination of dual service as an opportunity to recover those
losses.

Pressures for a rate increase also came from the fact that

consolidation increased the telephone company's short-term

expenses.

The Bell exchange was often unable to use much of the

physical plant it had purchased, yet the costs of buying it had to
be recovered.

The placement of the wires and switchboards of the

formerly competing systems usually did not facilitate their
combination into one system.

If some parts of the telephone

exchanges could be combined, money had to be spent on connecting
facilities, and in general operations became more complicated as
the system grew.

The revenue of a combined system was less than

the sum of the revenue of both systems prior to consolidation

because of the loss of duplicate subscribers.

Whatever operating

economies were achieved by merging were offset by the increased
expenses and lower revenue. [37] Universal service, rather than rate

decreases, was the incentive offered for permitting the merger.
While the user public and the municipal government generally looked
favorably upon unification of the service, support for it could
evaporate if it was accompanied by a rate increase.

Early on, Bell takeovers led to the severance of independent
toll line connections .. [38] After 1910, the mediation of utility
commissions made the mergers more orderly and protected the
interests of the other independent exchanges in the state whose
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users were dependent upon access to the city.

In order to ensure

that public reactions against severed connections did not threaten

the policy of achieving a universal service monopoly through
buyouts, Bell announced the "Vail Commitment" in January 1912.

The

Vail Commitment was a promise that Bell would leave all long
distance connections intact when an exchange changed hands.
Acquisition would neither enlarge nor restrict the toll access of

the exchanges involved.[39]
Vail made his consolidation overtures explicit beginning in
the Fall, 1910.

During a national independent association meeting

in Chicago, Vail and H.P.

Davison of J.P.

Morgan & Co.

invited

independent leaders to meet with them at the Blackstone Hotel.
About 25 prominent independent representatives responded to the
invitation.

At the meeting, Vail offered to cooperate with the

independents in thoroughly eliminating competition in the telephone
business.

He told the independents that the destructive warfare

between them was costing the Bell Companies millions.

He wanted to

effect a merger that would end those losses and leave AT&T in
control of most of the large cities and long distance lines, while
ceding the smaller places to the independents, where, he admitted,

they operated more efficiently than Bell.

The specific places to

be controlled by AT&T or the independents would be settled through
negotiations later.

With a representative of the Morgan Co.

at

his side, Vail said that the merged companies could be capitalized
liberally to cover the losses that had been sustained. [40]
At Vail's suggestion, a committee of seven independent leaders
was appointed to conduct the negotiations.

What became known as

the Committee of Seven met with Vail and Davison several times over
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the next four months. [41] This group became the nucleus of the
major mergers that helped create a telephone monopoly.
Negotiations concerning the purchase of almost every important

independent property were initiated between 1910 and 1913.

Though

some of these deals were not consummated until a decade later, they

represented the beginnings of Bell-independent cooperation in the
control of the industry.

2.

Interconnection in Law and Public Policy.

The law and public policy regarding interconnection,
competition and monopoly took two divergent and ultimately
incompatible paths after 1907.

The disturbingly rapid acquisition

of competing exchanges by Bell set off antitrust alarms allover
the country.

Antimonopoly sentiment was at fever pitch;

public

fears that big businesses were strangling the market economy had
led to successful prosecutions of the Northern Securities Company,

and to the dissolution of Standard Oil and the American Tobacco
Company in 1911.

Congress passed a new, broader antitrust law, the

Clayton Act, in 1913.

The institutional response at the state and

local level, however, pointed in an altogether different direction.
Municipalities weary with dual service began to favor consolidation
or connection of competing exchanges.

State governments began to

create utility commissions with the authority to regulate telephone
companies, or to empower existing railroad commissions to do so.

The majority of them also passed laws authorizing the commissions
to compel the telephone companies to connect their lines.

The

commissions upheld regulation as a substitute for competition and
often encouraged monopoly.

The desire to preserve market
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competition mingled uncomfortably with an impulse to unify the
system.

As the courts, commissions, cities and telephone companies

groped for a solution to the "telephone situation,1I it did not
become evident that these two approaches worked at cross purposes

to each other until the Kingsbury commitment, made at the end of
1913, transfigured the contradiction into a national policy.
The organized independents knew that competition could not be
sustained without dual exchanges in as many cities as possible.

The weapons they chose to fight Bell acquisitions were state and
national antitrust laws. [42] When the national independent
association gained wind of Bell's intentions to merge independent

and Bell properties in 1908, it formed a litigation committee and
raised thousands of dollars from independent companies and
associations. [43] The litigation committee prodded the Attorneys
General of Michigan, Nebraska, Kansas and Missouri to block Bell
purchases of independent companies. [44] A merger in Marion, Ohio in
1908 was also countered by a lawsuit under the Valentine Act, a
state antitrust law.

In Kentucky, merger negotiations between Bell

and the Louisville-based independent were called off because the
state constitution prohibited the consolidation of competing common

carriers.

Prodded by complaints from the Postal Telegraph Company,

the state of Mississippi sued AT&T for integrating its operations
with Western Union, charging that it was trying to monopolize the
telegraph business. [45]
Federal antitrust proceedings were initiated in July 1912,
when the U.S.

Attorney General in the Portland, Oregon district

filed a suit under the Sherman Act, charging Bell with an attempt
to monopolize the telephone business in the Pacific northwest.

For
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the next six months special agents of the Justice Department took
depositions from people involved in the telephone industry around
the country.

As the new administration of Woodrow Wilson took over

the Justice Department in January 1913, the outgoing Attorney
General turned over the completed investigation amidst widespread

rumors that AT&T would be prosecuted. [46]
At the local level, consolidations were opposed by those who
feared they would lead to a rate increase or a deterioration of

service.

Advocates of this position had no trouble finding

evidence that Bell rates in noncompetitive cities were higher than

those in cities with competition.

As Bell and independent plans to

consolidate in Kansas City began to be floated, the Kansas City
Post waged an effective newspaper war against the merger, noting

that while Bell had promised residential rates of $36 a year, the
residential rate in monopolized cities of comparable size was $42

or $48 a year.

"If the Bell Company charges from $42 to $48 a year

for residence phones in other cities, won't it find excuses to do

the same thing here if competition is removed?"

the paper

asked. [47] In many quarters there was still a willingness to rely
on the traditional method of competition to control rates and
service.

A different approach to the problem was taking shape at the
state level.

Twenty eight states passed laws creating regulatory

commissions or giving existing railroad commissions jurisdiction

over the telephone companies between 1909 and 1913.

Twenty six

states passed laws authorizing some form of compulsory physical
connection between telephone companies from 1907 to 1913,
inclusive. [48] In 1910 the Interstate Commerce Commission was given
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the authority to regulate telephone companies as common carriers.

Armed with their new powers to regulate entry, mergers and
connections, the utility commissions began to push the telephone
system toward a monopolistic structure.

Compulsory physical connection legislation was the most
important arena for working out the public policy regarding dual
systems.

These laws did not end access competition, but merely

empowered a utility commission to order connections when petitioned

to do so by the telephone users of a specific locality.

They

required hearings and a finding of public interest, convenience and

necessity by the commission, and thus could only be applied on a
case-by-case basis.

Furthermore, the laws were not yet used to

connect urban exchanges engaged in direct competition with each

other.
access.

More often, they were applied to broaden long distance
The restricted scope of their application was attributable

to the belief, still widespread, that merging the subscriber sets
of the telephone companies would harm one of the two telephone
systems.

In effect, this amounted to a belief that eliminating

access competition at the local level was tantamount to the
elimination of competition itself, a conclusion that turned out to

be not far from the truth.

Because there was as yet was no public

consensus on the issue of monopoly, the commissions concentrated on
cases where dual service restricted communication between different
cities.

The interconnection laws were vociferously opposed by both
Bell and the organized Independents.

Although their motives were

different, their arguments about its competitive effects often
paralleled each other.

Physical interconnection posed a problem
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for Bell in that it publicly advocated universal service but was
unwilling to bring that goal about by connecting with competing
systems.

It had to argue that universal service could be achieved

best under the administration of one system.

A detailed memo

outlining its argument was prepared in 1907. [49J
Part of its argument contrasted the standardization,

coordination and high quality that could be achieved under a
monopoly with the chaotic and uncontrolled conditions that would
result from nondiscriminatory connection with a multiplicity of

independently owned, overlapping systems.

It also attempted to

argue that independently manufactured telephones would not work
with the Bell system as well as Bell telephones, although this
point was easily discredited as Bell went about sublicensing
thousands of non-Bell systems.
A more significant argument was that competition between
connected networks was inherently imperfect and even parasitic.

If

a Bell exchange in a dual service city had fewer subscribers than
its opponent and Bell was forced to connect its toll lines with it,
the independent subscribers could benefit from Bell toll access
without subscribing to Bell.

Bell would lose all of its exchange

subscribers to the larger local company, it was argued.

In

economic terms, this can be summarized as an argument that

interconnection made networks complements rather than competitors.

Bell's defenders argued that it laid out telephone facilities to
cover an entire district, including what it called the "fat" and
the "1eanll areas.

Even though some parts of the system were not

profitable in isolation, connecting everyone could make the system
as a whole profitable.

Interconnection laws would allow another
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company to serve only the profitable areas while benefitting from
Bell's access to the "lean" areas.

The independents' motive in opposing compulsory
interconnection was to preserve dual systems rather than to

eliminate them.

A unified, fully interconnected telephone system,

they believed, could not possibly be a truly competitive one.
advanced two reasons for this view:

They

first, there was a tension, if

not an outright contradiction, between competitive rivalry and the
kind of interfirm cooperation needed to set up telephone
connections jOintly;

second, the whole competitive process in

telephony was driven by access differentials which would disappear
once the systems were interconnected.

Establishing a telephone connection over the facilities of two
or more companies involved linking their lines at the same time to

form an unbroken channel for voice communication.

The workers of

the two companies had to cooperate rapidly and efficiently, and
their methods had to be compatible.
that this was possible.

The independents did not deny

They did point out that the level of

cooperation required was so intricate that two companies involved
in it could hardly maintain their status as competitors.
Business firms sufficiently cooperative to exchange traffic
could just as easily divide the market, fix prices and cease to
compete.

By the same token, integrating their operations involved

a degree of mutual trust and openness that hardly seemed compatible
with business rivalry.

Whoever controlled the local exchange, for

example, would be in a position to discriminate between the toll

lines of the long distance companies when it routed the traffic, or
could engage in preferential treatment of one's own su.bscribers at
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the expense of the other's. [50]
The independent defenders of dual systems also believed that
dissolving the access differences between the networks eliminated
real competition.

The January 30, 1909 issue of Telephony

contained a vigorous argument against a physical connection law

proposed in Texas.

"We have scraped along during the past ten

years building exchanges and toll lines that we ought not to have
constructed except for the purpose of causing the service to be
more valuable than that of our adversary," the article stated.

If

toll lines were forced to connect with competitors,

Any fellow who feels aggrieved because his call did not
reach him promptly when his mother-in-law had cramp
colic ... can and probably will build a competing line
between your most profitable points, hitch onto you at each
end, and make you take his calls to all other points on
your lines.

If exchanges were forced to connect with competitors:

If a handful of businessmen [are] hostile to you for any
reason, ... they will build a co-operative exchange in the
business section of the town--hire an operator or

two--install telephones for themselves at a cost of only a
collar or a little over a month, take out your telephones,
connect to your exchange, ... and you will hold the bag, and
eventually lose out entirely.

The article appeared in the independent trade press--but it had
been reprinted from the newsletter of Southwestern Bell. [51]
There was at least one advocate of connecting with competing
companies within the Bell system:
Chicago Telephone Co.

B.E.

Sunny, the head of the

Sunny believed that Bell would benefit from
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voluntarily entering into connecting arrangements.

In February

1910, he wrote a memo proposing to operate lines connecting the
independent exchanges in Indianapolis, Grand Rapids, Racine and

Aurora to the Bell system.

The arrangement would give independent

subscribers in those cities access to Chicago, Cincinnati and

Milwaukee.
advantages:

Sunny pointed out that the proposal would have numerous
it would preempt the growing demand for physical

connection legislation, allowing Bell to connect on its own terms;

it would eliminate the need to grant a franchise to competing
companies in cities currently monopolized by Bell;

it would

greatly increase Bell's toll business, or at least allow them to
find out what effects interconnection would have on its traffic;

it would reveal the identity of independent long distance users to
Bell, allowing Bell to solicit them to take its own service and
save time and money by doing away with the costs of transferring
calls between two systems.

The only disadvantage Sunny recognized

was that it might lead to the loss of exchange subscribers in
cities where Bell rates were higher. [52]
Sunny's arguments tend to support the independents' contention

that interconnection would lead to a single system rather than
continued competition.

The proposal was not implemented, however,

because the national Bell management feared that interconnection
would perpetuate dual systems and ease the pressure for

consolidation.

A particularly shrewd aspect of Sunny's proposal

was that all long distance calls from independent to Bell points
would have to go over Bell lines the whole way.

If an independent

user in Peoria wanted to call Chicago, for example, he would not be
allowed to use independent toll lines between Peoria and Aurora and
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then transfer to Bell lines;
between both cities.

Bell would have to carry the traffic

The independents knew that these kinds of

problems were not only possible but likely when interconnecting
competing networks, which is why they viewed the prospect with
suspicion.

Sunny's proposal is also significant because it may

have been used as a model for the interconnection arrangements of

the Kingsbury commitment.
The flood of physical connection legislation from 1910 to 1913
reflected a change of heart among the independents.

There had

always been public demands for connecting the separate networks,

but the combination of Bell and independent opposition had
prevented action.

By 1910 many independents were beginning to

concede victory in the access competition to Bell.

Those who

embraced this view, however, did not see interconnection as a means

of preserving competition, but were generally the same independents

who worked out consolidations and divisions of territory with Bell.
Others saw interconnection as a way to minimize Bell competition at

the local level by giving their exchanges access to Bell toll
lines.
The physical connection provision of Wisconsin's state utility

law was defeated in 1907, when the independents opposed it, but
passed in 1911, after they had given up hope of establishing an
exchange in Milwaukee and the state association had become
"dormant". [53] Frank Woods, the president of the National
Independent Telephone Association, came out in favor of physical
connections with Bell in 1910.

Woods embraced the "universal

service" concept and advocated laws compelling the interchange of
service between all companies under the supervision of the

312

Interstate Commerce Commission. [54] (Two years later, Woods worked
out a consolidation with Bell which eliminated dual service in most
of southeastern Nebraska.)

In 1911, the NITA national convention

followed Woods's lead, passing a resolution for compulsory
connection and state and national regulation. [55] The issue of
interconnection and cooperation with Bell split the independents,
however.

A splinter independent association led by the owners of

the competing systems in New York, Pennsylvania and West Virginia
was formed in January 1913.

One of its leaders, Burt Hubbell,

explained that the new association

II

s ha!! be composed of members

who represent telephone companies not owned or controlled by the
AT&T, directly or indirectly."[56]
Three landmark cases in California, Wisconsin, and Oregon

highlight the different facets of the interconnection issue:

the

attitudes of users toward nonconnected networks, the effects that
the telephone companies believed connection would have on their

economic viability, and the attitudes of regulators toward
competition.

In April 1912, complaints calling for physical connection were
filed with the state railroad commission by two rural independent
telephone systems in northern California. [57] The Glen and Tehama
County Telephone companies had started operation a few years
earlier.

Prior to their formation in the predominantly rural

counties, the Bell system had established exchanges only in the
cities, had minimal toll lines, and used obsolete equipment.

The

new companies built exchanges and toll lines throughout their
counties using modern independent apparatus.

Their entry provoked

Bell into installing modern switchboards, bUilding toll lines
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throughout the district ·and signing interconnection contracts with

the many farmer lines in the area.

Following the standard pattern

of access competition, Bell was forced to duplicate the rural lines
of the independent systems and sublicense farmer lines in order to
remain competitive.

At the time of the proceeding the subscriber

breakdown was as follows:

Tehama County
Bell:

629

Tehama Cty. Co: 457

Both:

241

Both:

329

Glen County
Bell:

674

Glenn Cty. Co:

570

Only 30 percent of the Bell-connected stations were telephones
leased from Bell.
farmers.

The rest were sublicensed phones owned by

The commission considered connecting the two systems an

appropriate solution because the independents offered superior

local service while the Bell system had more extensive long
distance access.

From the text of the decision it is clear that the local
telephone companies viewed interconnection as a way to overcome the

competitive advantages given to Bell by its long distance lines.
They believed that once the two systems were connected they would
win the majority of the local exchange subscribers.

The utility

commissioners also saw interconnection as a means of eliminating

duplicate subscriptions and overlapping exchanges.

Its ruling

pointedly did not disagree with Bell's contention that it would
lose most of its exchange subscribers if telephone users could gain
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access to its long dista.nce lines without subscribing to its

exchange.

Like Bell, the commissioners thought of the telephone as

a natural monopoly.

That Bell had been forced to extend and

improve its service by the new entrants was interpreted by the
commission not as evidence for the benefits of competition, but as

an indication that a monopoly could and should have been doing
better. [58]
In the city of LaCrosse, Wisconsin (pop.

30,000), Frank

Winter, a subscriber to the independent company, petitioned the
Wisconsin Railroad Commission to connect the toll lines of the two

competing systems in 1912.

La Crosse was the largest city to

undertake a physical connection proceeding at that time.
Wisconsin Telephone Co.

The

(Bell) had 1400 subscribers in the city;

the LaCrosse Telephone Co.

had 4200.

Both companies had toll

facilities offering connections throughout the state, but Wisconsin

Telephone lines extended to many places not reached by the local
independent.

Only 8 percent of the telephone users had duplicate

subscriptions, and 12-15 large businesses had PBXs connected to the
toll lines of both companies.

The petitioner's business required

almost daily use of Bell toll facilities.

When calls for local

people not on the Bell exchange came into the city, messengers had
to be dispatched to bring the desired party to a Bell station.
Winter requested connecting only the toll lines of the two systems,
leaving the division of local exchange service intact.

The

petitioners argued that the arrangement would be more convenient

and would benefit the Bell company by increasing its toll
business. [59]
Wisconsin Telephone opposed the request with its usual

315

arguments.

It laid most. of its emphasis on establishing that

interconnection would result in the loss of most of its exchange

subscribers.

If users could obtain access to Bell toll lines

without a subscription to Bell's exchange, they would migrate to
the larger independent exchange in order to obtain universal local

service in addition to Bell's widespread long distance service.

To

support its contention it introduced evidence from Canada, where
interconnection had been ordered in 8 cities and Bell's growth in

subscribers had been reversed while its local competitors grew. [60]
The Wisconsin regulators ordered the connection made.

Unlike

the California Commission, however, they took seriously the
question of confiscation of property.

"It is evident that the only

inducement to subscribe to the Bell system is the fact that thereby
the subscriber is connected with a telephone system covering like

net work the entire country."

In order to compensate for economic

damage to Bell's exchange, the commission imposed a surcharge on

users of Bell toll lines who did not subscribe to the Bell
exchange.

"A subscriber who has not installed the telephones of

both exchanges is not entitled to the toll service of both
exchanges without paying an additional charge," it said. [61] A
surcharge had also been imposed in Canada, however, where it had

failed to stop the desertion of the Bell system.

In June 1914, the

Wisconsin Commission issued another physical connection order

pertaining to the city of Janesville, Wisconsin.

In this case the

connection order included both local exchange and toll service. [62]
Portland, Oregon in 1913 was a dual service city with about
40,000 Bell telephones, 13,600 Home Co.
duplicate subscribers.

telephones and 7,000

The Hotel Oregon had Home Co.

telephones
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in its 400 rooms and 45 Bell system phones in the public places
throughout the hotel.

The hotel's customers objected to the

inconvenience of having to walk to the lobby or hallways to call
Bell subscribers in the city.

When incoming calls came into the

hotel over the Bell system, the hotel staff had to contact the
patrons and bring them to a Bell station.

The switchboards of the

two systems were in the same room in the hotel.

The Home Co.

was

willing to set up a connection between the two, but Bell refused to

do so.

The only remedy Bell offered was to install duplicate Bell

telephones in all the hotel rooms, an expensive propostion for the
hotel management.

On the motion of the hotel owners, the case was

brought to the Oregon Railroad Commission.

The commission ordered

the telephone companies to connect their hotel switchboards and
exchange traffic, charging 3 and a half cents for each transferred
call.
There were other important physical connection cases in

Hamilton, Ohio and Grand Ledge, Michigan.

The commission ordered

connections, but in each case the decision was appealed.

As in the

exclusive connecting contract cases, the State Supreme Courts
decisions conflicted with each other.

Indiana's Supreme Court

ruled against compulsory phyiscal connection in August 1909.[63J
California's Supreme Court overturned the railroad commission's

interconnection order in 1913, calling it "confiscatory.

II

The

Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld its commission in 1916. [64J
The regulatory commissions promoted consolidations as well as

interconnection.

In September 1911, only three months after the

bill creating the Ohio utility commission became law, state
officials were meeting with representatives of the Bell company to
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discuss plans for the elimination of dual service throughout the
state.

In 1912 the Bell and independent telephone companies in

southeastern Nebraska worked out a consolidation in which Bell
achieved a monopoly in some territories and the independent a

monopoly in the others.

The deal was made with the aid and

approval of the state commission.

The Michigan commission presided

over the consolidation of the competing exchanges in Detroit in

1912, and helped to assure the remaining independent companies that
the change would not impair their access to the city. [65] Bills
which explicitly prevented competition or permitted mergers between
competing companies were defeated in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Ohio

in 1909 and 1910.

Another merger bill with the support of both

Bell and the Morgan interests (which controlled the big independent
system in the state) was introduced in Ohio in 1911, but failed to
pass again.
in 1911.

A similar bill was vetoed by the governor of Nebraska

While the creation of one system had the support of

regulators, it was still controversial with the general public.
Municipal governments also were agitating for the elimination
of fragmentation locally.

A Cleveland city council resolution of

January 1908 declared dual service a "nuisance" and instructed its

committee on telephones and telegraphs to investigate the
feasibility of compelling the Bell and Cuyahoga exchanges to
interconnect.

A civic committee in another former independent

stronghold, Indianapolis, also recommended a return to one system
after an investigation of the telephone situation.

Kansas City and

Los Angeles both experienced political agitation to connect or
consolidated their systems. [66] In all cities, however, support for
the elimination of dual service was tempered by fears that it would
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lead to a rate increase. [67]
The vitality and novelty of the issue of interconnection can
be measured by the contradictory nature of the responses it evoked.
Exclusive connecting contracts had been declared to be both
anti-competitive and the salvation of competition.

Their legality

had been upheld by one state supreme court and overturned by
others.

Consolidation of competing telephone companies was being

prosecuted under state and federal antitrust laws and actively
encouraged by state utility commissions.

The commissions could

effect consolidations but bills explicitly authorizing them were
usually defeated.

Physical interconnection was desireable goal,

but so was competition, and the two did not seem to be compatible.

Compelling physical connection was authorized by law in many
states, but had been declared confiscatory and illegal by some
state courts.
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Chapter 9
The subtle politics and economics of unification
1913 - 1921

By 1913, Vail's attempt to unify the telephone system had
reaped a whirlwind of controversy.

almost every state.

AT&T was mired in lawsuits in

More threatening still, AT&T's pursuit of a

single system had fueled agitation for government ownership of the
telephone system.

Postmaster General Burleson's annual report

advocated government ownership of all forms of interstate
communication, and Burleson was cooperating with two powerful

congressmen in the drafting of a bill to nationalize long distance
telephone lines. [1]
Bell's attempt to acquire and consolidate the Morgan-owned
independent properties in Ohio brought matters to a head.

After

extensive negotiations with state and federal authorities, it

learned that the consolidations would be considered a violation of
the Sherman Act.

In order to extract itself from litigation and

abate the threat of government ownership, Bell was forced to back
away from its pursuit of a unified system.

Its vehicle for doing

so was the "Kingsbury commitment II of December 19, 1913, so named

because it was expressed in a letter from AT&T Vice President
Nathan C.

Kingsbury to Attorney General McReynolds and G.

Todd of the Department of Justice.

Carroll

The letter eliminated the
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threat of federal antitrust prosecution and stilled some of the
demands for government ownership.

1.

The Kingsbury Commitment.

Nominally, the Kingsbury commitment was a near-complete
victory for the view that competition rather than monopoly should
be the norm in the telephone industry.

AT&T agreed to divest

itself of its Western Union subsidiary, despite the important
economies of scope gained from joint operation of telephone and

telegraph lines.

It agreed to stop acquiring competing independent

exchanges, thus preserving dual service in the approximately 1,200

cities and towns where Bell and an independent divided the market.
And it offered to open up its long distance lines to independent
exchanges under certain conditions.

The interconnection provisions

of the commitment only applied to exchanges that were more than
fifty miles apart.

Thus, the agreement was intended to preserve a

divided, competitive service at the local level while depriving
AT&T of the competitive advantage it obtained by tying long
distance access to local exchange service.

The independents had

every reason to congratulate themselves on what seemed to be lithe

acceptance of the principle of competition in the conduct of [the
telephone] business."[2]
In fact, the Kingsbury commitment was at odds with other
forces propelling the telephone system towards monopoly.

The

growing desire of users for universal access, state utility
commissions' determination to supplant competition with regulation,

and World War I-induced centralization all pointed towards the
unification of the network.

The Kingsbury commitment thus created

a temporary stalemate rather than a complete victory for the
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competitive principle.

For the next five years, the commitment

impeded consolidations while the political, economic, and social
forces that favored them continued to build.
The Kingsbury commitment is often misinterpreted as a sweeping
interconnection agreement that effectively ended the fragmentation
brought about by Bell and independent competition.
misconception.

This is a

Aside from the fact that it left dual service

intact within a fifty mile radius, there is no evidence that any

sizable independent company availed itself of the opportunity to
connect with AT&T under its terms.

Bell's own statistics on the

number of telephone subscribers connected to itself through
independent companies show no quantum leaps in 1914 or 1915.

On

the contrary, the rate of increase in the number of connecting

stations, which advanced rapidly during the sublicensing craze of
1907 to 1910, declined steadily from 1913 to 1916. [3J
The reason for the commitment's lack of impact becomes
apparant as soon as its actual provisions are examined.

The

commitment was carefully crafted to preserve Bell's competitive
advantage, and its terms were far from generous.

To make long

distance connections over the Bell system, an independent had to

build its own lines to the nearest Bell exchange and pay, in
addition to the regular toll charges, a 10 cent fee for every call
handled.

Most physical connection agreements ordered by utility

commissions established a surcharge one half to one third that
size.

The agreement also stipulated that the entire toll circuit

should be over Bell facilities and under the control of Bell
operators.

Independent long distance lines, in other words, could

not be used to make up any part of the circuit, except to get the
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call to the nearest Bell switchboard in cases where there were no

Bell lines.

This prevented competitive long distance companies

from serving the long distance traffic flowing from independent to
Bell telephones.

Just as the sublicensing contracts opened up a

significant number of independent subscribers to Bell connections
without allowing independents access to any part of the market
exclusively served by Bell, so the Kingsbury commitment was
designed to open up parts of the long distance business heretofore
exclusively controlled by independents to Bell, without any
reciprocal concessions to the independents.

More restrictive

still, the agreement only permitted independent subscribers to
terminate calls in Bell exchanges;

it did not allow Bell

subscribers to place calls to users on independent systems.
The terms of the commitment were so disadvantageous to the
independents that they were immediately dismissed as "absurd" and
"insane."[4] The independents still viewed it as a victory,
however, because the commitment was interpreted as the first

proposal in a bargaining process that would eventually lead to
acceptable terms.

Those hopes were dashed when major independents

entered into post-Kingsbury interconnection negotiations.

In 1914

the President of Buffalo's independent Federal Telephone Co.
an inquiry about interconnecting with Bell toll lines.

made

In his

correspondence with vice president Kingsbury he qUickly discovered
that AT&T would make no concessions to reciprocity. [5J The
independents complained to the Department of Justice.

Late in 1916

their national association charged that Bell had failed to live up
to the spirit of the interconnection agreement. [6J Apparently the
protests had no effect.
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2.

Three Great Consolidations.

The Kingsbury commitment's moratorium on acquisitions was far

more important than its ineffectual interconnection agreement.

Hundreds of ongoing negotiations for Bell purchases of major
independent properties were suddenly suspended.

In many cases, the

commitment prevented mergers where the independents were willing to

sell, Bell wanted to buy, the city and state authorities approved,
and voters had expressed their desire to unify the service by large
majorities.

The moratorium on acquisitions left intact independent

operating companies rooted in major cities and possessed of
significant levels of toll interconnection.

From all appearances,

dual service could have continued indefinitely after 1913.
Nevertheless, within three years of its publication a series of

great consolidations of independent and Bell telephone systems in
major cities began.

Many were concluded by 1918, well before a

1921 federal law nullified the Kingsbury commitment.
examines three of these consolidations:

This chapter

those in the cities of Los

Angeles and Buffalo, and in the state of Kentucky.
Bell had a distinct method and agenda to its approach to the
consolidations.

Universal service was used to develop public

support for the change, but to the company itself the elimination
of competition was primarily an opportunity to increase rates.

Bell promoted consolidations cautiously, making sure that it had
the support or at least tacit consent of telephone users and all
relevant government authorities.

The reckless acquisitions and

disconnections of earlier years had been left behind for good.
Technically, new acquisitions violated the Kingsbury commitment,

but Bell had learned that it could obtain the Justice Department's
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approval if the merger had the support of the public and the
approval of state and local officials.

The only form of restraint

imposed on Bell was that it could not come out of the transaction
with control of a larger share of the nation's telephones.

This

made it possible for Bell and the independents to merge by trading
The independent would assume control wherever it was

territories.

dominant or firmly entrenched, while Bell would take over the
territories where it had a commanding lead.

The Attorney General

would then be presented with a list of the exchange territories
being swapped which showed that Bell was losing control over as
many telephones as it was gaining.

The antitrust officials

generally granted their approval to these trades.
Fragmentation of the subscriber universe was always a critical

factor in driving the consolidations forward.

What is equally

interesting, however, is how the unification process affected and

reflected the interests of people located in different levels of
the communications hierarchy,

The issue was not merely whether the

public wanted universal service or not, but also who would gain and
who would lose because of the transition.

This issue comes out

most clearly by examining the way rates were adjusted following a
consolidation.
The Federal Telephone Company, Buffalo.
The Buffalo-based Federal Co.

was run by Burt G.

Hubbell, a

prominent national independent leader and one of the ablest and
most sincere supporters of telephone competition.

Hubbell's

company had an ownership interest in 35 independent exchanges in
western New York, including the systems of Buffalo, Rochester and

Jamestown.

The Jamestown independent exchange had more subscribers
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than its rival Bell exchange;

the Rochester exchange was roughly

equal to its competitor, while Bell's subscriber universe in

Buffalo outnumbered the independent by nearly three to one.

In

1916 Hubbell observed a tendency among subscribers served by two
exchanges to gravitate toward the larger of the two systems.

His

Buffalo exchange was having a harder and harder time attracting new
subscribers, and the size of its list was decreasing.

According to

Hubbell, "the natural tendency of the public to patronize the
company with the largest number of subscribers ... has led to a
segregation into telephone districts in each of which one of the
two competitors has usually acquired a great predominance of

subscribers.

II

As a result, large numbers of users in western New

York were unable to communicate with each other by telephone. [7J
In a memo to the U.S.

Attorney General seeking his approval

for a consolidation, Hubbell pointed out that the Federal Company
had used every means at its disposal to reverse the downward trend.
It had waged an advertising campaign touting competition, local
control, and lower rates.

It had financed, purchased and installed

an automatic switching system in Buffalo.

Automation had resulted

in rapid and efficient service, but failed to reverse the migration
of subscribers to the Bell system.

Hubbell concluded:

A careful and painstaking analysis of this situation has
brought the company to the conclusion that through a change
in sentiment (entirely beyond the control of this company
to direct or influence) the public, in the territory
occupied by the company, now feels that its best interests
can be served through a unified telephone system under
state Public Service Commission control, rather than

through the support of two companies giving a divided
service. [8 J
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Bell's New York Telephone Company pursued the consolidation in
the manner characteristic of the Bell companies at this time.
During the consolidation, it worked closely with the Buffalo
Chamber of Commerce to secure its approval of the rate changes it
wanted to make.

It insisted that the majority of telephone users

express their approval of the consolidation by petition or a local
referendum before the companies applied to the Attorney General for
a waiver of the Kingsbury commitment. [9] As in many other
localities in this period, Bell skirted the prohibition of the
Kingsbury commitment against the acquisition of competing
independents by trading territories with its former competitor.

In

this case, Bell acquired control of the Buffalo area while the
independents gained a monopoly over Rochester and Jamestown and

vicinity.

The Buffalo Chamber of Commerce approved the consolidation
after a special committee conducted a detailed investigation of

telephone rates in the city.

The first of the committee's

conclusions:

No permanent and satisfactory telephone situation can be

established which contemplates the division of our people
into two separate groups.

General inter-communication is

the essential requirement for adequate and complete
telephone service, especially for business men. [IO]

The most interesting aspect of the report is its proposal to
completely overhaul the telephone rate structure upon
consolidation.

The report claimed that neither telephone company

was making an adequate return under present conditions" and could,

if they so requested, obtain approval for a rate increase from the
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This, it claimed, "would prove an added

Public Service Commission.

burden to the telephone users of this city, and particularly to
those who use both services.

11

As an alternative to rate increases

under continued dual service, the report proposed a system of
measured rates and a move away from party line service.

Consolidation would result in reduced operating expenses, while the
proposed rate changes, the committee asserted, would reduce rates

for most subscriber groups while justly assigning a larger share of
the costs to those who used the telephone the most.

In its

assessment of the impact of the rate change, the committee relied

almost entirely on information provided by New York Telephone.
The structure of the proposed rates yields important clues
about who wanted universal service and who was expected to pay for

it.

One effect of the new rates was to dramatically increase the

charges of the 1,000 or so large business users at the top of the
hierarchy.

One such user, the Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., entered

an emphatic protest with the city council, pointing out that its
payments for telephone service would triple under the proposed
rates. [II] The Postal Company circulated its own petition for
continued competition to counter the Bell-Chamber of Commerce
petition favoring merger.

The leaflet carried a list contrasting

the rates of cities with and without competition. [12]
The Chamber of Commerce report tried hard to make it look as
if residential and small user rates would be unaffected by the
change.

But it is fairly certain that the rates of users on the

bottom of the hierarchy were being subtly increased, too.

All

business party lines were to be eliminated, and half the business
subscribers of both companies were served on a party line basis.
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The lowest measured service rate allowed a business subscriber to

make only about two calls a day without incurring extra charges.
Four-party residential lines, currently priced at $ 24/year, were to
be put on a measured basis, while individual and two-party
residential lines were to be offered on a flat-rate basis at much
higher rates.

Although the four-party residential line preserved

the old monthly rate, it now came with a limit of 600 messages,
beyond which there would be an additional charge of 4 cents per

If each person on a 4-party line made only one call a day

call.

they would exceed that limit by 840 calls, leading to extra charges
of $33/year.
The discouragement of party lines was a predictable
characteristic of a telephone system that no longer had to compete

for access to subscribers.

Party lines had flourished during the

competitive period because each network wanted to get as many

subscribers as possible onto its system at the lowest possible
cost.

As competition waned, the telephone companies took access

for granted and concentrated on maximizing their revenues from
usage.

If the consolidation increased rates for users at the top and
bottom of the hierarchy, it probably saved money for business users
located somewhere in the middle, assuming that they were
single-line users before.

Savings would be especially pronounced

for businesses with a moderate level of calling who had paid for
two subscriptions before.

Consolidation gave them universal access

at a price about the same, and possibly lower, than the price of a
subscription to a single system before the change.
Southern California.
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The political response to dual service in Southern California
was particularly revealing.

By 1916 the Bell and the independent

systems had split the telephone business of the region almost
exactly in half.

Bell's Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.

11 exchanges serving 67,000 stations in the area;

had

its toll lines

offered connections to most of the Bell exchanges west of the
Rockies and AT&T connections to the rest of the U.S.
independent Home Telephone and Telegraph Co.

The

operated 14 local

exchanges and one long distance exchange using automatic switching

equipment.

In 1916 the Home Co.

had 60,300 subscribers and toll

connections to many other independent exchanges in Southern
California.

Despite the fact that the Los Angeles city council had

imposed artificially low rates on both companies, forcing them to
operate at a loss, both systems were financially sound and in good
physical condition. [13] The unremunerative rates harmed the credit
of the independent company and made it difficult for it to raise
money for expansion, but its effect on the Bell company was equally
severe;

only its financial ties to AT&T and the rest of the Bell

system kept it solvent.

Assuming reasonable rates, then, dual

service could have been maintained indefinitely in Southern

California.
Yet as the telephone saturated the area, political agitation
against dual service and for some form of unification took hold.
Organized demands for change began around 1910, when the city
created its own municipal Public Utilities Board.
were discussed:
exchanges;

Three remedies

1) compulsory interconnection of the competing

2) municipal ownership of the telephone system;

consolidation into a privately owned but publicly regulated

and 3)
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monopoly.

The first option, which appeared to leave both

competition and the existing companies intact, was the most

popular.

In April of 1910, the Municipal League of Los Angeles

asked the Board of Public Utilities to investigate the feasibility
of establishing a method of interconnecting the two rival telephone
systems.

As the Board prepared its report, agitation against dual
service by the business community grew.

In 1912, the Southern

California Hotel Men's Association created a committee to prepare a

plan to eliminate the use of both telephones in hotels. [14] The
Hotel Association's approach to the problem boiled down to an
attempt to coordinate users to select one telephone system over the

other as a bloc.

The same year a group calling itself the

Telephone Reform Assocation initiated a campaign against dual
service and for consolidation. [15] By 1914 the Association had
changed its name to the "One Phone League,1I and claimed 1200

members.

There was no doubt that the policy of interconnecting the

two companies enjoyed widespread public support.

A municipal

referendum of June 1, 1915, saw 63,194 voters express their
preference for compulsory interchange of service, while only 14,921
voted against it.

Also in 1915, the Socialist Party put a

referendum on the ballot authorizing the city to take over and
operate the telephone system.

The proposition was defeated with

20,000 votes in favor and 30,000 votes against.
If the opposition to dual service is broken down by subscriber
group a familiar pattern emerges.

Earlier in Chapter 7 the

correlation between telephone users' duplication rate and their

position in the calling hierarchy was demonstrated.

Organizations
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at the top of the hierarchy--i.e., those whose usage was large both
in volume and in geographic scope--had high duplication rates.
Telephone users at the bottom of the hierarchy tended not to
duplicate.

In the political reaction to dual service we see the

same hierarchy,

A survey taken by an economics student at the

University of Southern California in 1916 asked telephone users,
"Are you ever troubled about not being able to get people by
telephone because they have the other service?!!

The survey

interviewed 50 "business men," 50 "professional men,

IIhousewives.

II

The answers are shown below:

and 50

II

[16]

Business Men

Yes:

100

No:

0

Professional Men

Yes:

96

No:

4

Housewives

Yes:

66

No: 34

The strongest objections to dual service came from businesses in

the middle of the calling hierarchy.
opposed dual service is striking.
contain a measure of ambiguity.

The unanimity with which they

The data as reported here
The surveyed population is small,

we do not know how the samples were selected, nor do we know what

the economic status of the housewives was.

It is reasonable to

assume, however, that most of the businessmen were IItroubled ll not

because they were unable to get people by telephone--many of them
would have been duplicate subscribers, after all--but because they
objected to the additional expense of subscribing to both systems.
As noted before, telephone rates had been a volatile political
issue in the city since 1907, with the voting public demanding, and
politicians supplying, rates that could not recover the companies'
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costs.

Business and professional users of the telephone provided

the political constituency for those actions.
The corresponding lack of unanimity among housewives is

equally striking.

Although a majority of them answered "Yes" to

the question, one in every three of them was willing to say that
she was not troubled at all by an inability to reach half the
telephone subscribers in the region.

This is even more remarkable

when we keep in mind that almost none of the housewives would have
been duplicate subscribers, so that they, unlike the business and
professional users, really were unable to reach subscribers on the

other system.

The demand for homogenization was widespread, but

the most vigorous calls for it came from the upper levels of the
communications hierarchy.

The Los Angeles Board of Public Utilities issued its report on
the subject of interconnection April 28, 1914.

The report had been

conducted by the Utility Department's Chief Engineer, James Barker,
and was viewed by all concerned as an objective and impartial
study.

The Barker report effectively destroyed compulsory

interconnection as an option by showing how expensive it would be

to build and operate the facilities required to transmit, switch
and record calls between the two systems.

Although Barker

concluded that interconnection was "physically possible,1I the
expense of joint service was increased by the technical

incompatibility of the two systems.
Home Co.
voltages.
systems.

Bell relied on manual and the

on machine switching, and both operated at different
The main problem, however, was the sheer size of the two
Compulsory interconnection had never been carried out on

a scale involving more than 100,000 telephone subscribers before.
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Most of places in which it had been tried, such as Janesville and
La Crosse in Wisconsin, or Pasadena in California, had only a few

thousand subscribers and one central office for each company.
To connect the two large regional systems in Southern

California, Barker observed, required one of two methods.

One

could, first, build direct trunk lines between all of the Home
Co.'s central offices and all of the Pacific Co.'s central offices.
While this was the most technically desireable method, Barker
concluded that:

The expense in connection with this plan is so great as to
preclude its adoption. The initial investment and fixed
charges on the necessary equipment are prohibitive.

Under

this plan it would be necessary to practically duplicate
the present trunking equipment of the companies and make
extensive changes in the switchboards.
In order to carry
out this plan it would be necessary in some instances to

enlarge the quarters in which the switchboards themselves
are contained.
In view of these difficulties, and the
enormous expense involved, this plan presents so many

obstacles that it appears commercially impracticable.

The other method of interconnecting the two exchanges was to
establish what would now be called a tandem switching center, an
exchange office where calls between the two systems would converge
to be switched.

Barker estimated that such a switching center

would have to be able to handle a peak load of 20,000 calls an
hour, and calculated that building and operating it would require
about $400,000 in capital investment and another $500,000 to
$600,000 per year in expenses.

This figure represented about

one-third of the total annual operating revenues of both companies
combined.

Barker concluded by saying:
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By far the best plan for obtaining the desired results is,
in my opinion, through a consolidation of the two systems.
By this means all duplication and unnecessary investments
are avoided and operating and overhead costs are reduced to

a minimum, and in the end the patrons will be given a
better service and at the lowest rates commensurate with

the necessary investment. [17J

After the Barker report, consolidation became the most popular
strategy for unification.

Municipal acquisition had been

repudiated by the voters.

"There seemed to be a hesitancy,

contemporary wrote,

lI

II

a

about adding to municipal enterprises another

institution with annual deficits of nearly $400,000."[18J The Bell
Company's franchise expired in November 1916, and the city seized
on this opportunity to require a consolidation by refusing to grant
its request for a renewal.

The product of the merger, the Southern

California Telephone Company, was Bell-owned.
on the first of May, 1917.

It began operation

The three-sided struggle over rates

between the city's telephone users, the regulators and telephone
companies continued, but the question of dual VB.

universal

service had been settled.
From the Barker report it might appear as if telephone
monopoly in Souther California was the product of scale economies.
Barker had shown convincingly, after all, that it was less
expensive for one telephone company to provide universal
interconnection than two.

But to view the problem this way is to

overlook the most important question in the emergence of telephone
monopoly:

why did Southern Californians, like Americans almost

everywhere else at that time, decide that they wanted universal
interconnection?

It is clear that the least expensive thing to do

for the 88 percent of the subscribers who did not duplicate was to
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maintain dual service.

To view telephone monopoly as a product of

economic efficiency is to reverse the order of causation.

Southern

Californians decided that they wanted universal telephone access
first, and then sought the least expensive way of bringing it
about.
The State of Kentucky.
Bell's principal competitor in Kentucky was the Central Home
Telephone Company.

Central Home owned 19 exchanges in the state in

1910, as well as its own long distance company.

After a financial

failure in 1907, the system was successfully rehabilitated by the
committee of bankers who assumed control of it.

As they were not

interested in remaining in the telephone business, the bankers
approached Bell about selling out near the end of 1910.

When

Central Horne initiated its negotiations, its facilities were

generally in better shape than Bell's and its exchanges had more
subscribers. [19] In Louisville and its suburbs, for example, the
independent had gained over 3,000 subscribers while Bell had lost
1,200 since 1907.

The company claimed that this growth had been

achieved without any extraordinary promotional measures, but

suggested that they would become more aggressive if Bell did not
buy them out.
Bell, however, was only mildly interested in acquiring Central
Horne in 1911.

There were two serious obstacles to a merger from

its point of view.

Already embroiled in controversy and

litigation, Bell was not interested in acquiring a major telephone
property unless it could be done openly and legally, and the
Kentucky constitution contained a flat prohibition of mergers of
competing common carriers. [20] The other problem was a city
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ordinance in Louisville fixing the rates for telephone service.

The president of Bell's Cumberland Company advised Kingsbury that
the rates imposed by the city would preclude any possibility of
making a profit on a consolidated investment.

He went on to say:

I am of the oplnlon that the two companies will be
compelled to operate for several years, until the people
there get tired of two systems and join with us in
formulating a plan by which the two companies can be
consolidated and fair rates charged. [21]

This comment illuminates both the nature of Bell's commitment to
universal service and its antipathy toward physical interconnection

in this period.

Bell was confident of the ultimate victory of the

universal service idea and expected it to come about through a

process of public negotiation in which reasonable regulators
balanced the interests of the telephone users and the telephone
companies.

Until that happened, the benefits of a unified service

were to be withheld, and used as leverage for bringing the
interested parties around to a consolidation that would allow the
surviving telephone company to increase its rates.
no universal service without a rate increase.

There would be

Given this policy,

pressures to interconnect with competing exchanges in major cities

had to be rebuffed because they would deprive Bell of its
bargaining power over the unification process.

In an internal letter, Kingsbury admitted that the only reason
he was interested in buying Central Home was the possibility that
independent subscribers in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky
would begin to demand a connection to Cincinnati. [22] A major
metropolis only 100 miles from Louisville, Cincinnati attracted a
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substantial part of Kentucky's commerce and communication, yet had

always been a Bell monopoly town.

If a substantial number of

telephone users in Kentucky remained on independent systems,

especially one as politically well-connected as the Central Home,
there was a danger that Bell could be ordered to supply long
distance connections to its exchange there, or that a competing

exchange would be established there.

Late in 1911, in fact, the

Postal Telegraph Company, which had an outlet in Cincinnati,
offered to provide four heavy copper long distance circuits between
the Louisville independent exchange and Cincinnati. [23]
If the Central Home Co.

knew definitely that it was not going

to be purchased by Bell, it would either adopt more competitive
tactics or, worse, cause legal and political trouble for Bell
throughout the state.

Kingsbury advised his local operatives to

keep them mollified so as to avoid potentially

lIannoyinglt actions on their part.

lI

emharassing" and

While he was not able or willing

to buyout the independent, he had to convince them that a Bell
purchase was imminent or possible in the long run. [24] Kingsbury
bided his time for two years, conducting an appraisal of the
property and encouraging its owners to be patient, but negotiations

were broken off in November 1912.

The Kingsbury commitment, made

about a year later, laid the matter of a sale to rest.

During the lull created by the antitrust agreement, Bell and
its allies addressed themselves to the political situation in

Kentucky.

The company's unpopUlar litigation against municipal

rate regulation in Louisville was settled in 1914, with the company
accepting the city's dictates.

Its rate litigation with the city

of Paducah, which had led to the massive boycott of 1911, was
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settled by the U.S.

Supreme Court in 1915.

In the meantime,

support for one telephone system had been growing.

A new utility

bill was passed in 1912, giving the railroad commission the power
to compel toll connections.

It also contained a provision allowing

the railroad commission to authorize consolidations of telephone

companies when they were supported by the municipalities involved.
The part of the law legalizing mergers was an attempt to skirt the
constitutional prohibition on consolidations that eliminated
competition.

A few months after its passage, the railroad

commission approved a merger of the competing systems in Christian
and Todd counties [25] but expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of the ruling.

Pending test litigation neither

the commission nor Bell felt ready to proceed with any further
consolidations.

Dual service reached its numerical peak in Kentucky in 1914,
when there were competing exchanges in 63 of the 159 cities with
exchanges.

Public support for it, however, was rapidly waning.

Having extracted itself from its unpopular rate litigation and
repaired its relations with the state officials, Bell was in a
position to promote the final step needed to eliminate it.

In 1916

the legislature passed a constitutional amendment specifically
exempting telephone consolidations from the merger prohibition.

To

become law, the amendment had to be ratified by the state's voters.
The vote was scheduled for the November, 1917 elections.

Hunt

Chipley of Southern Bell, who had been instrumental in building up
political support for the move, wrote to Kingsbury that the passage
of the bill reflected a major change in public attitudes 'toward
Bell since the Kingsbury commitment:
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The legislature passed this bill because it was made plain
to them, from all quarters of the state, that the public
were tired of supporting dual systems of telephones and
that the companies should be put in a position, under

proper regulations, to remedy this situation.

The proposed amendment passed with 63 percent of the vote.

It was

supported by every major newspaper and board of trade in the state,
and passed through the legislature almost unanimously.

In singling

out the telephone for a special exemption from laws intended to
preserve competition, Kentucky anticipated the federal

Willis-Graham Act of 1921.

Even the political composition of the

coalition that brought the change about--an alliance of Bell and
independents who claimed that they needed to be able to consolidate
to maintain their economic viability--was reproduced at the

national level four years later.

Although the legal prerequisites

of a monopoly telephone system had been supplied, Bell did not
actually acquire the Central Home system until 1924.
3.

The substitution of regulation for competition.

In large cities such as Buffalo, Louisville and Los Angeles
public policy was consumed with the problem of what to do with
existing competitors.

Given the heavy capital requirements and the

entrenched position of the existing firms, there was little threat
that a new company would enter.

This was not true of the small

towns and rural areas, however.

There telephone competition

continued with the vigor of the early 1900s.

When confronted with

competitive entry, the state utility commissions generally
suppressed it.

The April 24, 1909 Telephony reported that the

independent telephone companies of New York opposed commission
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regulation "because of the prejudice of that body against
competition in public utilities,lt

The state of Ohio affords a revealing case study.

The state

law authorized the PUC to prevent telephone companies from
lIinvading the territory" of another company without a certificate
of public interest, convenience and necessity from the commission.

When numerous farmer and small town telephone companies came to the
commission to obtain permission to compete with an existing

company, showing that they could supply better service or offer
lower rates than the existing company, the commission refused

whenever it had the authority to do so.

In a case involving the

Village of New Washington, the PUC denied permission to set up a
new phone system even though the proposed service was at lower

rates and the application was supported by a pleading filed by the
Village government. [26] Entry was suppressed because prevention of
a "multiplicity of telephone systems" and the confinement of
telephone service to "one well regulated company" was "the whole

intention of the [utili ties] Act," a judge ruled. [27] When another
small town company attempted to enter the territory of a
neighboring company because of the latter's failure to maintain its

facilities in proper working condition, the PUC's opinion denied
that this was a legitimate reason for competition.

The filing of a

complaint before the PUC, it said, could compel any company to
improve its facilities.

In other words, the commission was

determined to substitute regulatory remedies for problems of
service and rates formerly addressed by means of competition.

In

part, this adamant reliance on regulatory solutions reflected a
movement that embraced all utilities, whether communicative or not.
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What gave the arguments about "natural monopolyll their peculiar

force in application to the telephone, however, was the problem of
a divided subscriber universe.

After the end of World War I there were still competing
exchanges in 1,000 locations, including 12 major cities.

Further

consolidations were blocked by the Kingsbury commitment and more
importantly by the Clayton antitrust act.[28J The telephone
companies inability to consolidate, they claimed, made it

impossible for them to raise money to rebuild their systems.

In a

movement that had the active support of both Bell and independent
interests, Congress amended the Transportation Act to permit the
consolidation of dual telephone systems with the approval of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.

In introducing the Willis-Graham

Act of 1921, Senator Graham stated:

I think I am stating the op1n1on of most men who have
considered the matter, that it is believed to be better

policy to have one telephone system in a community that
serves all the people, even though it may be'at an advanced
rate, properly regulated by State boards or commissions,

than it is to have two competing telephone systems.

There

is nothing more exasperating, nothing that annoys the
ordinary business man or the ordinary person more than to
have two competing local telephone systems, so that he must

have in his house and in his office two telephones, on
neither one of which he can get all the people he wants to
be in communication with. [29J

The passage of the Willis Graham Act gave the imprimatur of the
U.S.

Congress to the elimination of the last vestiges of

competition.

It cleared the way for major consolidations in Ohio,

Kentucky and elsewhere, although such consolidations had been
taking place gradually since 1916.
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The historical achievrnent of telephone monopoly is too often
confused with AT&T's rise to dominance over the telephone industry.
AT&T helped to articulate the goal of a unified system, and
certainly exploited its advantages adroitly, but the outcome of an
integrated telephone system was by no means its own doing.

A

single system was sanctioned and enforced by city councils, state

commissions, and federal legislators, and demanded by vocal
segments of the telephone users themselves.
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Chapter 10

Summary and Conclusions

This study presented the history of the telephone industry
from 1894 to 1921 as a history of the rise and decline of access
competition.

In colloquial terms, access competition meant that

separate telephone systems divided subscribers into two camps as
they battled to become the dominant system.

A more technical

definition would describe it as a race to offer users demand-side

economies of scope in a market characterized by high levels of
demand interdependence.

There have been several historical

treatments of the competitive period, but the centrality of
noninterconnection to the story has never been adequately

identified and explored.

Yet hardly anything about these

events--frorn the rate policies to the business strategies, from the

effects on telephone development to the rise of regulatory
intervention--can be understood without reference to it.

The

unique thing about the so-called competitive-period was not
competition per 5e, but the presence of a distinctive kind of

rivalry.

The Bell-independent struggle was completely different

from the kind of competition that has characterized the telephone
industry since the 1970s, for the latter has thrived on regulations
requiring nondiscriminatory interconnection of competing carriers.
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Indeed, economic theorists have only recently begun to identify the
unique features of access competition, and many economists would
still define it as an anti-competitive practice.

The U.S.

experience with access competition is of interest

because of its implications for history, economic theory, and

policy.

Perhaps the most significant historical conclusions to be

drawn concern the subject of "universal service.

1I

Universal

telephone service, an important historical achievement in its own

right, is an enduring ideal in communications policy.

The goal of

a universal communications network was enshrined in the 1934
Communications Act and has remained a touchstone of state and

federal policy throughout the turmoil of technological change and
the divestiture.

Yet the historical data assembled here challenges

some deeply engrained assumptions about what it meant and how it

came about.

The period of Bell-independent rivalry can be said to have
invented universal service.
true.

There are two senses in which this is

First, the name itself was coined at this time to express a

particular philosophy about how telephone communications should be
organized.

The U.S.

was forced to directly confront the issue of

universality because of the existence of two or more competing,
noninterconnected telephone systems in the same territory.

Philosophy aside, the events of this period also had the effect of
making a nationwide voice communications system a physical and

economic possibility.

A telephone system that could reach every

city and bring voice communication within the reach of a majority
of the population was merely a speculative fantasy untl1 the
Bell-independent rivalry accelerated development to previously
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unheard-of levels.
Universal service, however, did not mean the same .thing then

that it means now.

From 1907 until the 19208, "universal service ll

meant the interconnection of all localities and telephone users
into a single system.

It did not mean a telephone in every home,

nor was universality in that sense considered to be a matter of

policy significance.

True, the diffusion of the telephone was

hailed as a desirable thing.

Trade journals and the popular press

marvelled at its rapid penetration of farm areas and residences,

and interpreted this as a sign of the inexorable progress of the
industrial age. [1] Where the l880s and early l890s saw the
telephone as a specialized device of limited appeal, no one in the
1900s or 1910s would have disagreed with an assertion that
eventually there would be a telephone in every home.

But this

progress was seen as something that would occur naturally as

industrialism increased wealth, lowered prices and improved

technology.

Universality in this sense posed no special policy

issue, required no government action.
Universal service in its native historical context meant

complete system interconnection--the elimination of both geographic
and competitive barriers between telephone users.

The policy issue

at that time was whether the telephone would develop under the
guise of separate, competitive systems or as an integrated

monopoly.

The U.S.

in the early 1900s was willing to entertain a

radically different vision of the telephone's role in society.

It

was, for a time, willing to accept fragmentation of the subscriber

universe in exchange for the benefits of system competition.

Both

sides in this debate equated competition with noninterconnected
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systems and saw regulated monopoly as the only feasible way to
eliminate fragmentation.

Contrary to the implications of later

historical work, the country was aware of the possibility of
interconnecting competing exchanges, but this option was rejected
for a variety of reasons.

The most historically significant reason

was that interconnection seemed to contemporaries to be
incompatible with true competition.

competition.

Real competition meant access

Interconnecting competing exchanges led to problems

of cream skimming and parasitism, and also entailed such close

integration of the plant, planning and operations of the two
companies that they might as well be merged anyway.

One could also

say that the progressive-era experts had become convinced that
certain utilities should be treated as regulated monopolies, and
the telephone seemed to them to be one of them.

Nevertheless, it

was unification of the service rather than lower unit costs that
served as the rationale for telephone monopoly.

By 1921, universal

interconnection had been adjudged to be more important than
competition in virtually all quarters.

The concepts of monopoly

and universal interconnection had become inseparable.
Once a nationwide, fully interconnected network was
established, universal service took on a new meaning.

As telephone

communication came to be considered one of the basic necessities of
life, universal service began to mean a telephone in every horne.
As this happened, universal service became a great mythical
creature invoked by both AT&T and the telephone regulators to
legitimize themselves.

AT&T's corporate propaganda claimed that it

had invented the idea and generally succeeded in taking credit for

its achievment in the U.S.

In this construction, universal service
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was a product of AT&T's integrated structure, its nationwide scope,

its operating efficiency, and its ability to improve technology.
Later on, state regulators also claimed credit for universal
service.

In their version of history, universal service was a

product of government subsidies.

The telephone, they claimed, was

extended to rural areas because of revenue settlements and Rural

Electrification Administration loans in the 1930s.

Small

independent telephone systems in rural areas were kept afloat
because of cross-subsidies created by the regulatory commissions'

control of rates.

Penetration reached universal levels because

regulation kept basic subscription rates low.

As new competition

began to threaten this system in the 1970s and 80s, state
regulators began to assert that deregulation and universal service

were incompatible goals.

Competition threatened to unravel the

rate subsidies on which the whole system was based.

Increasingly,

universal service was presented as something that had to be
preserved or defended against the onslaught of competition;

it was

a "social goal" that would never arise in an undirected market
economy.

There are elements of truth in both of these constructions of
history.

AT&T's vertical integration and commitment to long

distance development did create the backbone of a nationally
interconnected network.

Basic subscription rates were kept

artificially low and many small rural systems were sustained by the
cross subsidies of the regulated monopoly.

But these partial

truths have been advanced at the expense of a more fundamental fact
about the telephone's history:

the most important factor

contributing to extensive coverage and high penetration in the U.S.
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was twenty years of intense rivalry between telephone systems that
were not connected to each other.

The infrastructure of universal

service was created by access competition, not by AT&T or the
regulators.

Had access competition never existed, the highly

developed, ubiquitous telephone system of the United States never
would have come into being.
The dynamic underlying this rapid development was described in
detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

By denying the two rivals access to

each other's facilities, noninterconnection gave a competitive
advantage to the larger network, and thus set in motion a race for

universality.

As a result, the U.S.

by 1920 attained levels of

telephone coverage and penetration unmatched by other developed
countries until the 1960s or '70s.

The independents occupied the

rural areas and connected them to the cities because it gave them

exclusive control of access to large numbers of telephone users.
This in turn gave them the leverage needed to enter the cities.

Bell was forced to extend its toll and exchange facilities to
smaller towns in order to counteract this access advantage.

To an

almost unbelievable extent, the Bell system occupied small towns
and rural areas not by building its own facilities but by
interconnecting with independent exchanges.

This willingness to

interconnect was a product of access competition, not of regulation

or of AT&T's commitment to universal service, for such
interconnection was a quick and inexpensive way to enlarge its own

access universe while diminishing that of its rivals.
In dual service cities, competition spurred both companies to

price access as low as possible in order to develop'the critical
mass required to attract and maintain high levels of
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subscribership.

Indeed, many of the rate structures that were

later claimed to be a product of regulation were in fact
established in the competitive period as responses to system

rivalry.

During the competitive era, the policies of underpricing

basic residential subscription rates, of subsidizing exchange

access with revenues from toll usage, and of establishing exchanges
in unprofitable locations in order to provide a more universal
service were set in place.

Regulators simply maintained these

practices after competition had ceased;

they did not invent them.

Thanks to access competition, an infrastructure that made

universal service (in the modern sense) attainable was in place by
1925.

There were exchanges in almost every city and near-complete

interconnection of the system.

Subscription levels were high

enough to support social and well as commercial uses.

One third of

the farm houses and one fourth of the city households subscribed to
the telephone system;

public telephones were widely accessible in

bars, drug stores and on streets;

telephone.

virtually all businesses had a

Complete universality in the modern sense (98 percent

household penetration) was still many years down the road, but to
attain this level of penetration at that point in time would have
required massive subsidies beyond the resources of the richest
government.

The effect of regulation was simply to hold the

infrastructure and rate structure established in the competitive
era in place.

As average income levels rose consistently after

World War II, penetration gradually increased to "universal ll

levels.

It is generally conceded that the rise in income levels

after World War II had more to do with the increase of penetration
than subsidization of rates.

The effect of regulation was
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stabilizing, gradual and conservative;

access competition was the

truly creative and revolutionary force in development.
The historical experience with access competition also has
interesting implications for the economic theory regarding
industrial organization.

As Chapter 2 explained, economists and

historians have attempted to explain why the industry was a
monopoly for some time, but the results have been inconsistent and

unsatisfactory.

The older natural monopoly literature attributed

monopoly to supply-side economies of scale.

The new theories of

standardization offered a more convincing approach to the problem
but suggested that a single system came about because of
demand-side economies of scale.

The historical data makes it clear

that the first explanation is dead wrong and the second is
improperly formulated.

The unique industrial organization of the

telephone industry emerged because of demand-side economies of
scope.

As Chapter 3 explained, a telephone system is not one product
but a combination of many different products.

In effect, each

pairwise connection between telephones is a separate product, a
unique output.

Under these conditions, it is fruitless to look for

"economies of scale."

Two telephone systems with different

subscriber sets are not producing "morel! or 1I1e88" of the same

output, they are producing entirely different products.

(Scale

economies are significant only with respect to the efficient

loading of traffic on lines.)

The most important issues revolve

around scope economies, i.e., the efficiency with which many

different products (connections) can be combined into one system.
It is clear that the telephone industry in this period did not
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enjoy significant or decisive supply-side scope economies.

Larger

telephone exchanges were more expensive than smaller ones.[2] When
large telephone systems in the same city consolidated, the result
was generally a modest increase in unit costs to the supplier.

The

increased efficiency of a unified system occured almost entirely on

the demand side.

A telephone user in a dual system had to pay for

two subscriptions to obtain access to all users.

Unification

eliminated the need for duplication, and thus was more efficient

from the subscribers' point of view.

This was true even when the

rate for a single subscription went up as a result of a

consolidation.

As long as the price of access to a single system

did not double, unification tremendously enlarged a single
telephone's communicative scope at a net savings over a duplicate

subscription.
The logic of demand-side economies of scope explains why
competition was tolerated at first but eventually came to be seen

as a problem.

In the early years of dual service, the entry of the

independents resulted in vast increases in the scope of telephone
access.

Despite the division of the subscribers into two camps,

from 1895 to about 1910 the Bell-independent race led to huge gains
in the number of people and locations telephone users could
contact.

Telephone users were suddenly being offered access to

five or ten times as many subscribers and locations for a rate that

was significantly lower than what they had paid the Bell monopoly.
Once the rapid growth in subscribership of the early 1900s ceased,
however, competitive fragmentation became an obstacle to the
achievement of greater demand-side scope economies.

After 1913,

the increased access that could be achieved by adding subscribers
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to one of the two systems was insignificant compared to ,the
increases that would result from consolidation and interconnection

of the competitors.
The analysis of the actual process of unification in Chapters
8 and 9 confirms this analysis.

Had the telephone monopoly been a

product of supply-side cost efficiencies, we would have seen Bell
driving out its rivals by undercutting their rates, and
consolidations would have resulted in significant rate cuts.

In

fact, Bell rates were higher than the independents' in most cases,

and it promoted consolidations in order to be able to increase

rates.

Mo_st importantly, Bell's desire for a monopoly was not the

most important social _force leading to its creation.

Significant

pockets of dual service survived the holocaust of 1907-1913, and
the Kingsbury commitment gave them legal protection.

Some of the

remaining independents strove valiantly and often successfully to
modernize and extend their systems.

Despite these efforts, from

1910 to 1920 there was widespread political agitation by user
groups, city governments, and utility commissions to unify the
system.

The user groups, as one might expect, were led by business

subscribers in the middle range of the communications hierarchy.
These users needed access to all telephone users but objected to
the cost and inconvenience of two subscriptions.

Unification

allowed them to realize very direct and positive scope economies.
While these middle-range business users led the opposition to dual
service, their cause enjoyed widespread support among many other
elements of the public, even though users lower down in the
hierarchy often got higher rates as a result and had a less
pressing need for universal telephone access.

Even in cities where
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there was no political agitation for consolidation, such as

Buffalo, users showed a long term tendency to gravitate toward the
larger of the two systems, making sustained competition impossible.
Bel1's aggressive and often shrewd business policies ensured

that it would emerge as the dominant figure in the emerging
telephone monopoly.

But the issue of why we ended up with a single

telephone system cannot be equated with or reduced to the question
of why AT&T in particular dominated it.

The economic and

communicative forces driving the system toward interconnection were

very strong, and probably would have led to a single system in most
cities regardless of how large or small AT&T's share of the total
system turned out to be.
The emergence of a telephone monopoly must be analyzed from
the standpoint of communications as well as economics.

The ability

of users to realize economies of scope depends on the specific
pattern of communicative interdependence.

As Chapter 3 explained,

the outcome of coordination models is strongly affected by how
concentrated the communications hierarchy is, how large the
population of communicants is, and whether the communication

patterns are fairly self-contained or highly interdependent.

Under

certain conditions separate systems can be as efficient as one

system.

It is interesting that with the advent of regulation

public utility commissions eliminated dual service rivalry in areas
where.it continued to be viable, i.e., in small towns and farm

areas.

The PUGs also formalized the monopoly status of the

telephone by legally closing off the possibility of new entry.
This overreaction reflected the triumph of an ideology rather than
a rational assessment of the situation.

Regulators convinced
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themselves that any duplication and competition was inefficient

almost by definition.
From a policy standpoint, the historical experience with
access competition provides a very useful contrast with the current
competitive revolution in telecommunications.

The approach to

network competition taken after 1894 was almost the opposite of
that prevailing now.

Today, regulators have promoted competition

by enforcing nondiscriminatory interconnection of competing
carriers.

This means that the competitors all have access to the

same subscribers and compete exclusively on the basis of price and

service quality.

Instead of having to completely duplicate the

system of the existing telephone companies, a new rival can build
substitute lines along certain routes and rely on other carriers

for access to all other points.

Unlike the early 1900s, for

example, a competing long distance carrier does not have to own an
exchange or negotiate an exclusive connecting contract to be able

to terminate calls in a city.

It can connect its lines to the

local exchange regardless of who owns it, on the same terms offered
to all other long distance carriers.

This approach appears to

reconcile the chief policy dilemma of the earlier competitive
period:

it permits competition without fragmentation or, what is

another way of saying the same thing, it provides universal service

without monopoly.
The successes of the new interconnection policy are readily

apparent:

by easing the entry of new telecommunications suppliers

it has encouraged the proliferation of many new services, including

a host of new microwave- and fiber-based long distance carriers.
The price of long distance service has plummeted.

A business
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telecommunications user can now assemble the private line and

switched services of a multitude of local and long distance
carriers to create a network for virtually any purpose and of any
scope.

The problems created by the new interconnection policies are
more subtle.

The most significant issue is that nondiscriminatory

interconnection seems to prevent competitive pressures from ever
reaching the basic exchange access line.

Indeed, the price of

basic subscription service has increased after the divestiture.

The benefits of competition are confined to the top of the
communications hierarchy.

By fostering disaggregation of the

telephone system, the policy enables new entrants to serve only the
most profitable segments of the network while relying on the
facilities of the established utility to serve smaller users and
thinner routes.

Unlike the early 1900s, there is no competition

for the bottom of the hierarchy, nor is it likely that there ever
will be as long as new entrants can rely on interconnection rather

than new construction to reach the bulk of the population.
The new interconnection policies create a network that is

universally connected, but some of the linkages are served by

mUltiple competitors while many are still monopolistic.

This

mixture of competition and monopoly is inherently unstable and
makes setting prices, assigning costs, and regulating the dominant
local exchange carrier an extraordinarily complex matter.

Although

one of the objects of the new policy was to create a deregulated
market for telecommunications services, 'the promotion of open
interconnection has increased regulation in many areaS.

For

example, the equal access obligations of local exchange carriers
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has led to detailed government oversight and control of the
technical terms of, and the rates charged for, interconnection.

The demand for equal access has also led to the imposition of
drastic line of business restrictions on the divested Bell
operating companies.

In order to prevent them from using their

exclusive control of access to local subscribers to the detriment
of other companies, they are kept out of the long distance market,

information services and equipment manufacturing.

From a technical

and economic point of view, these prohibitions are completely

arbitrary.

Yet they seem necessary to prevent the exercise of the

kind of "bottleneck" market power that was accepted as the norm
during the early competitive period.
Whatever the merits of the current approach to
interconnection, the fact remains that it was accepted largely by
default, with very little analysis of the problems it posed and the
long term consequences it might have.

The example of access

competition offers an alternative approach to interconnection

policy and an alternative model of a competitive telecommunications
system.

Like the current policy, it has its weaknesses, but an

awareness of its possibility can only sharpen the policy dialogue.
Regulators grappling with the entry of new long distance carriers
in the late 1970s and early 1980s could have learned a lot about
what kind of issues they would have to face and what the effects of
their policies might be had they examined the debates over
compulsory interconnection legislation in the early 1900s.
The experience with access competition contradicts many of the
assumptions about the economic effects of interconnection

underyling current policy.

The growth of the independents from
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1895 to 1902, for example, makes it clear that the refusal of an
established network to connect with its competitor does not
necessarily make survival of the competitor impossible, even when

the established network has a 20 year head start and dwarfs the
newcomer in size.

Bell's use of sublicensing shows that a larger

competitor may interconnect with smaller networks without legal
coercion if it fears that failure to bring them into its system
will isolate it from signficant markets and/or provide the nucleus
of a larger competitive system.

In other words, smaller

competitive networks do have appreciable bargaining power in their

relations with larger networks when the established network is
unable to develop the market fully.

The case of sublicensing also

indicates that interconnection can be a powerful method of

pre-empting rather than promoting competition.

Networks have a

strong incentive to enter the same territories and compete when
they are not interconnected, because the absence of a connection

forces them to build duplicative facilities to gain access.

When

they are connected, they tend to cooperate and divide territories

and markets.
Competition between separate systems avoids many of the
problems inherent in the present scheme of regulation.

Under a

dual service regime, there would be no need for government
supervision of network interfaces or access charges, and no need
for arbitrary line of business restrictions.

Where

nondiscriminatory interconnection appears to discourage the

development of a universal infrastructure by allowing competitors
to cream skim, access competition rewards competitors who make
their system universal in scope.

It would also create its own set
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of problems.

Users might be more fragmented than they would like;

competition may prove to be transitory if

OTIe

of the contestants

attained a significant advantage over the other.

System

competition seems to be most appropriate in the developmental stage
of a network, when it is necessary to assemble critical mass and to

develop the basic infrastructure needed to cover a territory.

Its

example may be most useful to developing coUntries, where the
telecommunications facilities are as limited and as biased toward

urban centers as the Bell system was in 1894.
The transition from dual service to universal service is more
than a matter of business, economics and regulation.

At some point

between 1913 and 1918, a preponderance of telephone users came to
the conclusion that a divided subscriber universe was intolerable.
After being accepted and encouraged for 15 years, dual service was

described as an "annoyance,

If

a "burden,

II

a "calamity. II

Competition, which had once stimulated and expanded communications
access, came to be seen as an arbitrary barrier.

Above all else,

telephone monopoly was chosen as an institutional structure in
order to bring about universal interconnection.

It represents the

homogenization of real-time communications access on a national

scale.

This was part of a broader social transformation in which a

decentralized, predominantly agricultural country became an
integrated, urban, industrial nation.

Historians have grappled with the Progressive era for many
years, using a variety of labels to express what all sense was a

revolutionary change. [3] Here is a very concrete manifestation of
the nature of that change:

voice telecommunication, which had been

supplied by local, fragmented, overlapping and competing systems,
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became the basis of a vertically and horizontally integrated,
nationwide monopoly, regulated by public authorities and capable of
connecting users almost anywhere in the country.

The probabilistic

model in Chapter 3 demonstrated that a population with a higher
degree of interdependence is more likely to converge on a single
network or standard than a population with very specific,
concentrated communication patterns.

Telephone communications

increased the interdependence of the population.

By extending

voice communication it helped to create a social structure based on
increasingly impersonal, far-flung relations of communication.

As

this occured, Theodore Vail's admonitions about the need for
universal service began to ring true:

"the telephone network must

be a system that will afford communication with anyone that may
possibly be wanted, at any time."[4] It became necessary to have
access to people, places and institutions one did not know in

advance and could never predict one would need.
The origins of a universal monopoly becomes even more

interesting as the era of a single telephone system recedes into
the past.

In 1918, the demand was for integration and

homogenization.
direction.

Today, the pendulum swings in the opposite

The scope of telecommunications services has become so

large, the technology of accounting for, recording, and
discriminating between user groups so refined, the population so

heterogenous that the growth of specialized networks serving
separate segments of the people seems inevitable.

In the age of

computerized data bases, even umassu media like weekly news
magazines can tailor their advertisements or articles to the

specific demographics or geographic location of the receiver.
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Increasingly, communications media respond to and reflect the
differences in the population.

If magazines, television and radio

stations, computer bulletin boards, and information services are

all broken down on the basis of population differences why not
voice communication?

Do we still need a universal

telecommunications network?
absence?

What would be the consequences of its

For seventy years, universal telephone service seemed to

be the divinely ordained way of doing things.

Dual service was

both historically invisible and unthinkable as a policy option.
The tables are turning, but our ability to understand the social
consequences of the change is still imperfect.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
[1] Commenting on the growth of residential subscribership in
New York city, a trade journal wrote: " ... it will not be long
before no moderately well appointed residence will be considered
completely equipped if it is not connected to the telephone
system." Electrical Review 31:15 (October 13, 1897) p. 180. For
similar expressions, see liThe farmer and the telephone," Electrical

Review 31:11 (September 15, 1897) p. 126, and "Making [social]
calls by telephone," Electrical Review 30:13 (March 31, 1897) p.
146.
[2] Chapter 4, p. 81-84. See also the American Bell cost
study cited in Chapter 4, note [15].
[3] For a comprehensive, synthetic statement of this view see
Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920. (New York: Hill
and Wang) 1967.
[4] 1909 AT&T Annual Report, p.23.
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